Sustainability,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
16(24), P. 11300 - 11300
Published: Dec. 23, 2024
This
paper
constructs
an
evolutionary
game
model
involving
the
“central
government–local
government–coal
enterprises”
to
explore
impact
mechanism
of
central
environmental
protection
inspection
on
green
coal
mining.
By
analyzing
strategic
behaviors
key
actors,
this
study
identifies
critical
factors
that
influence
their
decisions.
System
simulations
are
conducted
assess
effects
parameters
system
stability
and
convergence.
The
findings
indicate
following:
(1)
Increasing
costs
weaken
government’s
support
for
mining,
with
excessive
potentially
causing
regulatory
fatigue.
Moderating
investments
is
sustaining
long-term
effectiveness.
(2)
Higher
penalties
local
governments
improve
enforcement
mining
policies,
particularly
in
mid-term,
showing
stringent
effective
tool.
(3)
Lower
technical
greater
economic
incentives
encourage
enterprises
adopt
practices,
highlighting
role
innovation
profitability
driving
transitions.
(4)
Central
government
subsidies
enhance
governments’
short-term
but
may
lead
dependence
if
overused.
Balanced
subsidy
policies
essential
sustained
policy
implementation
at
level.
Based
these
findings,
proposes
recommendations
mechanisms,
optimize
tools,
establish
a
collaborative
ensure
effectiveness
Environmental Sciences Europe,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
36(1)
Published: April 30, 2024
Abstract
The
enactment
of
the
Environmental
Protection
Tax
Law
was
a
major
event
in
process
China's
economic
and
social
development.
This
law
has
achieved
certain
results
first
two
years
since
enactment,
but
there
have
also
been
many
problems.
During
three-year
strict
pandemic
control
period,
normal
implementation
impacted,
causing
alienation
reducing
quality
implementation.
study
empirically
reveals
mechanism
by
taking
1000
Chinese
tax
professionals,
randomly
divides
sample
equally
into
parts,
utilizing
500
samples
for
initial
test
another
robustness
test.
research
shows
that
pollutant
emission
monitoring
(correlation
coefficient
is
0.07),
preferential
policies
0.03)
personnel
0.06)
are
not
conducive
to
realizing
crowding-out
effect
Law,
while
0.05),
information-sharing
platforms
0.05)
hinder
incentive
effect,
remaining
elements
passed
correlation
within
confidence
intervals.
Therefore,
should
be
improved
following
ways:
accuracy
environmental
protection
departments'
supervision
emissions
as
well
scientificity
rationality
improved,
construction
strengthened,
compound
collection
management
talent
created.
Sustainability,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
16(24), P. 11300 - 11300
Published: Dec. 23, 2024
This
paper
constructs
an
evolutionary
game
model
involving
the
“central
government–local
government–coal
enterprises”
to
explore
impact
mechanism
of
central
environmental
protection
inspection
on
green
coal
mining.
By
analyzing
strategic
behaviors
key
actors,
this
study
identifies
critical
factors
that
influence
their
decisions.
System
simulations
are
conducted
assess
effects
parameters
system
stability
and
convergence.
The
findings
indicate
following:
(1)
Increasing
costs
weaken
government’s
support
for
mining,
with
excessive
potentially
causing
regulatory
fatigue.
Moderating
investments
is
sustaining
long-term
effectiveness.
(2)
Higher
penalties
local
governments
improve
enforcement
mining
policies,
particularly
in
mid-term,
showing
stringent
effective
tool.
(3)
Lower
technical
greater
economic
incentives
encourage
enterprises
adopt
practices,
highlighting
role
innovation
profitability
driving
transitions.
(4)
Central
government
subsidies
enhance
governments’
short-term
but
may
lead
dependence
if
overused.
Balanced
subsidy
policies
essential
sustained
policy
implementation
at
level.
Based
these
findings,
proposes
recommendations
mechanisms,
optimize
tools,
establish
a
collaborative
ensure
effectiveness
