Implementing artificial consciousness DOI Creative Commons
Leonard Dung, Luke Kersten

Mind & Language, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Nov. 17, 2024

Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue several recently proposed implausible, or at least well‐supported, insofar as conflate intuitions about implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We instead the mechanistic account of computation can explain driving implementationalism non‐computationalism in a manner which is consistent with consciousness. Our argument provides indirect support for computationalism view conventional be conscious.

Language: Английский

Developmental Bioelectricity as an Explanatory Framework for Cognition and Meaning DOI Creative Commons
Ahti‐Veikko Pietarinen, Majid Davoody Beni, Vera Shumilina

et al.

Biosemiotics, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Feb. 5, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0
Artificial consciousness in AI: a posthuman fallacy DOI

Mahesh Prabhu,

J. Anil Premraj

AI & Society, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Sept. 14, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

2
The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip DOI Creative Commons
Johannes Kleiner, Tim Ludwig

Neuroscience of Consciousness, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 2024(1)

Published: Jan. 1, 2024

Abstract We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to question artificial consciousness. The result is a theorem which shows that under general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according theory consciousness, it relevant for temporal evolution system’s states. rests facts about semiconductor development: AI central processing units, graphics tensor or other processors have been designed and verified adhere computational dynamics systematically preclude suppress deviations. Whether our resolves consciousness depends truth theorem’s main this paper does not establish.

Language: Английский

Citations

1
Implementing artificial consciousness DOI Creative Commons
Leonard Dung, Luke Kersten

Mind & Language, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Nov. 17, 2024

Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue several recently proposed implausible, or at least well‐supported, insofar as conflate intuitions about implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We instead the mechanistic account of computation can explain driving implementationalism non‐computationalism in a manner which is consistent with consciousness. Our argument provides indirect support for computationalism view conventional be conscious.

Language: Английский

Citations

0