The concept of critical age group for density dependence: bridging the gap between demographers, evolutionary biologists and behavioural ecologists
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
379(1916)
Опубликована: Окт. 28, 2024
Density
dependence
plays
an
important
role
in
population
regulation
the
wild.
It
involves
a
decrease
growth
rate
when
size
increases.
Fifty
years
ago,
Charlesworth
introduced
concept
of
'critical
age
group',
denoting
classes
which
variation
number
individuals
most
strongly
contributes
to
density
regulation.
Since
this
pioneering
work,
has
rarely
been
used.
In
light
Charlesworth's
concept,
we
discuss
need
develop
work
between
behavioural
ecology,
demography
and
evolutionary
biology
better
understand
mechanisms
acting
density-regulated
age-structured
populations.
We
highlight
demographic
studies
that
explored
age-specific
contributions
underlying
processes.
Understanding
competitive
interactions
among
is
pivotal
identify
ages
contributing
regulation,
highlighting
move
towards
ecology
decipher
Because
individual
characteristics
other
than
can
be
linked
abilities,
expanding
critical
structures
(e.g.
sex,
dominance
rank)
offers
interesting
perspectives.
Linking
research
fields
based
on
group
key
from
pattern-oriented
view
process-oriented
approach.This
article
part
discussion
meeting
issue
'Understanding
society
using
natural
populations'.
Язык: Английский
Optimality Theory
Elsevier eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments
Physical review. E,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
110(1)
Опубликована: Июль 29, 2024
The
emergence
of
collective
cooperation
in
competitive
environments
is
a
well-known
phenomenon
biology,
economics,
and
social
systems.
While
most
evolutionary
game
models
focus
on
the
evolution
strategies
for
fixed
game,
how
strategic
decisions
coevolve
with
environment
has
so
far
mostly
been
overlooked.
Here,
we
consider
selection
model
where
not
only
but
also
can
change
over
time
following
principles.
Our
results
show
that
coevolutionary
dynamics
games
induce
novel
phenomena,
fostering
cooperative
environments.
When
taken
structured
populations
architecture
interaction
network
significantly
amplify
pro-social
behavior,
critical
role
played
by
heterogeneity
presence
clustered
groups
similar
players,
distinctive
features
observed
real-world
populations.
By
unveiling
link
between
different
populations,
our
sheds
new
light
origin
dilemmas
ubiquitously
Язык: Английский
Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’
Dynamic Games and Applications,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
13(4), С. 1035 - 1048
Опубликована: Дек. 1, 2023
Язык: Английский
Stability analysis of evolutionary dynamics of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric games
Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
480(2282)
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2024
In
biology,
economics,
sociology
as
well
other
fields,
there
is
often
a
2
×
asymmetric
evolutionary
game
problem
in
which
each
party
has
set
of
strategies,
and
different
strategy
combinations
correspond
to
the
specific
pay-offs
party.
Since
participant
dynamically
adjusts
for
maximizing
their
own
interests,
pay-off
matrix
plays
an
important
role
evolution
system.
Based
on
matrix,
we
probe
into
resulting
state
games.
The
results
show
that
from
information
judgement
conditions
system
evolve
three
pure
two
strategies
one
can
be
determined
directly.
What
more,
under
certain
type
fixed
observed
at
times
always
varying.
Here,
explore
connection
between
behaviours
through
stability
theory,
obtained
are
conducive
deeply
understand
predict
dynamic
behaviour
systems.
Язык: Английский
The cross-regional settlement methods in hospitals and the treatment-seeking behavior of patients with malignant tumors in China: an evolutionary game model
Frontiers in Public Health,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
12
Опубликована: Июль 17, 2024
Background
Cross-regional
settlement
management
is
a
key
indicator
of
national
health
insurance
system
maturity.
Given
the
significant
demand
for
cross-regional
medical
treatment
among
Chinese
patients
with
malignant
tumors
and
territorially
managed
system,
further
research
necessary
to
explore
relationship
between
hospital
methods
treatment-seeking
behaviors
these
patients.
