The role of behavioral decision-making in panic buying events during COVID-19: From the perspective of an evolutionary game based on prospect theory
Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
82, С. 104067 - 104067
Опубликована: Сен. 14, 2024
Язык: Английский
Government constraints: influences on irregularities in the energy sector
Management Decision,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2025
Purpose
To
address
the
various
irregularities
that
occurred
during
development
of
China’s
electricity
market,
particularly
issue
collusive
pricing
between
upstream
and
downstream
firms.
Design/methodology/approach
This
study
constructs
a
tripartite
evolutionary
game
model
involving
government
regulators,
grid
operators
power
producers
to
market
chaos.
By
analyzing
stable
strategies
within
each
subject’s
game,
adjustments
relevant
parameters
are
made
achieve
state
strategy
selection.
Findings
The
findings
this
indicate
following:
(1)
Enhancing
government’s
rewards
punishments,
increasing
speculation
rent-seeking
costs
for
modifying
tariff
sales
revenue
can
promote
integrity
operators.
(2)
Establishing
reasonable
incentives
penalties
effectively
mitigate
behaviors
resulting
from
in
industry.
(3)
Strengthening
accountability
higher
authorities
regulators
adjusting
comply
generators
refrain
behavior
increase
likelihood
rigorous
inspections
by
regulators.
Originality/value
elucidates
impact
factors
such
as
cost
operators,
strength
punishments
departments
on
sector.
Adjusting
these
significantly
influence
stability
three-party
providing
valuable
insights
into
regulatory
mechanisms
Язык: Английский
Rent-seeking behavior of ship sulfur emission detection based on evolutionary game theory
Regional Studies in Marine Science,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 104060 - 104060
Опубликована: Фев. 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Leveraging Evolutionary Game Theory for Cleaner Production: Strategic Insights for Sustainable Energy Markets, Electric Vehicles, and Carbon Trading
Journal of Cleaner Production,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 145682 - 145682
Опубликована: Май 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Sustaining success: the power of relational bonding in building franchisee trust in South Korea’s food service industry
Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Май 17, 2024
Purpose
Relationship
marketing
has
emerged
as
pivotal,
aiming
to
bolster
collaboration
and
reduce
uncertainty
for
both
franchisors
franchisees.
However,
understanding
the
nuanced
impact
of
relational
bonding
strategies
–
financial,
social,
structural
on
franchisee
outcomes,
particularly
in
South
Korea’s
food
service
industry,
remains
lacking.
This
study
is
an
in-depth
exploration
franchisors’
structural,
economic
critical
outcomes
industry.
Design/methodology/approach
By
leveraging
data
from
496
franchisees
Korea,
our
investigation
meticulously
delineates
unique
contributions
these
enhancing
franchisee’s
social
satisfaction,
building
trust
fostering
long-term
orientation
among
unravels
complex
mediating
roles
that
satisfaction
play
dynamic
interplay
between
efforts
cultivation
enduring
relationships.
Findings
The
reveals
while
all
factors
directly
influence
satisfaction.
Structural
franchisor,
but
does
not.
Economic
affect
trust,
only
influences
orientation.
Finally,
franchisor
positively
affects
Originality/value
We
offer
fresh
insights
into
strategic
management
franchisor–franchisee
relationships,
enrich
literature
relationship
by
highlighting
differential
impacts
significance
distinct
promoting
sustainable
franchise
partnerships.
Язык: Английский
How to address enterprise collusion in falsifying carbon emission data: A game theory analysis
Managerial and Decision Economics,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Сен. 6, 2024
Abstract
Falsification
of
carbon
emissions
data
poses
a
significant
challenge
to
the
integrity
trading
market.
Addressing
this
issue
requires
comprehensive
strategy
involving
various
stakeholders.
This
paper
focuses
on
collusive
behavior
in
falsification.
An
evolutionary
game
model
is
established
illustrate
interactions
between
local
governments,
carbon‐emitting
enterprises,
and
third‐party
verification
agencies.
The
stability
its
conditions
are
analyzed,
revealing
impact
regulatory
penalties,
credit
losses,
awareness
responsibility.
study
proposes
management
framework
tailored
for
tripartite
game,
providing
valuable
insights
policy
formulation.
Язык: Английский