We
analyze
the
incentives
of
authoritarian
regimes
to
segment
access
censored
content
through
technology.
Citizens
choose
whether
pay
online
at
a
cost
fixed
by
regime:
firewall.
A
low
firewall
segments
and
generates
more
compliance
than
full
censorship
-
high
ever
could.
Regime
opponents
self-select
into
consuming
content,
comply
conditional
on
positive
independent
reporting.
supporters
exclusively
consume
state
propaganda,
which
secures
their
compliance.
This
segment-and-rule
strategy
can
be
engineered
making
local
news
outlets
uninformative,
or
affecting
intrinsic
benefit
from
access.
Voprosy Ekonomiki,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
1, С. 32 - 43
Опубликована: Янв. 7, 2025
2024
Nobel
Prize
in
Economics
was
awarded
to
Daron
Acemoglu
and
Simon
Johnson
from
MIT
James
Robinson
the
University
of
Chicago
for
fundamental
contributions
institutional
economics.
The
laureates
their
followers
have
suggested
a
number
theoretical
models
dynamics,
giving
rise
new
areas
modern
economic
research.
In
addition,
Acemoglu,
Johnson,
made
major
empirical
studies
long-term
development
by
establishing
critical
patterns
that
connect
with
political
social
institutions.
CESifo Economic Studies,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Фев. 3, 2025
Abstract
The
growing
emphasis
on
nation-states
and
their
pivotal
role
in
economic
development
has
emerged
as
a
central
theme
contemporary
discourse.
This
review
examines
the
concept
of
state
capacity
discussed
literature,
focusing
its
practical
implications.
While
definition
remains
multifaceted,
this
analysis
delves
into
We
focus
primarily
literature
surrounding
fiscal
capacity,
exploring
how
state’s
ability
to
raise
manage
revenue
impacts
other
critical
outcomes.
aims
shed
light
crucial
shaping
performance,
inspiring
further
research
policy
area.
(JEL
codes:
D72,
D73,
D74,
E62,
H11,
H20,
H77,
H83)
American Journal of Political Science,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Фев. 10, 2025
Abstract
In
his
seminal
work
on
the
political
economy
of
dictatorship,
Ronald
Wintrobe
posited
existence
a
“dictator's
dilemma,”
in
which
repression
leaves
an
autocrat
less
secure
by
reducing
information
about
discontent.
We
explore
nature
and
resolution
this
dilemma
with
formalization
that
builds
recent
nondemocracy.
When
regime
is
sufficiently
repressive,
dictator's
popularity
correspondingly
unclear
to
opposition
as
well
autocrat,
ruler
faces
two
unattractive
options:
He
can
mobilize
repressive
apparatus,
even
though
there
may
be
no
threat
rule,
or
he
refrain
from
mobilizing,
danger
real.
Semicompetitive
elections
ease
through
controlled
revelation
Paradoxically,
manipulation
such
non‐repressive
means
allow
for
more
rather
than
repression.
Abstract
Political
institutions
of
authoritarianism
are
designed
to
ensure
the
elite’s
lasting
hold
power.
They
might
be
growth-enhancing
at
certain
stages
a
country’s
development
and
become
major
obstacle
economic
progress
in
other
stages,
but
their
primary
role
is
keep
elite
unaccountable.
Thirty
years
ago,
collapse
USSR-led
communist
system
gave
hope
for
“end
history,”
convergence
all
political
systems
democracy.
Since
then,
share
nondemocracies
has
stabilized
after
dramatic
fall;
world’s
GDP
been
increasing,
largely
due
China’s
enormous
contribution.
In
this
essay,
we
focus
on
institutional
connections
between
monopoly
power
monopolistic,
centralized
organization
life
under
authoritarianism.
IMF Working Paper,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
2023(036), С. 1 - 1
Опубликована: Фев. 1, 2023
Major
output
collapses
are
costly
and
frequent
in
the
developing
world.Using
cross-country
data,
we
classify
five-year
periods
using
a
two-dimensional
state
space
based
on
growth
regimes
political
institutions.We
then
model
joint
evolution
of
institutions
as
finite
Markov
chain,
study
how
countries
move
between
states.We
find
that
is
more
likely
to
be
sustained
under
democracy
than
autocracy;
persistent
stagnation
autocracy
can
give
way
outright
collapse.Democratic
appear
resilient.
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2024
How
should
information
be
transmitted
to
the
next
generation
in
aftermath
of
a
conflict?
We
propose
dynamic
model
where
two
groups
engage
an
infinite
sequence
conflict
games
with
evolving
costs,
observed
only
when
there
are
conflicts.
Without
communication,
persists
endlessly.
Optimal
communication
by
informed
leaders
generates
peace
cycles
and
balances
important
trade-off
between
how
likely
will
versus
long
it
last.
This
balance
depends
crucially
on
baseline
environment's
stability.
In
highly
unstable
environments,
optimal
mimics
static
Bayesian
persuasion
games.
Conversely,
stable
implies
slight
distortions
conveying
history.
