Cyclical oscillations and absorbing-state probabilities in optional public goods games: Interplay of reward and group size
Physical review. E,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
111(1)
Published: Jan. 21, 2025
The
optional
public
goods
game
(OPGG)
is
a
three-strategy
model
in
which
individuals
can
cooperate,
defect,
or
not
participate.
Despite
its
simplicity,
this
effectively
captures
various
social
dilemmas,
including
those
involving
services,
environmental
sustainability,
and
broader
societal
issues.
In
study,
we
investigate
how
the
reward
(r)
group
size
of
potential
players
(S)
games
influence
steady-state
coexistence
these
strategies
alternation
their
dominance
rock-paper-scissors
dynamic.
OPGG
simulated
using
Monte
Carlo
nonspatial
scenario,
meaning
there
no
topology
connecting
agents,
allowing
any
player
to
interact
with
other
player.
We
show
that
under
sufficiently
noisy
conditions,
system
consistently
evolves
an
absorbing
state,
prevailing
strategy
determined
by
values
r
S.
range
2≤r≤S,
shows
multiple
stable
states,
groups
S=4
exhibiting
more
pronounced
transient
dynamics
longer
average
times.
present
thorough
analysis
our
results
terms
fraction
time
spends
rock-paper-scissor
cycles,
number
probability
relaxes
each
possible
scenarios
where
does
reach
state
at
all.
locked
icon
Physics
Subject
Headings
(PhySH)Economic
gamesGame
theory
models
Language: Английский
OP-HHO based feature selection improves the performance of depression classification framework: A gender biased multiband research
Kun Li,
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PeiYun Zhong,
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Dong Li
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et al.
Applied Mathematics and Computation,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
495, P. 129317 - 129317
Published: Jan. 24, 2025
Language: Английский
Spatial reciprocity under reinforcement learning mechanism
Lu Wang,
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Xianpan Shi,
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Yang Zhou
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et al.
Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
35(2)
Published: Feb. 1, 2025
At
present,
the
research
on
dynamics
of
cooperative
behavior
agents
under
reinforcement
learning
mechanism
either
assumes
that
have
global
interaction,
is,
interact
with
all
other
in
population,
or
directly
study
influence
relevant
factors
cooperation
evolution
based
local
interaction
a
network
structure.
It
neglects
to
formally
how
limitation
only
affects
their
strategy
choice.
Thus,
this
paper,
we
typical
social
decision-making
environment
conflicts
between
individual
interests
and
collective
interests.
On
one
hand,
programmed
game
model
theory,
namely,
prisoner’s
dilemma
game,
is
used
capture
essence
real-world
dilemmas.
effects
are
investigated
separately,
nature
spatial
reciprocity
found.
Specifically,
when
there
no
inherent
connection
interacting
within
system,
structure
has
limited
effect
promoting
cooperation.
an
overlap
observed
traditional
evolutionary
theory
can
be
fully
realized.
Language: Английский
Catalyst strategy for the evolution of cooperation in indirect reciprocity
Ji Quan,
No information about this author
Yixin Feng,
No information about this author
Jiacheng Nie
No information about this author
et al.
Applied Mathematics and Computation,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
497, P. 129379 - 129379
Published: Feb. 27, 2025
Language: Английский
Brain functional connectivity network during deception: a visibility graph approach
Ali Rahimi Saryazdi,
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Atiyeh Bayani,
No information about this author
Farnaz Ghassemi
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et al.
The European Physical Journal Special Topics,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: April 16, 2025
Language: Английский
Evolutionary dynamics in state-feedback public goods games with peer punishment
Q. Wang,
No information about this author
Xiaojie Chen,
No information about this author
Attila Szolnoki
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et al.
Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
35(4)
Published: April 1, 2025
Public
goods
game
serves
as
a
valuable
paradigm
for
studying
the
challenges
of
collective
cooperation
in
human
and
natural
societies.
Peer
punishment
is
often
considered
an
effective
incentive
promoting
such
contexts.
However,
previous
related
studies
have
mostly
ignored
positive
feedback
effect
contributions
on
individual
payoffs.
In
this
work,
we
explore
global
local
state-feedback,
where
multiplication
factor
positively
correlated
with
frequency
contributors
entire
population
or
within
group,
respectively.
By
using
replicator
dynamics
infinite
well-mixed
population,
reveal
that
state-based
plays
crucial
role
alleviating
cooperative
dilemma
by
enhancing
sustaining
compared
to
feedback-free
case.
Moreover,
when
strength
sufficiently
strong
baseline
high,
system
state-feedback
provides
full
cooperation,
hence
supporting
“think
globally,
act
locally”
principle.
Besides,
show
second-order
free-rider
problem
can
be
partially
mitigated
under
certain
conditions
employed.
Importantly,
these
results
remain
robust
respect
variations
cost
fine.
Language: Английский
The dynamics of uncertainty: a systematic review of non-linear dynamical systems in decision-making
S. D. Bajpai,
No information about this author
Ahmed Sameer
No information about this author
Nonlinear Dynamics,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: April 23, 2025
Language: Английский
Coupled Information-epidemic Spreading with Consideration of Self-isolation in the Context of Mass Media
Dan Yang,
No information about this author
Kunwei Chen,
No information about this author
Wei Zhang
No information about this author
et al.
Physics Letters A,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
unknown, P. 130016 - 130016
Published: Oct. 1, 2024
Language: Английский
Emergency Evacuation Dynamics Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Physics Letters A,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
528, P. 130059 - 130059
Published: Nov. 12, 2024
Language: Английский
The Influence of Fine Distribution and Compensation on Cooperation in Public Goods Game
Mathematics,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
12(24), P. 3919 - 3919
Published: Dec. 12, 2024
In
spatial
public
goods
games,
groups
consisting
solely
of
defectors
do
not
benefit.
Consequently,
intelligent
are
inclined
to
incur
the
cost
punishing
other
enable
cooperators
flourish
within
group,
thereby
safeguarding
their
own
advantages.
Drawing
from
real-world
observations
where
early
preparation
often
dictates
future
success,
we
integrated
probabilistic
punishment
into
game
and
analyzed
two
scenarios.
first
scenario,
a
mechanism
was
established,
wherein
higher
monitoring
enforcement,
greater
probability
punishment.
second
compensation
fine
distribution
introduced
alongside
punishment,
outcome
determined
whether
smart
defector
recovered
part
or
rewarded
with
additional
benefits.
This
incentivized
judiciously
assess
required
effectively
protect
interests.
The
study
demonstrated
that
both
mechanisms
significantly
enhanced
cooperation,
model
involving
proving
more
effective
than
simple
alone.
These
results
offer
novel
insights
dynamics
role
in
fostering
cooperation.
Language: Английский