External Validity and Evidence Accumulation
Опубликована: Ноя. 29, 2024
The
accumulation
of
empirical
evidence
that
has
been
collected
in
multiple
contexts,
places,
and
times
requires
a
more
comprehensive
understanding
research
than
is
typically
required
for
interpreting
the
findings
from
individual
studies.
We
advance
novel
conceptual
framework
where
causal
mechanisms
are
central
to
characterizing
social
phenomena
transcend
context,
place,
or
time.
distinguish
various
concepts
external
validity,
all
which
characterize
relationship
between
effects
produced
by
different
settings.
Approaches
require
careful
consideration
cross-study
features,
including
theoretical
considerations
link
constituent
studies
measurement
about
how
quantifed.
Our
main
contribution
developing
uniting
principles
constitute
qualitative
quantitative
assumptions
form
basis
then
apply
our
three
approaches
studying
general
phenomena:
meta-analysis,
replication,
extrapolation.
Язык: Английский
Managing Government Hierarchy: Electoral Turnover and Intra-Governmental Cooperation
Опубликована: Май 13, 2023
Theories
of
political
accountability
often
consider
voter-politician
interactions
in
isolation
from
politician-bureaucrat
interactions.
We
study
a
model
electoral
with
governing
hierarchy:
voter-politician-bureaucrat.
The
politician
and
bureaucrat
both
produce
government
output
valued
by
the
voter.
voter
controls
via
election
provides
incentives
to
bureaucrats.
show
that
when
times
are
conducive
high
quality
governance---budgets
large
players
farsighted---incorporating
relationship
leads
weaker
standards.
However,
tough
budgets
small
or
myopic
voters
may
benefit
adopting
more
demanding
Язык: Английский
How the content of digital complaints shapes bureaucratic responsiveness in Mumbai
Governance,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Июль 23, 2024
Abstract
When
do
unelected
officials
respond
to
citizen
complaints,
and
what
are
the
implications
for
service
delivery?
In
formal
complaint
system
Mumbai's
water
sector,
bureaucrats
addressed
44%
of
roughly
20,000
complaints
lodged
from
2016
2018.
line
with
literature
on
distributive
politics,
responsiveness
marginalized
citizens
is
lower.
Yet
in
interviews,
emphasize
that
programmatic
goals
capacity
constraints
lead
prioritization
by
about.
fact,
once
controlling
content,
relationship
between
complainant
identity
disappears.
Initial
patterns
differential
arise
fact
groups
experience
lower
levels
provision,
which
leads
them
make
more
difficult
address.
The
paper
sheds
light
role
bureaucracy
e‐governance
delivery,
showing
administrative
priorities
responding
may
perpetuate
inequalities
provision.
Язык: Английский
Innovative but feeble: Civil society and political financing accountability in Uruguay
Journal of Civil Society,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown, С. 1 - 21
Опубликована: Окт. 15, 2024
This
article
examines
the
impact
of
civic
action
on
enhancing
accountability
and
combating
corruption
in
political
financing,
focusing
two
civil
society
initiatives
Uruguay.
The
aimed
to
digitize
map
information
funding
received
by
parties
politicians
2009
2014
elections,
presenting
their
findings
through
interactive
online
platforms.
paper
engages
theoretically
with
literature
dimensions
contributes
understanding
challenges
faced
organizations
promoting
financing
even
full
democracies,
a
topic
largely
understudied.
Findings
highlight
concerns
beyond
electoral
authorities'
well-known
resource
constraints
detecting
illicit
donations
spending
shows
that
transparency
is
not
enough
reduce
corruption.
We
argue
for
finance
be
effective,
it
must
encompass
bottom-up,
horizontal,
diagonal
dimensions.
analysis
suggests
need
complementary
measures,
such
as
digital
solutions
reporting
disclosing
information,
along
active
horizontal
bottom-up
oversight
mechanisms.
draws
qualitative
based
documentary
research
19
interviews
activists,
academics,
journalists,
developers
initiatives,
public
officials
involved
regulation.
Язык: Английский
Hierarchical Control
Опубликована: Март 30, 2020
Theories
of
political
accountability
typically
focus
on
voter-politician
relationships.
However,
overall
government
performance
depends
both
elected
politicians
and
unelected
bureaucrats.
Politicians
are
agents
voters
while
serving
as
principals
to
We
develop
a
model
electoral
in
governance
hierarchies,
treating
it
chain
relational
contracts.
The
problem
optimizing
control
reduces
classic
static
consumer
problem,
we
illustrate
how
voter
welfare
quality
respond
changes
the
political-economic
environment.
Язык: Английский
Complexity and the Reform Process: The Role of Delegated Policymaking
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Год журнала:
2022,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2022
Many
recent
reform
episodes
have
led
to
increased
policy
complexity:
laws
and
regulations
that
contain
more
contingencies,
exemptions,
carry
high
bureaucratic
implementation
costs.
Such
complexity
may
be
desirable
if
it
better
satisfies
the
needs
of
diverse
political
constituencies.
It
inefficient
is
a
byproduct
changing
power
balance
in
process
itself.
This
paper
uses
formal
model
disentangle
these
two
cases
understand
how
participation
create
complexity.
When
policymaking
requires
expertise,
informed
bureaucrats
draft
complex
policies
pander
persuade
their
less
principals.
We
show
this
type
equilibrium
outcome
when
politicians
are
uncertain
about
bureaucracy's
capacity.
Institutional
changes
give
relative
do
not
reduce
complexity,
they
cannot
substitute
need
for
Язык: Английский