Vaccination equilibria interplayed with epidemics and interval reference points DOI

Jin-Ying Dai,

Xiang Li

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 35(5)

Опубликована: Май 1, 2025

Given the limitations of fixed payoffs and reference points, we introduce interval points to capture fluctuations diversity in objective costs payoffs. We develop a prospect theory based evolutionary vaccination game model that incorporates (interval) evaluate role psychological factors updating strategies. The results suggest that, under higher point, when are small, changes payoff infected individuals have no significant effect on equilibrium, especially is relatively small. However, increasing decreases equilibrium. By analyzing relationship between payoffs, observe approaches equilibrium gradually as rationality coefficient decreases. In contrast, increases deviates further from point. addition, examine how different sensitivity coefficients affect individual behavior. When gain small (or loss high), more responsive gain) coefficient. These findings decisions affected by cost-effectiveness perception patterns, whether or

Язык: Английский

Analysis of the SEIR Mean-Field Model in Dynamic Networks under Intervention DOI Creative Commons

Jiangmin Li,

Zhen Jin, Ming Tang

и другие.

Infectious Disease Modelling, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Апрель 1, 2025

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

0

Vaccination equilibria interplayed with epidemics and interval reference points DOI

Jin-Ying Dai,

Xiang Li

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 35(5)

Опубликована: Май 1, 2025

Given the limitations of fixed payoffs and reference points, we introduce interval points to capture fluctuations diversity in objective costs payoffs. We develop a prospect theory based evolutionary vaccination game model that incorporates (interval) evaluate role psychological factors updating strategies. The results suggest that, under higher point, when are small, changes payoff infected individuals have no significant effect on equilibrium, especially is relatively small. However, increasing decreases equilibrium. By analyzing relationship between payoffs, observe approaches equilibrium gradually as rationality coefficient decreases. In contrast, increases deviates further from point. addition, examine how different sensitivity coefficients affect individual behavior. When gain small (or loss high), more responsive gain) coefficient. These findings decisions affected by cost-effectiveness perception patterns, whether or

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

0