Do non-audit service failures impair auditor reputation? An analysis of KPMG advisory service scandals in Germany
Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
Год журнала:
2023,
Номер
98, С. 102550 - 102550
Опубликована: Янв. 19, 2023
Язык: Английский
Audit Quality in the Face of a Crisis: Evidence from the Audit Inspection Scandal
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2024
This
paper
examines
the
2017
audit
inspection
scandal
involving
PCAOB
and
KPMG
—
one
of
few
publicized
breaches
"tone
at
top"
a
Big
Four
firm.
With
backdrop
an
egregious
violation
professional
ethics
by
leaders
KPMG,
we
study
how
affected
its
clients.
Using
differences-in-differences
approach,
find
that
quality
increased
after
compared
to
other
4
firms.
We
also
was
successful
in
preventing
client
desertions.
Clients
most
closely
tied
experienced
decline
non-audit
fees.
Overall,
document
operational
improvements
response
scandal,
along
with
some
possible
sacrifices
revenue
generation.
Язык: Английский
Regulatory investigations, media coverage, and audit opinions
Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
54, С. 100596 - 100596
Опубликована: Янв. 17, 2024
Язык: Английский
Client Acquisition Following an Auditor’s Unethical Behavior: An Examination of Reputational Consequences Following KPMG’s “Steal the Exam” Scandal
Accounting Horizons,
Год журнала:
2022,
Номер
37(2), С. 85 - 104
Опубликована: Апрель 13, 2022
SYNOPSIS
We
investigate
the
reputational
effects
of
KPMG’s
scandal
involving
improper
receipt
confidential
regulator
data
by
analyzing
acquisition
new
audit
clients
in
post-scandal
period.
While
we
find
no
evidence
that
KPMG
had
difficulty
gaining
relative
to
a
broad
class
other
large
auditors,
do
rate
decreased
period
comparison
Big
4
firms
but
increased
non-Big
auditors.
This
finding
indicates
shift
position
market
for
clients.
Our
results
suggest
more
nuanced
examination
auditor
damages
may
help
detect
distinct
between
classes
firms.
Importantly,
our
findings
be
interest
practitioners
and
researchers
as
they
consider
consequences
high-profile
on
an
firm’s
reputation,
even
if
does
not
appear
directly
impact
engagement-level
quality.
Data
Availability:
used
this
study
are
available
from
public
sources
identified
document.
JEL
Classifications:
M42;
M48.
Язык: Английский
Economic Consequences of Auditor Reputation Loss: Evidence from the Audit Inspection Scandal
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Год журнала:
2020,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2020
This
paper
examines
the
2017
audit
inspection
scandal
involving
PCAOB
and
KPMG
—
oneof
few
publicized
breaches
of
"tone
at
top"
a
Big
Four
firm.
With
backdrop
anegregious
violation
professional
ethics
by
leaders
KPMG,
we
exploit
this
high-power
settingto
study
how
affected
its
clients.
From
federal
court
trial
transcripts,
weconstruct
novel
data
set
clients
inspected
during
years.
Wefind
that
only
are
associated
with
an
increase
in
auditor
switches
reductionin
non-audit
fees
after
scandal.
We
find
no
evidence
fee
changes.
While
KPMG's
auditquality
decreased
scandal,
market
did
not
perceive
quality
to
have
declined.
Ourresults
suggest,
despite
serious
ethical
violations
exposed,
there
were
marketand
competitive
consequences
for
Язык: Английский
Do Non-audit Service Failures Impair Auditor Reputation? An Analysis of Multiple Scandals Surrounding KPMG Advisory Services in Germany
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Год журнала:
2019,
Номер
unknown
Опубликована: Янв. 1, 2019
Big
Four
accounting
firms
increasingly
focus
on
non-audit
services.
Failures
in
these
services
may
impair
the
firm’s
reputation
as
an
auditor.
They
negatively
affect
Four,
its
clients,
and
client
stakeholders.
From
perspective
of
critical
scholarship,
it
is
vital
to
understand
whether
potentially
marginalized
actors
that
auditors
are
meant
protect
(e.g.,
general
public)
bear
adverse
consequences
from
failures.
Low
litigation
settings,
such
Germany,
particular
interest
this
context
because
they
rely
risks
motivate
provide
high-quality
Accordingly,
we
analyze
two
events
observable
service
deficiencies
KPMG
Germany.
We
first
use
event
study
show
KPMG’s
audit
clients
suffer
negative
capital
market
reactions
after
NAS
failure
events.
then
ask
KPMG,
having
caused
events,
also
faces
consequences.
Moreover,
explore
theoretical
mechanisms
behind
observed
reactions.
Using
Eisenhardt
Method,
deeply
engage
with
extensive
quantitative
data
sets
auditor
switches,
pricing,
clients’
earnings
management.
The
analyses
do
not
reveal
significant
for
KPMG.
Earnings
management
provides
some
limited
indication
allows
more
opportunistic
choices.
Overall,
our
analysis
suggests
be
insufficient
discipline
acting
opportunistically
at
cost
less
powerful
low
settings.
Язык: Английский