Buildings, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 15(6), С. 890 - 890

Опубликована: Март 12, 2025

Herein, an evolutionary game model involving the government and practitioners during registration phase was constructed based on bounded rationality assumption of prospect theory. The stability equilibrium points explored under scenarios ineffective, effective, highly effective regulation, respectively. construction industry is a vital pillar national economy, credit regulation in engineering sector essential component social system. This forges foundation for maintaining well-ordered market. In order to illustrate dynamic decision-making process working professionals fields, numerical experiments were hereby conducted examine important factors influencing stable outcomes, comparative performed by adjusting discount factor parameter settings. research findings include following: (1) trends are consistently influenced risk preferences subjects; (2) inspection intensity exerts stronger short-term impact low-credit groups, yet unilaterally increasing has limited policy effectiveness; (3) restructuring technological advancements significantly influence behavior high-credit groups but have groups. Additionally, this paper suggests specific regulatory strategies from three perspectives: role associations, design disciplinary mechanisms, adjustment long-term costs. These grounded experimental results adapted distinct characteristics high-

Язык: Английский