Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 2, 2025
Abstract
In
Appearance
&
Explanation,
Kevin
McCain
and
Luca
Moretti
developed
“Phenomenal
Explanationism”
(PE).
PE
is
a
theory
of
epistemic
justification
that
combines
an
explanationist
evidential
support
with
appearance-based/phenomenal
conception
evidence.
According
to
PE,
matter
what
best
explains
our
evidence,
which
ultimately
consists
appearances.
Explanation
it
was
argued
complete
internalist
delivers
on
the
promises
other
appearance-based
theories
while
avoiding
their
pitfalls.
One
provides
satisfactory
response
skepticism.
However,
in
only
PE’s
external
world
skepticism
discussed,
discussion
issue
limited.
Explanatory
Solutions
Skeptical
Problems
greatly
expanded.
This
isn’t
all
though.
readers
will
find
also
offers
solutions
host
perennial
skeptical
problems,
including
problem
criterion,
regress
justification,
memory
skepticism,
inductive
The
promise
displays
responding
these
problems
makes
plain
viable
worthy
careful
consideration
accepting
internalism
more
generally
doesn’t
leave
one
without
reasonable
responses
problems.
Язык: Английский
Pyrrhonian Problems
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 52 - 73
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
displays
Phenomenal
Explanationism’s
(PE)
solution
to
two
classic
Pyrrhonian
skeptical
problems:
the
problem
of
criterion
and
Agrippa’s
Trilemma
(the
regress
problem).
With
respect
PE
offers
a
non-skeptical
that
is
superior
particularism,
methodism,
skepticism
in
it
solves
without
begging
question.
When
comes
provides
foundationalist
response.
That
say,
allows
for
justification
end
beliefs
are
themselves
justified
but
not
on
basis
other
beliefs.
Further,
explained
why
response
this
provided
by
arbitrary.
Язык: Английский
Humean Problems
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 118 - 142
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
The
focus
of
this
chapter
is
the
Humean
problem
induction.
It
argued
that
Phenomenal
Explanationism
(PE)
provides
a
satisfying
response
to
inductive
skepticism.
However,
an
analogous
arises
for
PE—the
challenge
providing
reasons
thinking
explanatory
virtues
are
truth-conducive.
argues
PE
has
resources
overcoming
further
as
well.
offers
in
fact
circular,
but
it
kind
circularity
involved
solving
these
skeptical
problems
not
vicious.
solutions
final
ones
offered
book.
They
help
solidify
viability
PE’s
addressed
earlier
chapters
and
display
extent
its
anti-skeptical
power.
Язык: Английский
Memory Problems
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 100 - 117
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
explains
Phenomenal
Explanationism’s
(PE)
responses
to
two
forms
of
memory
skepticism:
skepticism
about
the
past
and
concerning
reliability
faculty
itself.
Concerning
first
problem,
contends
that
many
(perhaps
infinite)
ages
world
could
be
only
a
small
portion
those
would
actually
amount
genuine
skeptical
threat.
Once
it
is
made
clear
non-skeptical
age
range
for
vastly
larger
than
one,
appears
we
have
good
reason
reject
past.
With
respect
second
attacks
on
are
limited
in
key
ways.
these
limitations
recognized,
PE
provides
think
reliable.
Язык: Английский
The Cartesian Problem
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 74 - 99
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
begins
by
getting
clear
on
the
nature
of
skeptical
argument
for
external
world
skepticism.
The
relationship
between
arguments
that
rely
closure
principles
and
underdetermination
is
explored.
shows
how
Phenomenal
Explanationism
(PE)
offers
a
unified
response
to
both
forms
argument.
then
argues
overly
simple
hypotheses
can
be
dismissed
because
they
cannot
match
explanatory
power
our
common-sense
view
world.
also
includes
an
thinking
explanation
offered
superior
all
relevant
competitors
(the
are
sufficiently
sophisticated
avoid
problem
with
hypotheses).
It
this
reason
justified,
unsound.
Язык: Английский
Phenomenal Explanationism Revisited Part I
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 7 - 25
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
clarifies
the
account
of
evidence
and
possession
included
in
Phenomenal
Explanationism
(PE).
In
particular
it
explains
that
all
ultimate
consists
appearances.
After
arguing
various
conceptions
appearances
are
mistaken,
makes
clear
non-factive
mental
states
with
propositional
content,
mind-to-world
direction
fit,
phenomenal
force.
Finally,
distinguishes
between
three
important
classes
their
features.
While
each
kind
appearance
provides
some
positive
epistemic
support
for
its
they
differ
considerably
degree
provided.
Mere
seemings
provide
minimal
paired
slightly
more
support,
presentational
highest
appearances—when
undefeated
knowledge-level
justification.
Язык: Английский
Phenomenal Explanationism Revisited Part II
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 26 - 51
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
completes
discussion
of
Phenomenal
Explanationism
(PE)
as
a
theory
epistemic
justification.
In
particular,
the
explanationist
account
evidential
fit
is
formulated
and
various
finer
points
are
discussed
such
relevant
notion
explanation
what
it
takes
for
an
to
be
best.
Once
details
PE
firmly
in
hand
turns
toward
explication
how
applies
kinds
Specifically,
discusses
number
cases
perceptual,
memorial,
testimonial,
introspective,
inferential,
priori
justification
yields
intuitively
correct
results
each
case.
Язык: Английский
Explanations and Skeptical Problems
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 1 - 6
Опубликована: Янв. 5, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
provides
an
overview
of
the
book.
It
briefly
introduces
Phenomenal
Explanationism
(PE),
which
is
internalist
theory
epistemic
justification
holding
that
all
ultimate
evidence
consists
appearances
and
support
a
matter
explanatory
relations.
The
clarifies
broad
sort
skeptical
challenges
will
be
focus
In
particular,
it
made
clear
problems
being
discussed
are
each
targeting
propositional
justification.
general
features
explanationism
discussed.
And
outline
rest
book
along
with
short
summaries
chapters
follow
provided.
Язык: Английский
Presentational and phenomenal forces of perception
Episteme,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown, С. 1 - 22
Опубликована: Янв. 22, 2025
Abstract
Contra
both
phenomenalists
and
anti-phenomenalists,
I
defend
the
following
thesis
in
this
paper:
epistemic
power
of
perceptual
experience
is
grounded
its
presentational
property
that
(i)
uniquely
possessed
by
good
case
(ii)
essentially
a
phenomenal
property.
In
§2,
set
ground
for
my
argument
elaborating
on
phenomenalist
account
phenomenology.
§3,
argue
(against
phenomenalism)
first
part
presentation
thesis:
experience’s
instances
good,
but
not
bad
case.
§4,
anti-phenomenalists)
second
§5,
address
some
potential
objections
to
thesis.
§6
concludes.
Язык: Английский