Regulatory mechanism of vulnerability disclosure behavior considering security crowd-testing: An evolutionary game analysis

PLoS ONE, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 19(6), P. e0304467 - e0304467

Published: June 21, 2024

The security crowd-testing regulatory mechanism is a vital means to promote collaborative vulnerability disclosure. However, existing mechanisms have not considered multi-agent responsibility boundaries and stakeholders’ conflicts of interest, leading their dysfunction. Distinguishing from previous research on the motivations constraints ethical hacks’ disclosure behaviors legal perspective, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model SRCs, researchers, government managerial perspective propose promoting tripartite results show that higher initial willingness three parties choose strategy, faster system evolves into stable state. Regarding government’s incentive mechanism, establishing reward punishment based effective thresholds essential. it worth noting has adopt such only if receives sufficient benefits. To further facilitate disclosure, Security Response Centers (SRC) should establish including trust mechanisms. Additionally, publicity training for researchers be introduced reduce revenue illegal participation, which promotes healthy development crowd-testing. These findings contribute improving SRCs’ service quality, guiding researchers’ enhancing effectiveness, ultimately multi-party system.

Language: Английский

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Market incentives for the introduction of environmentally friendly products in conditions of asymmetry between companies

Theoretical economics, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 0(7), P. 70 - 79

Published: Sept. 6, 2024

An unstable market economy, environmental problems arising under the influence of carbon development and need to search for innovations are becoming a challenge introduction environmentally friendly products or orientation towards achieving long-term goals. The purpose article is identify incentives based on an asymmetric duopoly theory prisoner’s dilemma (game theory), operating in conditions limited access information, assumption non–interference state processes. following results were obtained study. It was determined how dynamics competition affect supply dirty products, taking into account cost technology, demand formation, competitive advantages information. demonstrate that focus occurs only if costs these low already formed. Awareness actions competitors makes more predictable, focused friendliness product. variety formed one condition – asymmetry. formation product differentiation important condition, since consumers have different income levels. provides recommendations implementation public policy aimed at supporting reduction companies’ innovations, ensuring ensures interests all categories consumers. Limitations study: does not study function its elasticity, also strategies related interaction price quantity productl.

Language: Английский

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Evolutionary game study and empirical analysis of the adoption of green coal mining technology: A case study of ITMDB

Energy, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 134019 - 134019

Published: Nov. 1, 2024

Language: Английский

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Research on Environmental Pollution Control Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game in China’s New-Type Urbanization

Sustainability, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 16(15), P. 6363 - 6363

Published: July 25, 2024

The inconsistency of interests among local governments, polluting companies, and the public reduces efficiency environmental pollution control, posing a significant challenge in harmonizing these to achieve sustainability China’s new-type urbanization. To elucidate strategic decision-making rules each party this study constructs tripartite evolutionary game model analyzes stable strategies (ESS), identifying influencing factors parties’ strategies. Subsequently, numerical simulations are used examine asymptotic stability various ESS effects parameter variation on ESS. results indicate existence optimal wherein all three parties adopt environmentally friendly Specifically, governments can mitigate expenses for companies implement low-pollution strategies, while concurrently facilitating participation control. Public enhance supervisory capabilities exert positive influence companies. Furthermore, simulation suggest that evolve into expected by adjusting reasonably, thereby supporting

Language: Английский

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Producing Green or Brown? A Game of Green Innovation in an Asymmetric Oligopoly

Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 26(02)

Published: March 20, 2024

As consensus grows for low-carbon development, innovation becomes vital green growth, given the substantial technology adoption needed long-term environmental targets. This paper explores market-driven incentives product in an asymmetric duopoly using a game theory approach without relying on direct government intervention. The roles that market dynamics and rivalry have supply of or brown products are explored simultaneous sequential scenarios, considering costs, demand-creating effects, gains, information availability. Results reveal fully is contingent low depending especially magnitude demand creation effects. Notably, differentiation occurs only under extreme cost asymmetry. Recommendations underscore importance incentivising low-cost innovations, assessing impact diversity, concerning lower-income consumers, proposing measures to improve transparency firms’ strategic choices.

Language: Английский

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Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Technological Innovation in Developing Country Under External Technological Monopoly

Published: Jan. 1, 2024

Technological innovation is an effective way to break through the monopoly of key core technologies. To consider interaction effects multi-stakeholders, we constructed a three-party evolutionary game model including enterprises, technology monopolists, and government. The examines strategic decision-making process, influential factors, stability three players, followed by simulation analysis. results showed that (1) R&D outsourcing costs impact enterprises' technological decisions, (2) success probability innovations benefit affect monopolists' (3) government subsidies incentives for innovations, penalties can effectively inhibit monopolistic behaviors monopolists. paper also lists policy recommendations subsidy mechanisms punitive measures.

Language: Английский

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Unlocking Synergy: The Coevolution Mechanism of Enterprises’ Green Innovation Decisions Under China's Energy-Saving Regulations

Published: Jan. 1, 2024

Language: Английский

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation on Green Innovation Behavior Decision-Making of Energy Enterprises

Sustainability, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 16(17), P. 7542 - 7542

Published: Aug. 30, 2024

Encouraging environmentally friendly innovation in energy companies is an essential way to stop global warming. Through ingenious integration of reputation and fairness preference, this research develops evolutionary game model between the government companies. This investigates dynamic evolution green strategy selection by firms operating under supervision, using as a basis. study examines how regulations, including their subsidies penalties, reputation, affect behavior enterprises. The shows that without considering subsidy punishment regulation can improve tendency enterprises choose behavior. At same time, assume social responsibility In case with strong preference are more likely not adopt need penalties innovation; weak will take place fewer penalties; plays stronger role preferences. give theoretical foundation on which build precise regulatory plans for various encourage those

Language: Английский

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Government regulation, time-of-use tariff and flexibility improvement of power system: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Journal of Energy Storage, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 101, P. 113748 - 113748

Published: Sept. 20, 2024

Language: Английский

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Evolution of the financial market: Concepts and mechanisms

Finance and Credit, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 30(9), P. 2008 - 2033

Published: Sept. 30, 2024

Subject. The article deals with the transformation of basic trading procedures, mechanisms, and conceptual justifications financial market. Objectives. Our aim is to substantiate genesis concepts markets practices. Methods. study employs evolutionary analysis both market main approaches its explanation. We assess changes in processes through structural identification drivers, logic ongoing transformations. Results. underpinned possibilities limitations using traditional structures analyze modern associated development algorithmic procedures. Determining transitions market, practices technological as a single process made it possible open new research space algorithmic-computational transformations performative function finance. Conclusions. Analysis hypotheses influence models on organization enables conclude about strengthening properties

Language: Английский

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