This
study
introduces
validates
an
evolutionary
game
model
that
provides
theoretical
foundation
direct
policies
in
treatment.
Methods
An
was
constructed
hospitals
serving
as
strategic
players
within
dynamic
system.
integrates
patients’
utility,
nonmedical
costs,
hospitals’
financial
technological
advancement
benefits.
Results
The
stability
analysis
revealed
seven-game
outcomes
tumors.
numerical
simulations
suggest
convergence
toward
strategy
(1,
0),
indicating
trend
where
opt
treatment,
yet
choose
not
implement
policy.
Parameter
sensitivity
showed
parameters
set
this
affected
player
behavioral
choices
equilibria.
Conclusion
A
strong
tumors,
some
require
more
incentives
settlements.
factors
influencing
willingness
resettle
include
costs
in-area
care,
without
settlement,
utility
Technological
benefits
input
influence
motivation
adopt
Policy
adjustments
effectively
can
facilitate
equilibrium,
enhance
initiatives
local
departments,
improve
accessibility
efficiency
services,
reduce
expenses
Язык: Английский
Half a century of evolutionary games
Опубликована: Май 24, 2023
Evolutionary
game
theory
(EGT)
is
an
indispensable
part
of
modern
evolutionary
theory.
2023
marks
the
50th
anniversary
article
by
John
Maynard
Smith
and
George
Price
that
defined
central
concepts
became
a
focal
point
in
field.
EGT
can
address
biological
questions
where
there
no
obvious
“best
thing”
individual
do,
because
their
payoff
depends
not
only
on
what
they
do
but
also
‘opponents’
do.
In
last
50
years,
has
expanded
become
integrated
with
range
other
theoretical
methods.
A
recent
theme
issue
reviewed
history
methodology
field
presented
novel
research.
this
seminar,
some
authors
from
will
talk
about
topic
papers.
Evolutionarily
stable
preferences
The
50-year
old
concept
evolutionarily
strategy
provided
key
tool
for
theorists
to
model
ultimate
drivers
behaviour
social
interactions.
For
decades,
economists
ignored
used
models
which
individuals
choose
strategies
based
preferences—a
proximate
mechanism
behaviour—and
distribution
population
was
taken
be
fixed
given.
This
summarizes
findings
literature
preferences,
past
three
decades
proposed
combine
two
approaches:
inherit
determine
choices,
turn
success.
One
objective
highlight
complementarities
potential
avenues
future
collaboration
between
biologists
economists.
Cooperation
coordination
heterogeneous
populations
landmark
application
study
dilemmas.
explores
why
people
cooperate
even
when
are
strong
incentives
defect.
Much
literature,
however,
assumes
interactions
symmetric.
Individuals
assumed
have
same
strategic
options
pay-offs.
Yet
many
interesting
arise
once
allowed
differ.
Here,
we
asymmetry
simple
games.
our
set-up,
human
participants
need
decide
how
much
endowment
contribute
public
good.
If
group’s
collective
contribution
reaches
pre-defined
threshold,
all
group
members
receive
reward.
To
account
possible
asymmetries,
either
differ
endowments
or
productivities.
According
equilibrium
analysis,
such
games
tend
solutions.
equilibrium,
may
amount,
different
amounts
nothing
at
all.
behavioural
experiment,
humans
favour
everyone
contributes
proportion
endowment.
We
use
these
experimental
results
non-trivial
effects
inequality
cooperation,
discuss
extent
effects.
rarer-sex
effect
sex
allocation—that
is,
investment
resources
into
male
versus
female
reproductive
effort—yields
among
best
quantitative
evidence
Darwinian
adaptation,
long
enjoyed
tight
productive
interplay
empirical
fitness
consequences
individual's
allocation
decisions
depend
crucially
upon
others
and,
accordingly,
readily
conceptualized
terms
game.
I
investigate
historical
development
understanding
fundamental
driver
evolution
allocation—the
effect—from
its
inception
writing
Charles
Darwin
1871
through
explicit
framing
consanguinity
value
William
D.
