We
analyze
the
incentives
of
authoritarian
regimes
to
segment
access
censored
content
through
technology.
Citizens
choose
whether
pay
online
at
a
cost
fixed
by
regime:
firewall.
A
low
firewall
segments
and
generates
more
compliance
than
full
censorship
-
high
ever
could.
Regime
opponents
self-select
into
consuming
content,
comply
conditional
on
positive
independent
reporting.
supporters
exclusively
consume
state
propaganda,
which
secures
their
compliance.
This
segment-and-rule
strategy
can
be
engineered
making
local
news
outlets
uninformative,
or
affecting
intrinsic
benefit
from
access.
The Review of Economic Studies,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Ноя. 14, 2024
Abstract
Authoritarian
regimes
often
use
targeted
social
control—unequal
application
of
the
law
to
limit
expressive
freedom
and
enforce
conformity.
At
same
time,
their
methods
appear
less
draconian
than
in
past.
In
this
model,
an
authority
structures
punishments
rewards
compel
adherence
its
preferred
norm.
The
authority’s
commitment
is
time-limited
depends
on
imperfectly
informative
signals
a
citizen’s
behaviour.
Given
two
citizens
with
observed
behaviour,
imposes
harsher
poorer
and/or
ex
ante
dissident
individual.
Lighter
are
imposed
wealthier
citizen
prevent
“over-compliance”.
Wealth
inequality
increases
over
time.
Some
become
prosperous
“lackeys”
while
others
destitute
from
confiscation.
stable
high
state
capacity,
reduces
allow
accumulate
wealth,
leading
conformity
balanced
growth
long
run.
unstable
low
citizenry
splits
into
groups
wealthy
lackeys
proles.
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Дек. 18, 2024
Abstract
An
autocrat’s
power
depends
on
gaining
support,
managing
agents,
and
preventing
the
opposition
from
mobilizing.
The
language
of
game-theoretic
modeling
is
designed
specifically
to
study
strategic
interactions
among
rulers,
regime
agents/elites,
actors.
Consequently,
in
past
two
decades,
game
theory
has
become
an
indispensable
tool
for
studying
authoritarian
politics.
Recent
contributions
applied
have
advanced
our
understanding
main
problems
that
autocrats
confront,
including
commitment
problems,
agency
coordination
problems.
We
highlight
both
canonical
models
very
recent
advances
showcase
insights
formal
inform
how
address
these
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2023
One
frequently
overlooked
aspect
of
the
U.S.-style
electoral
college
system
is
that
it
discourages
election
fraud.
In
a
presidential
based
on
popular
vote,
competing
political
parties
are
motivated
to
manipulate
votes
in
areas
where
they
hold
most
significant
influence,
such
as
states
control
local
executive
offices,
legislatures,
and
judiciary.
However,
with
place,
incentives
for
fraud
shift
swing
government
politically
divided,
therefore
more
difficult
costly.
Our
theoretical
model
elucidates
why
provides
effective
protection
against
compared
vote
system.
While
polarization
makes
likely,
does
not
affect
superiority
We
analyze
the
incentives
of
authoritarian
regimes
to
segment
access
censored
content
through
technology.
Citizens
choose
whether
pay
online
at
a
cost
fixed
by
regime:
firewall.
A
low
firewall
segments
and
generates
more
compliance
than
full
censorship
-
high
ever
could.
Regime
opponents
self-select
into
consuming
content,
comply
conditional
on
positive
independent
reporting.
supporters
exclusively
consume
state
propaganda,
which
secures
their
compliance.
This
segment-and-rule
strategy
can
be
engineered
making
local
news
outlets
uninformative,
or
affecting
intrinsic
benefit
from
access.
