Sustainability,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
16(18), P. 8084 - 8084
Published: Sept. 16, 2024
Prefabricated
buildings
(PBs)
are
considered
a
green
way
to
reduce
energy
consumption
and
carbon
emissions
in
the
construction
industry
due
their
environmental
social
benefits.
However,
PBs
have
obstacles
such
as
high
costs,
immature
technology,
insufficient
policy
incentives,
developers’
willingness
develop
them
needs
be
higher.
Therefore,
it
is
necessary
explore
how
motivate
more
developers
PBs.
In
this
paper,
we
first
discuss
impact
of
trading
scheme
(ETS)
on
then
consider
heterogeneity
developers,
introduce
collaborative
mechanism
establish
three-party
evolutionary
game
model
between
government
heterogeneous
evolution
dynamic
strategies
through
numerical
simulation.
The
results
show
that
initial
development
probability
affects
system’s
trend,
developer
who
obtains
low-carbon
benefits
plays
dominant
role.
Further
analyses
critical
factors
market
profitability,
synergistic
benefits,
tax
price
positively
influence
PBs,
cooperation
mechanisms
should
especially
emphasized.
This
study
provides
practical
insights
into
sustainable
government’s
suitable
portfolio
for
it.
Including
ETS
recommended
when
prices
reach
110
RMB/t.
At
point,
can
remove
subsidy
but
behaviors
participate
still
need
supervised.
Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: Jan. 16, 2025
Purpose
The
managerial
questions
of
this
paper
are
as
follows:
What
the
equilibrium
conditions
transfer
price,
quantity
and
profits
when
considering
dynamic
subsidies
from
government?
Which
collection
channel
is
better
for
a
manufacturer,
direct
by
itself
or
through
an
online
platform?
Design/methodology/approach
This
research
investigates
three
models:
manufacturer-driven
model,
platform-driven
model
competitive
model.
Based
on
differential
game,
explores
cost,
subsidy
manufacturer
platform
profit
in
different
models
subsidy.
Findings
results
show
that
strategy
depends
its
cost.
If
cost
lower,
then
may
prefer
to
collect
itself.
When
meets
certain
range,
used
product
platform.
most
efficient
because
both
can
make
higher
profit.
Originality/value
bridges
gap
between
waste
electrical
electronic
equipment
government
demonstrating
condition
subsidies.
It
offers
approach
address
influence
subsidy,
which
provide
practical
insights
implementing
policy.
Managerial and Decision Economics,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: April 16, 2025
ABSTRACT
The
contradiction
between
economic
development
and
the
negative
externalities
generated
by
extraction
of
ionic
rare
earth
elements,
such
as
resource
depletion
environmental
pollution,
is
becoming
increasingly
prominent.
Based
on
prospect
theory,
this
paper
utilizes
perceived
value
game
players
to
construct
a
benefit
matrix
that
differs
from
traditional
tripartite
model.
On
basis
analysis
evolution
static
reward
punishment
mechanisms,
three
dynamic
namely,
reward,
punishment,
are
successively
introduced
for
analysis.
study
demonstrated
under
mechanism,
three‐party
evolutionary
not
asymptotically
stable.
After
introduction
becomes
stable,
all
in
show
positive
willingness
govern.
Furthermore,
varying
sensitivity
coefficients
result
relatively
stable
governance
behaviors
mine
enterprises.
With
different
coefficients,
product
enterprises
remains
while
government
application
more
variable.
Energy Science & Engineering,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: April 28, 2025
ABSTRACT
Achieving
carbon
emission
reduction
of
prefabricated
building
supply
chain
(PBSC)
has
become
an
effective
means
to
achieve
low‐carbon
economic
development
in
many
countries.
However,
the
current
PBSC
lacks
coordination
among
enterprises
chain,
making
it
difficult
realize
effects
policy.
To
this
end,
paper
proposes
innovative
strategy
that
integrates
government
rewards
and
punishments,
bilateral
cost‐sharing
revenue‐sharing
contracts
(GRP‐BCRC)
promote
collaborative
thus
bridge
gap
between
policy
practical
implementation.
Therefore,
considering
mechanism
reward
punishment
BCRC,
establishes
a
tripartite
evolutionary
game
model
government,
material
suppliers
(MS)
component
manufacturers
(PCM),
thence
numerically
simulate
evolution
stability
trend
coordinated
reductions
emissions
analyze
sensitivity
parameters.
The
results
show
that:
(1)
GRP‐BCRC
is
approach
for
achieving
joint
enterprises,
enabling
system
reach
more
desirable
equilibrium
state
under
specific
conditions.
(2)
Both
subsidies
penalties
can
effectively
improvement
PBSC,
with
demonstrating
significant
impact.
Additionally,
increasing
greater
influence
on
behavior
than
construction
enterprises.
(3)
facilitate
optimization
proving
efficient
goal.
Construction
are
sensitive
changes
profit
distribution
variations
cost‐sharing.
(4)
sharing
ratio
critical
factor
influencing
effectiveness
innovation
strategy.
Excessively
high
or
low
ratios
lead
collapse
efforts,
undermining
long‐term
PBSC.