Hamilton
1972.
show
step-wise
proceeded
refinements
conceptualization
set,
function
unbeatable
strategy.
volutionary
truly
interdisciplinary
subject
goes
well
beyond
limits
biology.
Mathematical
minds
get
hooked
up
often
gradually
move
parts
biology
ecology.
Social
scientists
realize
learn
thinking
transfer
insight
originally
generated
Computer
algorithms
explore
new
machines
environment,
each
other.
breadth
focus
few
very
popular
issues,
as
comes
price:
several
insights
re-discovered
fields
under
labels
heroes
modelling
traditions.
example,
reciprocity
spatial
structure
treated
differently.
Will
continue
develop
things
parallel?
Or
converge
single
set
ideas,
tradition
eventually
software
repository?
cross-fertilize
other,
learning
engaging
constructive
exchange
fields?
Ultimately,
popularity
rests
explanatory
power,
intuitive
character
models.
analysis
links
demography
genetics
invasion
(ESS)
pioneered
took
off
it
does
require
assumptions
contrast
genetic
Though
simplicity
useful,
obscures
degree
ESS
applies
more
realistic
demography:
handle
complexities
kin
selection,
selection
variable
environments
phenotypes
affected
multiple
genes?
paper,
review
early
uncertainty
method
lead
important
mathematical
linking
general
emphasize
link
fitness.
give
examples
measure
linked
modifier
genes
response
environments.
ESSs
demographic
parameters,
highlights
patterns
increasing
abundance
long-term
data
natural
populations.
Stackelberg
theory:
manage
evolving
systems
(SEG)
combines
classical
frame
rational
leader
followers.
interactions,
wants
preserve
system
(e.g.
fisheries
management),
while
others,
try
drive
extinction
pest
control).
Often
worst
adopt
constant
aggressive
overfishing
management
maximum
tolerable
dose
cancer
treatment).
Taking
ecological
dynamics
typically
leads
better
outcomes
corresponds
Nash
equilibria
game-theoretic
terms.
However,
leader’s
most
profitable
anticipate
steer
eco-evolutionary
dynamics,
leading
help
bring
desired
outcome,
as,
management,
treatment.
Finally,
limitations
opportunities
applying
SEGs
improve
systems.
Game
biology:
years
onwards
gained
prominence
ago,
formulated
(ESS).
Their
aim
explain
conflicts
animals
species
usually
‘limited
war’
type,
causing
serious
injury.
They
emphasized
alternative
previous
ideas
were
ethologists
limited
aggression.
Subsequently,
applied
phenomena
frequency
dependence
success
strategies,
including
allocation,
mating
types,
contest
signalling,
parental
care.
Both
analyses
signalling
cooperation
inspired
similar
problems
economics
attracted
attention
Here
perspective
ambitions
been
achieved,
cooperation.
evaluate
whether
game-theoretical
measured
expectations
explaining
non-human
animals.
potentially
fruitful
directions
field,
importance
incorporating
mechanisms
Язык: Английский
Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments
arXiv (Cornell University),
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2023
The
emergence
of
collective
cooperation
in
competitive
environments
is
a
well-known
phenomenon
biology,
economics,
and
social
systems.
While
most
evolutionary
game
models
focus
on
the
evolution
strategies
for
fixed
game,
how
strategic
decisions
coevolve
with
environment
has
so
far
mostly
been
overlooked.
Here,
we
consider
selection
model
where
not
only
but
also
can
change
over
time
following
principles.
Our
results
show
that
coevolutionary
dynamics
games
induce
novel
phenomena,
fostering
cooperative
environments.
When
taken
structured
populations
architecture
interaction
network
significantly
amplify
pro-social
behavior,
critical
role
played
by
heterogeneity
presence
clustered
groups
similar
players,
distinctive
features
observed
real-world
populations.
By
unveiling
link
between
different
populations,
our
sheds
new
light
origin
dilemmas
ubiquitously
Язык: Английский