Optimizing pricing for sustainable government-subsidized omnichannel closed-loop supply chains
Transportation Research Part E Logistics and Transportation Review,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
194, С. 103932 - 103932
Опубликована: Дек. 21, 2024
Язык: Английский
How government intervention and supply chain competition and cooperation affect power battery recycling from a game theory perspective?
International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
20, С. 1121 - 1135
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2025
Abstract
In
this
paper,
I
delve
into
two
supply
chains,
each
composed
of
one
battery
supplier
and
new
energy
vehicle
manufacturer.
Considering
government
intervention,
competition,
cooperation,
analyze
six
scenarios.
It
is
found
that
vertical/horizontal
cooperation
benefits
the
power
battery-recycling
rate,
while
deposit-subsidy
policy
has
limited
impact,
so
should
raise
subsidy.
When
some
firms
cooperate
others
do
not,
it
cooperators
harms
non-cooperators.
Scenario
C
maximizes
chain’s
overall
profit,
yet
Scenarios
CC
or
TC
are
not
always
best
for
firm
profitability.
Notably,
social
welfare
peaks
in
TC.
Язык: Английский
How Does the Government Policy Mix Influence the Used Battery Recycling in a New Energy Vehicle Closed-Loop Supply Chain?
Sustainability,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
17(8), С. 3324 - 3324
Опубликована: Апрель 8, 2025
The
sales
of
New
Energy
Vehicles
(NEVs)
have
experienced
substantial
growth,
resulting
in
a
significant
increase
the
number
used
NEV
batteries.
Improper
disposal
these
batteries
can
lead
to
pollution
and
resource
wastage.
In
line
with
Extended
Producer
Responsibility
(EPR)
principles,
this
research
designs
three-level
hybrid
recycling
closed-loop
supply
chain
(CLSC)
consisting
manufacturer,
retailer,
third-party
recycler.
Furthermore,
Stackelberg
game
theory
is
applied
develop
distinct
models
for
analyzing
interactions
among
participants.
To
interaction
multiple
policies
on
system,
it
explores
optimal
pricing
CLSC’s
performance
under
policy
mix.
addition,
coordination
mechanism
devised
validated
solve
decline
members’
individual
profits
caused
by
findings
indicate
that
battery
tax
may
reduce
total
profits,
subsidy
could
result
enterprise
dependency,
but
mix
both
price
amount.
This
demonstrates
overcome
limitations
single
policy,
implement
long-term
dynamically
adjustable
incentive
provide
crucial
reference
government’s
role
as
“visible
hand”
recycling.
Язык: Английский
Blockchain-Enabled Closed-Loop Supply Chain Optimization for Power Battery Recycling and Cascading Utilization
Sustainability,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
17(9), С. 4192 - 4192
Опубликована: Май 6, 2025
This
article
investigates
decision-making
strategies
for
power
battery
recycling
and
cascading
utilization
within
the
context
of
rapidly
advancing
blockchain
technology,
aiming
to
enhance
sustainability
efficiency
energy
storage
systems.
A
closed-loop
supply
chain
model
is
proposed,
integrating
key
stakeholders
such
as
manufacturers,
OEM
(original
equipment
manufacturer)
vehicle
third-party
recyclers,
tiered
users,
consumers.
The
study
focuses
on
critical
factors
including
competition
among
channels,
level
blockchain-enabled
traceability,
rate
retired
batteries.
By
analyzing
four
hybrid
modes,
research
identifies
optimal
evaluates
their
economic
environmental
impacts.
findings
provide
a
theoretical
foundation
practical
insights
improving
recycling,
contributing
development
cleaner
more
efficient
Язык: Английский
Comparisons of government policies for electric automobile battery recycling using system dynamics
Waste Management,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
203, С. 114892 - 114892
Опубликована: Май 19, 2025
Язык: Английский
Decision-Making in Remanufacturing Supply Chains: Game Theory Analysis of Recycling Models and Consumer Value Perception
Sustainability,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
16(23), С. 10476 - 10476
Опубликована: Ноя. 29, 2024
In
view
of
the
uncertainty
regarding
consumers’
perceived
value
remanufactured
products,
a
remanufacturing
supply
chain
system
with
manufacturer
as
Stackelberg
leader
is
constructed,
in
which
faces
three
modes,
namely
recycling
mode
(M),
retailer
(R),
and
entrusted
third-party
(3P).
The
analyzed
using
game
theory
approach
these
modes.
Using
to
analyze
optimal
pricing
profits
each
participant,
we
also
discuss
impact
on
party
under
different
then
explore
selection
channels
chain.
results
show
that
when
at
medium
or
low
level,
retailers
are
responsible
for
used
products
producing
brings
higher
system;
high,
demand
market
decreases,
revenue
lower.
Finally,
validity
theoretical
model
verified
by
numerical
simulation.
Язык: Английский