The Influence of Fine Distribution and Compensation on Cooperation in Public Goods Game DOI Creative Commons
Yong Shen, Jin Guo, Hongwei Kang

et al.

Mathematics, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 12(24), P. 3919 - 3919

Published: Dec. 12, 2024

In spatial public goods games, groups consisting solely of defectors do not benefit. Consequently, intelligent are inclined to incur the cost punishing other enable cooperators flourish within group, thereby safeguarding their own advantages. Drawing from real-world observations where early preparation often dictates future success, we integrated probabilistic punishment into game and analyzed two scenarios. first scenario, a mechanism was established, wherein higher monitoring enforcement, greater probability punishment. second compensation fine distribution introduced alongside punishment, outcome determined whether smart defector recovered part or rewarded with additional benefits. This incentivized judiciously assess required effectively protect interests. The study demonstrated that both mechanisms significantly enhanced cooperation, model involving proving more effective than simple alone. These results offer novel insights dynamics role in fostering cooperation.

Language: Английский

Cyclical oscillations and absorbing-state probabilities in optional public goods games: Interplay of reward and group size DOI
Eduardo V. Stock, Pablo A. Valverde,

Juan Carlos González-Avella

et al.

Physical review. E, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 111(1)

Published: Jan. 21, 2025

The optional public goods game (OPGG) is a three-strategy model in which individuals can cooperate, defect, or not participate. Despite its simplicity, this effectively captures various social dilemmas, including those involving services, environmental sustainability, and broader societal issues. In study, we investigate how the reward (r) group size of potential players (S) games influence steady-state coexistence these strategies alternation their dominance rock-paper-scissors dynamic. OPGG simulated using Monte Carlo nonspatial scenario, meaning there no topology connecting agents, allowing any player to interact with other player. We show that under sufficiently noisy conditions, system consistently evolves an absorbing state, prevailing strategy determined by values r S. range 2≤r≤S, shows multiple stable states, groups S=4 exhibiting more pronounced transient dynamics longer average times. present thorough analysis our results terms fraction time spends rock-paper-scissor cycles, number probability relaxes each possible scenarios where does reach state at all. locked icon Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)Economic gamesGame theory models

Language: Английский

Citations

0

OP-HHO based feature selection improves the performance of depression classification framework: A gender biased multiband research DOI
Kun Li, PeiYun Zhong,

Dong Li

et al.

Applied Mathematics and Computation, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 495, P. 129317 - 129317

Published: Jan. 24, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Spatial reciprocity under reinforcement learning mechanism DOI
Lu Wang,

Xianpan Shi,

Yang Zhou

et al.

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 35(2)

Published: Feb. 1, 2025

At present, the research on dynamics of cooperative behavior agents under reinforcement learning mechanism either assumes that have global interaction, is, interact with all other in population, or directly study influence relevant factors cooperation evolution based local interaction a network structure. It neglects to formally how limitation only affects their strategy choice. Thus, this paper, we typical social decision-making environment conflicts between individual interests and collective interests. On one hand, programmed game model theory, namely, prisoner’s dilemma game, is used capture essence real-world dilemmas. effects are investigated separately, nature spatial reciprocity found. Specifically, when there no inherent connection interacting within system, structure has limited effect promoting cooperation. an overlap observed traditional evolutionary theory can be fully realized.

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Catalyst strategy for the evolution of cooperation in indirect reciprocity DOI

Ji Quan,

Yixin Feng,

Jiacheng Nie

et al.

Applied Mathematics and Computation, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 497, P. 129379 - 129379

Published: Feb. 27, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Brain functional connectivity network during deception: a visibility graph approach DOI

Ali Rahimi Saryazdi,

Atiyeh Bayani, Farnaz Ghassemi

et al.

The European Physical Journal Special Topics, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: April 16, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Evolutionary dynamics in state-feedback public goods games with peer punishment DOI

Q. Wang,

Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

et al.

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 35(4)

Published: April 1, 2025

Public goods game serves as a valuable paradigm for studying the challenges of collective cooperation in human and natural societies. Peer punishment is often considered an effective incentive promoting such contexts. However, previous related studies have mostly ignored positive feedback effect contributions on individual payoffs. In this work, we explore global local state-feedback, where multiplication factor positively correlated with frequency contributors entire population or within group, respectively. By using replicator dynamics infinite well-mixed population, reveal that state-based plays crucial role alleviating cooperative dilemma by enhancing sustaining compared to feedback-free case. Moreover, when strength sufficiently strong baseline high, system state-feedback provides full cooperation, hence supporting “think globally, act locally” principle. Besides, show second-order free-rider problem can be partially mitigated under certain conditions employed. Importantly, these results remain robust respect variations cost fine.

Language: Английский

Citations

0

The dynamics of uncertainty: a systematic review of non-linear dynamical systems in decision-making DOI

S. D. Bajpai,

Ahmed Sameer

Nonlinear Dynamics, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: April 23, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Coupled Information-epidemic Spreading with Consideration of Self-isolation in the Context of Mass Media DOI
Dan Yang,

Kunwei Chen,

Wei Zhang

et al.

Physics Letters A, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 130016 - 130016

Published: Oct. 1, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

2

Emergency Evacuation Dynamics Based on Evolutionary Game Theory DOI
Kun Li, Zhiyu Chen

Physics Letters A, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 528, P. 130059 - 130059

Published: Nov. 12, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

0

The Influence of Fine Distribution and Compensation on Cooperation in Public Goods Game DOI Creative Commons
Yong Shen, Jin Guo, Hongwei Kang

et al.

Mathematics, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 12(24), P. 3919 - 3919

Published: Dec. 12, 2024

In spatial public goods games, groups consisting solely of defectors do not benefit. Consequently, intelligent are inclined to incur the cost punishing other enable cooperators flourish within group, thereby safeguarding their own advantages. Drawing from real-world observations where early preparation often dictates future success, we integrated probabilistic punishment into game and analyzed two scenarios. first scenario, a mechanism was established, wherein higher monitoring enforcement, greater probability punishment. second compensation fine distribution introduced alongside punishment, outcome determined whether smart defector recovered part or rewarded with additional benefits. This incentivized judiciously assess required effectively protect interests. The study demonstrated that both mechanisms significantly enhanced cooperation, model involving proving more effective than simple alone. These results offer novel insights dynamics role in fostering cooperation.

Language: Английский

Citations

0