Inquiry, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 1 - 25
Published: April 28, 2025
Language: Английский
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their us? Why place ourselves under the sway of concept and grant it authority shape thought conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way thinking better than another? This book develops framework for appraisal. Its guiding idea is that question concepts ask reasons special kind: use, which tell adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the action belief guide deliberations. Traditionally, use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision consistency. Against this, advances two main claims: we find conceptual needs discover when critically distance from by viewing autoethnographic stance; sometimes, conflict, exhibit other vices vagueness superficiality, are just need. By considering not absolutely best, but now need, can reconcile contingency concepts, determine proper efforts tidy up thought, adjudicate between competing conceptions things—even things contested liberty free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification hobbling tidy-mindedness, authoritative definition gerrymandering.
Language: Английский
Citations
14
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 255 - 304
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter describes the role of reasons for concept use, showing how they allow us to answer authority question without crowding out other kinds that transcend preoccupation with human concerns or instrumentality concepts. A needs-based conception conceptual is articulated, on which concepts are authoritative if and extent meet needs we have in virtue identify would still endorse after well-informed reflection merits those came by them. The contours this sharpened contrasting it alternative conceptions authority. then defuses worry yields wrong kind reasons, argues overlooks some our most important prefer certain over others. Finally, explored what sense can be valuable good-for-nothings.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 31 - 59
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter clarifies the basic question from which book sets out: why should we grant a given concept authority to shape our thought and conduct? The conceptual at issue in this ‘authority question’ is distinguished normativity of concepts, motivated by highlighting power architectures. then explores how finds expression everyday discourse before arguing that many conceptualizations do not involve anything as straightforward an epistemic error nevertheless have something wrong with them. They pick out alright, make any obviously false presuppositions. But they form proper targets critique—of ethical critique, broad sense includes all kinds practically relevant considerations. Truth, justification, knowledge are very well, but only things want human thought.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 84 - 110
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract Setting out from the phenomenon of concept loss, this chapter develops notion confidence in concepts. Confidence sustains engaged use. When shaken by confrontations with alternative ways thinking, however, comes to require reasons—especially when invite reflection on contingency our concepts more than they moral appraisal requiring This creates room for a helpful form relativism. The then considers how affects knowledge possessed under these Drawing confidence, plausible interpretation Williams’s notorious thesis that can destroy is advanced. But it argued epistemic loss be ethical gain, and that, pace Williams, also strengthen yielding different knowledge: metaconceptual question are right ones us.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 307 - 342
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter applies the needs-based approach to a contested concept that has long been at heart of debates over free will and responsibility: voluntary. further illustrates underscores two insights it yields: powerful concerns can distort our conceptualizations out shape in which they best serve balance concerns; sometimes, there are good reasons favour concepts exhibiting what tidy-minded would consider defect, namely superficiality. Our conception voluntariness is essentially superficial, as only if we refrain from deepening it. After showing how superficial serves for fairness freedom, suggested theories trying deepen morally motivated exemplify problematic moralization psychology—they warp conceptualization psychology ensure moral demands be met.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 144 - 178
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter assesses the merits of main non-foundationalist rival to needs-based approach concept appraisal, which also escapes trilemma and revives something spirit Vienna Circle: tidy-minded that seeks conceptual authority by eliminating theoretical vices from our repertoire. Various kinds vices—including superficiality, inconsistency, incoherence, incongruence—are explicated, thereby setting stage for later chapters. Different forms are then considered, but they all found wanting as general answers question. To supplement more theoretically virtuous concepts with grounds on can claim authority, discriminate contexts in these given lacking, a comprehensive is needed—one considers not just how relate each other, us concerns.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 213 - 254
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter argues that conceptual needs are the missing link mediating between concepts and concerns. After clarifying this notion, explores to what extent can express conditions in which they would be worth using even when these not given. As needfulness remain intractable, notion of a need matrix—an incomplete but illuminating model conditions—is introduced render them more tractable. Various ways needs-based appraisal put into practice then considered. It is shown how one work back from concept its by treating two variables matrix as constants while solving for third, draws attention overlooked desiderata on conceptualization. Finally, four problems identified previous solved.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 1 - 28
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract Underscoring the importance of demand for reasons to reason in certain terms, this chapter introduces book’s overall project—to develop a needs-based framework concept appraisal—and motivates its focus on thick normative concepts. By tightly linking empirical conditions consequences, such concepts inexorably drive us towards beliefs, which makes them powerful tools influence; at same time, they are sociohistorically variable, leaving more freedom not think those terms all. This particularly liable raise question why prefer over alternatives. An overview structure and themes rounds out introduction. If primary theme book is use, secondary how drives foundationalist theorizing tidy-minded pursuit theoretical virtues, these should sometimes be resisted.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 60 - 83
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This chapter argues that addressing the authority question in way matters requires one to adopt a distinctive stance towards our concepts: autoethnographic stance. The possibility of taking up this whereby we disengage ourselves from concepts normally use an engaged is crucial achieving critical distance concepts. After bringing out importance distinction between and disengaged concept use, it shown how variety tempting philosophical errors can be traced conflations these two aspects: when reveals reasons perceive depend on notably, becomes insert dependence into content thoughts making those Finally, discussion nature shows conceptual ethics compatible even with picture as immutable abstracta.
Language: Английский
Citations
0
Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 376 - 380
Published: Jan. 31, 2025
Abstract This concluding chapter underscores what we gain by thinking in terms of second-order reasons, and identifies the reasons advanced book itself as third-order reasons: to count conceptual needs heed certain first-order against counting considerations cited foundationalism, ironism, holism reasons. On resulting view, do not merely constrain our choices concepts. They can positively inform guide them. In closing, it is indicated how research programme embodied needs-based approach might be pursued further, opens out into wider questions application implementation.
Language: Английский
Citations
0