Coevolution Mechanism of Remanufacturer–Construction Enterprise–Public in Construction and Demolition Waste Resource Utilization Projects under Green Value Co-Creation
Buildings,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
14(7), С. 2214 - 2214
Опубликована: Июль 18, 2024
The
utilization
of
resources
plays
a
crucial
role
in
mitigating
the
environmental
pollution
issue
that
improper
disposal
construction
and
demolition
waste
(CDW)
causes.
However,
slow
growth
recycled
building
materials
market
limits
development
CDW
resource
utilization.
Green
value
co-creation
among
remanufacturers,
enterprises,
public
projects
is
an
effective
way
to
address
issue.
This
study,
based
on
theory
co-creation,
uses
evolutionary
game
method
construct
model
for
projects.
main
conclusions
are
as
follows:
(1)
When
degree
green
0.1
or
0.5,
remanufacturer,
enterprise,
cannot
maintain
state
co-creation;
when
0.9,
project
finally
reach
stable
co-creation.
(2)
enhancing
willingness
remanufacturer
can
lead
other
stakeholders
participate
study
contributes
promotion
stakeholder
cooperation
projects,
thus
providing
implications
resources.
Язык: Английский
The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China
Frontiers in Marine Science,
Год журнала:
2025,
Номер
11
Опубликована: Янв. 20, 2025
Mariculture
constitutes
the
primary
origin
of
microplastic
pollution,
necessitating
immediate
action
to
address
pollution
by
focusing
on
both
supply
and
demand
aspects
fishing
gear.
Based
cooperative
management
model
mariculture
this
paper
develops
an
evolutionary
game
that
incorporates
interactions
among
gear
enterprises,
fishermen,
government.
It
then
proceeds
examine
government’s
strategy
for
managing
through
theory
simulation
analysis.
The
main
findings
obtained
are
as
follows.
(1)
can
be
improved
chain
market
implementing
subsidies.
likelihood
receiving
government
subsidies
boosts
production
environmentally-friendly
enterprises
purchase
such
fishermen.
(2)
cost-benefit
variations
government,
reaches
distinct
equilibrium
states,
leading
corresponding
adjustments
in
optimal
subsidy
strategy.
(3)
While
there
some
positive
effects
subsidies,
increasing
does
not
necessarily
lead
better
outcomes.
As
total
amount
increases,
best
practice
governments
would
phase
out
Accordingly,
should
build
a
multi-subject
collaborative
governance
model,
reasonably
control
amount,
prevent
adverse
consequences
excessive
optimize
structure
recipients.
Язык: Английский
Can government subsidy promote the light-blue fishery upgrade to deep-blue fishery?
Frontiers in Marine Science,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
11
Опубликована: Июнь 5, 2024
Introduction
The
expansion
of
fishery
development
from
offshore
to
deep-sea
areas
has
become
essential
for
countries
address
environmental
constraints
and
ensure
food
security.
This
study
aims
establish
a
cooperative
model
deep-blue
involving
the
government,
enterprises,
consumers.
Methods
We
constructed
an
evolutionary
game
simulation
analyze
government's
subsidy
strategy.
considers
interactions
between
consumers,
evaluating
how
different
strategies
influence
fishery.
Results
Our
results
demonstrate
that
government
subsidies
can
stimulate
growth
both
demand
supply
sides.
Specifically,
likelihood
positively
affects
enterprises'
engagement
in
consumers'
willingness
purchase
products.
system
reaches
steady
states
based
on
cost-benefit
changes
leading
various
optimal
strategies.
Discussion
findings
indicate
amount
should
be
optimized
rather
than
maximized,
as
excessive
may
not
yield
proportionate
benefits.
Additionally,
subsidizing
enterprises
proves
more
effective
promoting
compared
These
insights
guide
policymakers
designing
efficient
foster
sustainable
development.
Язык: Английский
Evolutionary game analysis on technological innovation strategies of marine ranching enterprises considering government’s incentive policies and consumer preferences
Frontiers in Marine Science,
Год журнала:
2024,
Номер
11
Опубликована: Авг. 30, 2024
As
a
new
mode
of
marine
industry,
ranching
is
gradually
becoming
an
important
means
to
promote
the
high-quality
development
economy.
Meanwhile,
technological
innovation
enterprises
(MREs)
can
enhance
economic
and
ecological
functions
ranching.
This
paper
builds
evolutionary
game
model
including
MREs,
government
consumers
analyze
strategic
choices.
The
results
show
that:
(1)
government’s
incentive
policies
play
key
role
in
initial
period
while
eliminate
mature
MREs.
(2)
Government’s
consist
subsidy
tax
policies.
amount
should
be
moderate
order
avoid
financial
burdens,
policy
adaptation
different
types
(3)
Consumers’
preference
significantly
affects
strategy
MREs
innovation.
Government
subsidies
for
with
preferences
guide
market
demand
provide
signals
study
provides
reference
formulate
relevant
Язык: Английский