
Journal of Environmental Management, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 380, С. 124941 - 124941
Опубликована: Март 25, 2025
Язык: Английский
Journal of Environmental Management, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 380, С. 124941 - 124941
Опубликована: Март 25, 2025
Язык: Английский
Journal of environmental chemical engineering, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown, С. 116174 - 116174
Опубликована: Март 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
1Journal of Environmental Management, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 380, С. 125025 - 125025
Опубликована: Март 20, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0World Electric Vehicle Journal, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 16(3), С. 187 - 187
Опубликована: Март 20, 2025
Under the low carbon goal, recycling power batteries (PBs) from new energy vehicles (NEVs) is a crucial measure to address resource shortages and reduce emissions. This study examined insufficient collaboration among responsible entities imperfections in market mechanisms within PB system. We overcome limitations of traditional tripartite evolutionary game models by developing four-party model that incorporates government, manufacturers, recyclers, consumers investigate strategic interactions extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework. Using MATLAB 2023a numerical simulations Lyapunov stability analysis, we found system’s efficiency depend on stakeholder effective government policy guidance. The system evolves toward Pareto optimal state when all parties adopt proactive strategies. Meanwhile, ensuring substantial profits for manufacturers recyclers critical feasibility stable operation compliant channels. While are more sensitive subsidies than consumers, consumer decision-making key stability. Long-term excessive may lead diminishing marginal benefits. Strategic recommendations provided policymakers stakeholders enhance sustainability
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Journal of Environmental Management, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 380, С. 124941 - 124941
Опубликована: Март 25, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0