Scientific Reports,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
13(1)
Опубликована: Окт. 23, 2023
In
order
to
investigate
the
strategy
choice
of
each
player
in
capacity
sharing,
article
constructs
a
tripartite
game
model
based
on
provider-capacity
demander-government,
introduces
prospect
theory
and
conducts
numerical
simulation
analysis
using
MATLAB.
The
results
show
that
sharing
manufacturing
industry
is
related
three
parties:
providers,
demanders
government,
their
strategies
process
influence
other;
sensitivity
providers
higher
than
government;
increase
risk-return
coefficient
loss-avoidance
conducive
evolution
subjects
ideal
state.
Journal of Cleaner Production,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
434, С. 139988 - 139988
Опубликована: Дек. 1, 2023
Leveraging
on
the
theoretical
integration
of
stimulus-organism-response
(S-O-R)
theory,
stakeholder
and
self-consistency
an
investigation
is
undertaken
to
explore
effectiveness
environmental
corporate
social
responsibility
(ECSR)
in
shaping
green
buying
intentions
using
world's
largest
economy
new
energy
vehicles
(NEVs),
China,
as
a
case.
An
analysis
data
from
306
NEV
owners
four
Chinese
cities
demonstrated
that
ECSR
directly
indirectly,
via
trust
brand
image,
shapes
purchasing
positively.
However,
self-concept
consistency
was
found
weaken
connections
ECSR,
trust,
image.
From
perspective,
this
exploration
enhances
our
understanding
environmentally-driven
micro-CSR
(individual-level
CSR)
by
shedding
light
factors
influencing
consumers'
engage
consumption
(new
energy)
high
involvement
products
(vehicles).
Noteworthily,
examination
uncovers
social-psychological
mechanisms
drive
these
underscores
significance
maintaining
self-concept,
particularly
within
collectivist
societies.
practical
standpoint,
research
offers
valuable
guidance
for
marketing
approaches,
sector,
thereby
contributing
SDG7
clean
SDG12
responsible
production.
Heliyon,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
10(3), С. e25667 - e25667
Опубликована: Фев. 1, 2024
With
economic
and
social
development,
the
transport
sector
is
growing
rapidly,
leading
to
a
surge
in
energy
consumption
environmental
degradation.
New
Energy
Vehicles
(NEVs)
are
regarded
as
an
important
tool
alleviate
issues,
but
market
share
of
NEVs
China
low,
how
increase
urgent
issue.
This
study
constructs
evolutionary
game
model
between
local
governments
automakers
explore
stable
strategy
(ESS)
both
under
different
combinations
subsidy
carbon
tax,
aiming
find
rational
policies
promote
development
NEVs.
Considering
possible
delay
effect
process,
time-delayed
differential
equation
established
analyze
effects
random
time
on
stability
system.
Finally,
numerical
simulation
carried
out
obtain
following
conclusions:
constant
tax
policy
not
conducive
proliferation
NEVs,
variable
effective
short
term,
long
term;
strengthening
entry
can
help
develop
industry;
initial
value
will
affect
evolution
system
policy;
excessive
cause
lose
its
original
stability.
Sustainability,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
16(10), С. 4216 - 4216
Опубликована: Май 17, 2024
With
the
increasingly
serious
problem
of
global
climate
change,
many
countries
are
positively
promoting
carbon-emission-reduction
actions.
In
order
to
deeply
explore
interaction
between
enterprises’
carbon-emission
reduction
and
governments’
regulation,
this
paper
builds
evolutionary
game
models
governments
enterprises
under
reward-and-punishment
mechanism.
The
peer-incentive
mechanism
is
introduced
incentivize
reduce
carbon
emissions
coordinate
enterprises.
evolutionary-stability
strategies
obtained
by
solving
models.
stability
equilibrium
points
different
situations
theoretically
numerically
studied.
results
show
that
existence
peer
incentives
makes
more
inclined
regulate.
A
sufficiently
large
fund
can
always
encourage
choose
positive
carbon-reduction
emission
strategies,
while
regulation
strategies.
Not
only
increasing
rewards
fines
but
also
lowering
regulatory
costs
will
promote
behaviors
Peer
effective
in
compared
with
punishments.
This
study
provide
important
guidance
for
formulate
emission-reduction
Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 16, 2025
Purpose
The
managerial
questions
of
this
paper
are
as
follows:
What
the
equilibrium
conditions
transfer
price,
quantity
and
profits
when
considering
dynamic
subsidies
from
government?
Which
collection
channel
is
better
for
a
manufacturer,
direct
by
itself
or
through
an
online
platform?
Design/methodology/approach
This
research
investigates
three
models:
manufacturer-driven
model,
platform-driven
model
competitive
model.
Based
on
differential
game,
explores
cost,
subsidy
manufacturer
platform
profit
in
different
models
subsidy.
Findings
results
show
that
strategy
depends
its
cost.
If
cost
lower,
then
may
prefer
to
collect
itself.
When
meets
certain
range,
used
product
platform.
most
efficient
because
both
can
make
higher
profit.
Originality/value
bridges
gap
between
waste
electrical
electronic
equipment
government
demonstrating
condition
subsidies.
It
offers
approach
address
influence
subsidy,
which
provide
practical
insights
implementing
policy.
