Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale

International Review of Law and Economics, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown, С. 106264 - 106264

Опубликована: Март 1, 2025

Язык: Английский

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Coordinated vs Efficient Prices: The Impact of Algorithmic Pricing on Multifamily Rental Markets

SSRN Electronic Journal, Год журнала: 2023, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2023

Algorithmic pricing can improve efficiency by helping firms set prices that are more responsive to changing market conditions. However, widespread adoption of the same algorithm could also lead price coordination, resulting in elevated prices. In this paper, we examine impact algorithmic on U.S. multifamily rental housing using hand-collected decisions property management companies merged with data market-rate apartments from 2005 2019. Our findings suggest helps building managers prices: buildings software increase during booms but lower busts, compared non-adopters market. find evidence greater penetration higher prices, raising rents among both adopters and Such empirical patterns consistent either coordination through or errors before adoption.

Язык: Английский

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Deviations from the Nash Equilibrium in a Two-Player Optimal Execution Game with Reinforcement Learning

Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2025

Язык: Английский

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Can Government Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms Effectively Mitigate Tacit Collusion in Platform Algorithmic Operations?

Systems, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 13(4), С. 293 - 293

Опубликована: Апрель 16, 2025

Algorithmic collusion essentially constitutes a form of monopolistic agreement that utilizes algorithms as tools for signaling collusion, making it particularly challenging both consumers and antitrust enforcement agencies to detect. can be primarily categorized into two distinct types: explicit tacit collusion. This paper specifically investigates the phenomenon platform-driven algorithmic within platform economy. Employing an evolutionary game theory approach, we conduct comprehensive simulation analysis economic system involving four key stakeholders: government regulators, operators, in-platform merchants, consumers. conditions may reduce likelihood platforms engaging in examines how incentive–penalty mechanisms influence such collusive behaviors, provides in-depth critical roles played by merchants detecting exposing these practices.

Язык: Английский

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Weak Acyclicity in Games With Unique Best-responses and Implications for Algorithmic Collusion

SSRN Electronic Journal, Год журнала: 2023, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2023

We provide conditions for the weak acyclicity of symmetric games in which best-response function is unique. In this case, individual graphs (a concept we introduce article) belong to class functional relations. Using structural properties graphs, are able on game being weakly acyclic. addition, characterize sizes basins attraction strategy adjustment process. This process turn limiting Decentralized Q-learning infinite batch size limit. Finally, by applying our results simplest pricing environment exhibiting collusion, find that algorithm provably convergent and exhibits only an insignificant level collusion.

Язык: Английский

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Does an Intermediate Price Facilitate Algorithmic Collusion?

SSRN Electronic Journal, Год журнала: 2023, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2023

We analyze the probability of observing collusion by Decentralized Q-learning in a pricing duopoly with three possible prices and memory one period. Using logit demand model for payoffs, leads to payoff structure that is three-action generalization iterated prisoner's dilemma. investigate whether addition an intermediate action between "defection" "cooperation" increases likelihood cooperation/collusion. The algorithm provably convergent this environment, basins attraction its equilibria can be calculated explicitly. find even though additional number collusive equilibria, does not increase.

Язык: Английский

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Deciphering Algorithmic Collusion: Insights from Bandit Algorithms and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement

Journal of Economy and Technology, Год журнала: 2024, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Окт. 1, 2024

Язык: Английский

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