Recycling Models of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment under Market-Driven Deposit-Refund System: A Stackelberg Game Analysis DOI Creative Commons
Yi Liu, Weihua Liu, Chunsheng Li

et al.

Mathematics, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 12(14), P. 2187 - 2187

Published: July 12, 2024

Recycling waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has garnered considerable societal attention. To incentivize WEEE recycling within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), deposit-refund system (DRS) been implemented. This study delves into the implications of market-driven DRS on under different models. A Stackelberg game analysis is employed, where an electronics manufacturer (leader) sufficient channel power over retailer third-party recycler (followers). The results indicate that significantly incentivizes consumer efforts, ultimately elevating economic efficiency chain. When assumes responsibility for recycling, it streamlines process, thereby enhancing operational profitability. Conversely, when handles reduces retail prices simplifies positively influencing purchasing behavior. However, undertakes volume tends to be minimal, resulting in lowest level profits. paper provides theoretical practical improving effectiveness CLSC.

Language: Английский

Reverse Supply Chain of Spent Electric Vehicle Battery: The Risk Aversion Prospective DOI

elaine xin,

Shaolong Tang,

Jacqueline Wenjie Wang

et al.

Published: Jan. 1, 2024

Strategies for recycling spent electric vehicle (EV) batteries offer the possibility of a sustainable supply such metals. In this research, we address decision making EV battery reverse chain based on risk aversion. The channel, consisting collector and recycler, resembles Stackelberg decision-making game, where latter is leader with sufficient channel power over former. As faces great uncertainty recycled metal prices, leader, i.e., averse. Taking into account refined metals' prices attitude develop analytical models to analyze optimal decisions members. are validated using case-based real data collected from an recycler in Shenzhen, China. Our study shows that progressive transfer price scheme returned between can motivate achieve same return rate as centrally coordinated channel. We also show degree aversion volatility major metals affect well profits Insights policy makers discussed. practice, Decision Support System (DSS) has been developed company by implementing pricing scheme.

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Recycling Models of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment under Market-Driven Deposit-Refund System: A Stackelberg Game Analysis DOI Creative Commons
Yi Liu, Weihua Liu, Chunsheng Li

et al.

Mathematics, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 12(14), P. 2187 - 2187

Published: July 12, 2024

Recycling waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has garnered considerable societal attention. To incentivize WEEE recycling within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), deposit-refund system (DRS) been implemented. This study delves into the implications of market-driven DRS on under different models. A Stackelberg game analysis is employed, where an electronics manufacturer (leader) sufficient channel power over retailer third-party recycler (followers). The results indicate that significantly incentivizes consumer efforts, ultimately elevating economic efficiency chain. When assumes responsibility for recycling, it streamlines process, thereby enhancing operational profitability. Conversely, when handles reduces retail prices simplifies positively influencing purchasing behavior. However, undertakes volume tends to be minimal, resulting in lowest level profits. paper provides theoretical practical improving effectiveness CLSC.

Language: Английский

Citations

0