Environment Development and Sustainability, Год журнала: 2024, Номер unknown
Опубликована: Дек. 27, 2024
Язык: Английский
Energy, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown, С. 134676 - 134676
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
1
Sustainability, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 16(8), С. 3113 - 3113
Опубликована: Апрель 9, 2024
Upon the implementation of European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), substantial challenges are anticipated to impact international trade Chinese steel products. To safeguard competitiveness products on global stage, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving large enterprises, small- and medium-sized government. The model integrates collaborative emission reduction free-riding benefits among along with government’s dynamic subsidies penalties. First, we calculate replicator equations conduct stability analysis obtain trends system equilibrium points in different phases CBAM. Then, validate theoretical through example simulation analysis. Finally, explore parameters agents sensitivity parameters. findings indicate that (1) enterprises demonstrate greater CBAM, making their production structures more susceptible changes CBAM policies; (2) prone behavior influence; (3) government intervention should be kept within appropriate boundaries, as excessive may lead strategic oscillation, passive management being chosen by during strengthening phase CBAM; (4) elevating price carbon market would slow down structural serving an effective measure counteract impacts This provides support for how can respond aiding stakeholders selecting optimal strategies stages mitigating maximum extent possible.
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
4
Journal of Cleaner Production, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 460, С. 142501 - 142501
Опубликована: Май 6, 2024
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
4
Energy, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 320, С. 135384 - 135384
Опубликована: Март 5, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0
Energies, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 18(8), С. 2041 - 2041
Опубликована: Апрель 16, 2025
The low-carbon development (LCD) of energy markets not only serves as a critical enabler in combating global climate change and advancing the green economy but also enhances industrial competitiveness. Grounded prospect theory, this study develops tripartite evolutionary game model involving three core market stakeholders, i.e., enterprises, public, government, to investigate determinant factors decision-making mechanisms underlying LCD with subsequent simulation analyses conducted through MATLAB R2024a. research findings indicate that loss aversion primary driver for enterprises’ adoption strategies. Public supervision demonstrates optimal effectiveness under conditions low risk loss, while sensitivity remains dominant factor influencing government’s strategic choices. Notably, government incentives combined public demonstrate significant synergistic effects accelerating corporate transition toward LCD. Accordingly, should actively promote strategies mitigate transformation risks enterprises concurrently optimizing regulatory frameworks reduce costs amplify incentive benefits, thereby fostering active participation
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0
Journal of Cleaner Production, Год журнала: 2025, Номер unknown, С. 145682 - 145682
Опубликована: Май 1, 2025
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0
Frontiers in Physics, Год журнала: 2025, Номер 13
Опубликована: Май 16, 2025
Introduction The digital era has brought about new vitality and innovation across various industries, introducing concepts such as AI, information centers, cloud data, the Internet of Things, government. This article investigates mechanisms financial disclosure within context transformation. Methods A four-party game model is developed using a approach, involving digitally-intelligent enterprises, data analysts, quality productivity-based government, fintech users. Through Matlab simulations, evolutionary relationships equilibrium strategies among four parties are examined. Conclusion (1) There conditional stabilization points in four-way game. These represent strategic equilibriums that stakeholders may achieve under principle competitive neutrality. They mainly reflect choices government enterprises different scenarios. (2) numerical simulation analysis reveals when will strengthen regulation firm, it force firm to disclose information. And enterprise chooses disclosing information, then relax state its regulation. means plays stronger supervisory role process corporate disclosure, which makes tend increase degree external pressure, thus reducing asymmetry enhancing transparency, helps analysts users collect organize improves stability market. overall strategy evolves direction “information intelligent decision-making, intensive regulation, investment”. (3) From sensitivity analysis, government’s influence on utility intelligence transformation more significant, compared with other social actors, departments show significant institutional advantages process; incentive punishment mechanism imposed by productivity-oriented strongest reaction societies studied this paper; furthermore, found there exists bidirectional feedback between investors, poor market environment leads low investment intention make reluctant spend time cost. Further, two-way investors' willingness invest, time, energy cost processing.
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
0
Опубликована: Фев. 5, 2024
Upon the implementation of European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), substantial challenges are anticipated to impact international trade Chinese steel products. To safeguard competitiveness products on global stage, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving large enterprises, small and medium-sized government. The model integrates collaborative emission reduction free-riding benefits among along with government's dynamic subsidies penalties. analyzes trends stable states three parties during different stages CBAM, including sensitivity analysis key parameters. findings indicate that enterprises demonstrate heightened while more significantly influenced by benefits. Government intervention should be strategically timed incline towards passive management strengthening phase CBAM. Additionally, refinement carbon market emerges as an effective means counter This provides theoretical support for how government can respond aiding stakeholders in selecting optimal strategies mitigating impacts CBAM maximum extent possible.
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
3
Frontiers in Marine Science, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 11
Опубликована: Авг. 30, 2024
As a new mode of marine industry, ranching is gradually becoming an important means to promote the high-quality development economy. Meanwhile, technological innovation enterprises (MREs) can enhance economic and ecological functions ranching. This paper builds evolutionary game model including MREs, government consumers analyze strategic choices. The results show that: (1) government’s incentive policies play key role in initial period while eliminate mature MREs. (2) Government’s consist subsidy tax policies. amount should be moderate order avoid financial burdens, policy adaptation different types (3) Consumers’ preference significantly affects strategy MREs innovation. Government subsidies for with preferences guide market demand provide signals study provides reference formulate relevant
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
2
Heliyon, Год журнала: 2024, Номер 11(1), С. e41159 - e41159
Опубликована: Дек. 12, 2024
Язык: Английский
Процитировано
2