Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game DOI

Liyan Gao,

Qiuhui Pan, Mingfeng He

et al.

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 35(2)

Published: Feb. 1, 2025

When the number of cooperators does not reach collective target, resulting in risk social dilemma, self-organizing behavior group leads to loss interest and government intervention increase interest. For these two situations, we study evolution cooperation under threshold public goods game well-mixed population. The results show that introduction makes it possible generate complex dynamics with interior equilibria replication equation. behavior, increasing is a double-edged sword. Although raising may level cooperation, dominance defection also increases. significantly promotes cooperation. common result individuals tend free-ride when size In addition, greater impact behaviors on interest, more conducive promoting there are fewer initial cooperators, should intervene time attracting than intervention. We hope model proposed this paper can contribute addressing challenges posed by global issues such as climate change degradation ecological environment.

Language: Английский

Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game DOI

Liyan Gao,

Qiuhui Pan, Mingfeng He

et al.

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 35(2)

Published: Feb. 1, 2025

When the number of cooperators does not reach collective target, resulting in risk social dilemma, self-organizing behavior group leads to loss interest and government intervention increase interest. For these two situations, we study evolution cooperation under threshold public goods game well-mixed population. The results show that introduction makes it possible generate complex dynamics with interior equilibria replication equation. behavior, increasing is a double-edged sword. Although raising may level cooperation, dominance defection also increases. significantly promotes cooperation. common result individuals tend free-ride when size In addition, greater impact behaviors on interest, more conducive promoting there are fewer initial cooperators, should intervene time attracting than intervention. We hope model proposed this paper can contribute addressing challenges posed by global issues such as climate change degradation ecological environment.

Language: Английский

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