Systems,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
13(1), P. 19 - 19
Published: Dec. 31, 2024
Live
streaming
has
been
widely
used
by
enterprises
to
motivate
consumers
in
real-time
interactions.
However,
live
streamers’
corporate
social
responsibility
(CSR)
overlooked
existing
studies.
This
paper
examines
the
CSR
investment
strategy
for
brand
owner
and
streamer
considering
effect
of
consumer
preference
power
structure
within
live-streaming
supply
chains
(LSSCs).
To
achieve
this
objective,
we
develop
different
Stackelberg
game
models
examine
an
LSSC
focusing
on
whether
either
firm
can
be
leader
or
invest
CSR.
Additionally,
impact
both
firms
investing
are
analyzed.
Our
findings
reveal
that
regardless
who
investor
is,
benefits
firms,
(brand
streamer)
always
more
from
follower
consumers.
Moreover,
one
prefers
other
when
sensitivity
is
low;
otherwise,
it
itself.
Finally,
our
research
highlights
win-win
outcomes
members
These
provide
implications
strategies
preferences.
Live
streaming,
as
an
emerging
e-commerce
model,
has
changed
the
traditional
shopping
experience
and
business
model.
However,
due
to
high
slot
commission
fees,
many
brands
have
refused
celebrities
for
sales
instead
invested
more
marketing
effort
in
official
live
streaming
channel,
such
advertising
or
inviting
room.
This
paper
focuses
on
impact
of
brand's
invite
room
promotional
purposes
channel
selection
strategy.
An
interesting
finding
this
is
that
can
change
celebrity's
charisma
rate
demand
a
dual
scenario.
In
addition,
also
shows
brand
tends
increase
its
regardless
whether
it
operates
commissioned
celebrity.
Specifically,
when
both
commissions
costs
are
low,
likely
within
mode.
Conversely,
high,
operate
there.
Mathematics,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
13(2), P. 230 - 230
Published: Jan. 11, 2025
In
recent
years,
live
streaming
has
become
popular
among
merchants
as
it
helps
them
obtain
direct
access
to
and
attract
customers.
This
study
examines
how
weak
upstream
providers
strong
downstream
sellers
adopt
in
a
supply
chain
framework.
It
uses
theoretical
game
model
with
one
provider
seller.
The
seller
sets
the
procurement
price,
then
decides
level.
Both
can
use
alongside
traditional
channels.
results
show
that
(1)
raises
both
retail
prices
channels;
(2)
may
differ
or
coincide
between
channels
when
different
parties
streaming;
(3)
streaming’s
market
cultivation
efficiency
decreases,
adoption
strategies
shift
from
using
only
neither;
(4)
always
benefits
but
harms
seller,
overall
impact
on
depending
types
of
equilibrium
strategies.
