The whistle‐blower effect vs. the cry‐wolf effect: A game analysis framework for collaborative epidemic information governance

Risk Analysis, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Янв. 17, 2025

The unpredictability of the epidemics caused by new, unknown viruses, combined with differing responsibilities among government departments, often leads to a prisoner's dilemma in epidemic information governance. In this context, whistle-blower effect health departments delayed reporting avoid potential retaliation, and cry-wolf administrative results sustained observation ineffective warnings. To address these challenges, we employ game theory analyze dynamics governance focus on two external mechanisms-superior accountability media supervision-that can help resolve during after an outbreak. Our analysis indicates that it is necessary increase strategic coordination whistle-blowers short-term decision-making From long-term evolution perspective, maintaining optimal levels superior supervision essential overcoming dilemma. Media works more slowly implement effectiveness than direct accountability. This paper highlights crucial roles failures outbreaks viruses. It clarifies pathways between expert systems bureaucratic emphasizes importance enable effective, collaborative

Язык: Английский

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Decision analysis of cooperative governance of public health emergencies

OPSEARCH, Год журнала: 2024, Номер unknown

Опубликована: Авг. 15, 2024

Язык: Английский

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