Philosophy & Technology,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
37(3)
Опубликована: Июль 2, 2024
Abstract
In
this
reply,
I
respond
to
Joshua
C.
Gellers’
commentary
on
my
article
“Not
Relational
Enough?
Towards
an
Eco-Relational
Approach
in
Robot
Ethics”
(Puzio,
2024a),
which
present
a
deeply
relational,
“eco-relational
approach”.
This
approach
asserts
that
it
is
necessary
consider
the
relationality
with
non-human
entities
such
as
animals
and
technology
deeper
level
than
has
been
done
robot
ethics
so
far.
disrupts
traditional
ethical
concepts.
his
Ecological
Enough:
A
Commentary
(2024),
Gellers
raises
criticisms
of
method
consequences
eco-relational
approach.
address
these
focus
especially
ecological
responsibility
Abstract
Technological
advancements
raise
anthropological
questions:
How
do
humans
differ
from
technology?
Which
human
capabilities
are
unique?
Is
it
possible
for
robots
to
exhibit
consciousness
or
intelligence,
capacities
once
taken
be
exclusively
human?
Despite
the
evident
need
an
lens
in
both
societal
and
research
contexts,
philosophical
anthropology
of
technology
has
not
been
established
as
a
set
discipline
with
defined
theories,
especially
concerning
emerging
technologies.
In
this
paper,
I
will
utilize
New
Materialist
approach,
focusing
particularly
on
theories
Donna
Haraway
Karen
Barad,
explore
their
potential
technology.
aim
develop
techno-anthropological
approach
that
is
informed
enriched
by
Materialism.
This
characterized
its
relational
perspective,
dynamic
open
conception
being,
attention
diversity
dynamics
power
knowledge
production
ontology,
emphasis
non-human.
outline
centered
Materialism,
wherein
focus,
paradoxically,
but
equally
non-human
entities
entanglement
As
become
clear,
way
we
understand
relationship
fundamental
our
concepts
ethics
Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Апрель 15, 2024
There
is
a
widely
debated
issue
regarding
the
status
and
impact
of
exponentially
growing
artificial
intelligence.
The
article
deals
with
problem
moral
agency
animals,
author
addresses
several
criteria
for
agents
tries
to
find
answer
question
whether
we
can
treat
animals
AI
as
agents.
uses
mostly
method
philosophical
analysis
comparative
method.
claims
that
not
necessary
condition
doubts
practicality
attributing
full
AI.
Moreover,
comes
in
degrees
different
kinds
therefore
have
consider
complex
nature
when
dealing
actions.
For
instance,
even
human
are
all
on
same
level
development
suggested
just
by
empirical
evidence
but
also
virtue
ethics.
Philosophy & Technology,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
37(3)
Опубликована: Июль 2, 2024
Abstract
In
this
reply,
I
respond
to
Joshua
C.
Gellers’
commentary
on
my
article
“Not
Relational
Enough?
Towards
an
Eco-Relational
Approach
in
Robot
Ethics”
(Puzio,
2024a),
which
present
a
deeply
relational,
“eco-relational
approach”.
This
approach
asserts
that
it
is
necessary
consider
the
relationality
with
non-human
entities
such
as
animals
and
technology
deeper
level
than
has
been
done
robot
ethics
so
far.
disrupts
traditional
ethical
concepts.
his
Ecological
Enough:
A
Commentary
(2024),
Gellers
raises
criticisms
of
method
consequences
eco-relational
approach.
address
these
focus
especially
ecological
responsibility
