Toward Free-Riding Attack on Cross-Silo Federated Learning Through Evolutionary Game DOI
Tianxiang Chen,

Feng Wang,

Wangjie Qiu

и другие.

Опубликована: Июль 23, 2024

Язык: Английский

Coevolutionary dynamics of feedback-evolving games in structured populations DOI

Q. Wang,

Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

и другие.

Chaos Solitons & Fractals, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 193, С. 116070 - 116070

Опубликована: Фев. 6, 2025

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

2

Coevolutionary dynamics of collective cooperation and dilemma strength in a collective-risk game DOI Creative Commons
Shijia Hua,

Mingquan Xu,

Linjie Liu

и другие.

Physical Review Research, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 6(2)

Опубликована: Июнь 24, 2024

Human behavioral decision-making influences the gaming environment. In turn, changes in environmental impact individual strategic choices. However, there is scant exploration into how human coevolves with dilemma strength. Here, we propose a coevolutionary game model based on collective-risk social dilemma, where an increase cooperators within group reduces strength, and vice versa. Upon examining this coupled system, find that system capable of achieving relatively optimal state, wherein population sustains high level cooperation strength remains at lowest level. addition, have identified conditions for emergence tristability bistability numerically validated our theoretical results. Furthermore, incorporation institutional rewards not only promotes appearance system's all individuals choose to cooperate its level, but it also effectively averts manifestation worst resort defection reaches highest These findings illuminate can be sustained when dynamical coupling exists between Published by American Physical Society 2024

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

8

The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics DOI Creative Commons
Lichen Wang, Yuyuan Liu, Ruqiang Guo

и другие.

Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 291(2024)

Опубликована: Июнь 1, 2024

In contemporary society, the effective utilization of public resources remains a subject significant concern. A common issue arises from defectors seeking to obtain an excessive share these for personal gain, potentially leading resource depletion. To mitigate this tragedy and ensure sustainable development resources, implementing mechanisms either reward those who adhere distribution rules or penalize do not, appears advantageous. We introduce two models: tax-reward model tax-punishment model, address issue. Our analysis reveals that in evolutionary trajectory system is influenced not only by tax revenue collected but also natural growth rate resources. Conversely, exhibits distinct characteristics when compared with notably potential bistability. such scenarios, selection initial conditions critical, as it can determine system’s path. Furthermore, our study identifies instances where lacks stable points, exemplified limit cycle phenomenon, underscoring complexity dynamism inherent managing using models.

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

5

Investigating the trade-off between self-quarantine and forced quarantine provisions to control an epidemic: An evolutionary approach DOI Creative Commons
Md. Mamun-Ur-Rashid Khan, Md. Rajib Arefin, Jun Tanimoto

и другие.

Applied Mathematics and Computation, Год журнала: 2022, Номер 432, С. 127365 - 127365

Опубликована: Июль 6, 2022

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

19

Coevolution of extortion strategies with mixed imitation and aspiration learning dynamics in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game DOI

Zhizhuo Zhou,

Zhihai Rong, Wen Yang

и другие.

Chaos Solitons & Fractals, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 188, С. 115541 - 115541

Опубликована: Сен. 20, 2024

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

4

Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games DOI Open Access
Md. Rajib Arefin, Jun Tanimoto

Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences, Год журнала: 2021, Номер 477(2251)

Опубликована: Июль 1, 2021

Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such under premise replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations cooperation defection. Besides dynamics, here we employed aspiration in individuals, instead comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start a brief review feedback-evolving then comprehensively discuss dynamics. Interestingly, tenacious cycles, as perceived cannot be observed Our analysis reveals that parameter θ —which depicts strength enhancing environment—plays pivotal role comprehending In particular, symmetric level, if replete depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma Trivial games, rich environment is achievable only when > 1. The case < 1 never allows us reach state, even higher level. Furthermore, cooperators aspire less than defectors, enhanced state can achieved relatively lower value compared scenario because too much expectation from beneficial.

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

21

A memory-based spatial evolutionary game with the dynamic interaction between learners and profiteers DOI
Bin Pi, Minyu Feng, Liang-Jian Deng

и другие.

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 34(6)

Опубликована: Июнь 1, 2024

Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers neglect to consider effects memory. To bridge this gap, in paper, we propose memory-based spatial game with dynamic interaction between learners profiteers. Specifically, there two different categories network, including strategy updating rules. Notably, is learners, i.e., each individual has transition probability which portrayed by Markov process. Besides, payoff not only determined single round but also depends on memory mechanism individual. Extensive numerical simulations validate theoretical analysis uncover interactions foster cooperation, mechanisms facilitate behaviors among profiteers, increasing learning rate promotes rise number cooperators. In addition, robustness model verified through across various network sizes. Overall, work contributes deeper understanding driving formation evolution cooperation.

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

3

Mitigating ecological tipping points via game–environment feedback DOI
Arindam Mandal, Sukanta Sarkar, Sagar Chakraborty

и другие.

Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 481(2312)

Опубликована: Апрель 1, 2025

Widespread exploitation of biological resources raises concerns about the emergence tipping points characterizing abrupt ecosystem collapse. Mitigating these is crucial for sustainability our being. However, understanding how feedback loop between human strategies and environment influences mechanisms governing remains elusive. This study employs an eco-evolutionary game-theoretic framework to explore coupled dynamics a renewable resource undergoing sudden We investigate co-evolution strategic interactions environmental using six possible game combinations representing diverse social dilemmas. find that, depending on choice environment-dependent payoff structure, point can be shifted or even completely eluded. Additionally, this emphasizes impact monitoring punishment against high-effort strategists system’s resilience. Our results unveil rich spectrum dynamics, spanning from multi-stability oscillation, thereby presenting formidable challenges management. While addressing tragedy commons resulting heightened harvesting efforts, targeted penalties emerge as mitigating factor. Overall, highlights interplay ecological points, individual decision-making external control within realm

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

0

Multistability and Hopf bifurcation analysis for a three-strategy evolutionary game with environmental feedback and delay DOI

Haihui Cheng,

Xinzhu Meng

Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Год журнала: 2023, Номер 620, С. 128766 - 128766

Опубликована: Апрель 18, 2023

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

8

Evolution of cooperation under the coexistence of imitation and aspiration dynamics in structured populations DOI
Md. Rajib Arefin, Yuichi Tatsukawa, Jun Tanimoto

и другие.

Nonlinearity, Год журнала: 2023, Номер 36(5), С. 2286 - 2309

Опубликована: Март 24, 2023

Abstract Imitation and aspiration learning rules are frequently observed in humans animals. The former is an act of copying other’s action, whereas the latter characterized by self-evaluation. Here we study coexistence these mechanisms structured populations. Both have been combined focusing on two different scenarios: (I) adoption either update rule with a certain probability, (II) grouping entire population according to rules. We present pair approximation models, illustrating both scenarios, which yield nice agreement—under weak selection—with that agent-based simulations. For selection large size, find condition for cooperation dominate defection similar heterogeneous homogeneous examine several variants mixed model such as time-evolving aspirations alongside strategies coevolution In case, our simulation reveals Prisoner’s dilemma and, some cases, Stag-hunt experience overall less levels compared other games Chicken or Trivial. demonstrates better cooperation, contrast fixed exhibiting possibility asymptotic mechanisms.

Язык: Английский

Процитировано

6