Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown
Опубликована: Май 21, 2025
Язык: Английский
Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown
Опубликована: Май 21, 2025
Язык: Английский
Journal of Environmental Management, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 383, С. 125293 - 125293
Опубликована: Апрель 23, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
2Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 85, С. 101644 - 101644
Опубликована: Янв. 6, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 86, С. 101697 - 101697
Опубликована: Март 17, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Computers & Industrial Engineering, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown, С. 111119 - 111119
Опубликована: Апрель 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Sustainability, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 17(9), С. 3928 - 3928
Опубликована: Апрель 27, 2025
With the booming development of new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, issue power battery recycling has increasingly attracted attention. Standardized batteries can reduce environmental pollution and promote sustainable resource utilization. This paper employs evolutionary game theory to construct two models deposit systems for batteries: one under market mechanisms other with government participation. The stable strategies among manufacturers, consumers, are examined, equilibrium points analyzed. Finally, Matlab is used conduct a simulation analysis system results indicate that difficult constrain consumer behavior, while participation conducive promoting achievement long-term protection goals. These findings provide valuable insights policymakers in designing deposit–refund contribute advancing NEV industry.
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Sustainability, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 17(10), С. 4356 - 4356
Опубликована: Май 12, 2025
This paper focuses on the carbon emission problem of new energy vehicle (NEV) battery recycling, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model manufactures, original equipment manufacturers (NEV OEMs) and certified recyclers, analyzes stability each party’s strategy selection relationship between influence elements, simulates to verify validity conclusions, arrives at conditions for occurrence lowest stabilizing combinations, puts forward countermeasure suggestions accordingly, effects changes key parameters equilibrium results, study shows that (1) Carbon cost, decomposition recycling channel construction cost R&D are main factors affecting results. (2) Under reduction policy, manufacturer’s investment in low-carbon production can help other actors supply chain reduce negative impact policy so they their costs. (3) The cooperative based network constructed by maximize interests all parties chain. findings provide management insights governments, manufacturers, NEV OEMs, recyclers.
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 219, С. 115797 - 115797
Опубликована: Май 14, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown
Опубликована: Май 21, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0