The Politics of Conflicting Concerns

Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 343 - 375

Published: Jan. 31, 2025

Abstract This chapter considers how the needs-based approach accommodates politics of pluralistic and conflicting concerns. Applying to political concept liberty, it rounds out reconstruction Dworkin–Williams debate, showing Williams indicates two arguments for a conception liberty on which its realization conflicts with equality. But can also be used come Dworkin’s defence, revealing that there is place in tidy-minded pursuit theoretical virtues: need public reasoning take thinner more theoretically virtuous form than personal reasoning. serves concern hold decision-makers accountable. Once this ideal shapes people’s rationality reasoning, however, threatens entrain loss substance thought.

Language: Английский

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Concepts and Concerns

Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 181 - 212

Published: Jan. 31, 2025

Abstract This chapter argues that concept appraisal should look beyond theoretical virtues and consider how our concepts relate to the concerns animate their use. Using a little-known debate between Ronald Dworkin Bernard Williams over aspiration eliminate vices in as springboard needs-based account be developed, draws out three general lessons for conceptual ethics: merits of have judged based on prior understanding it serves; these cannot redirected at drop definition; if some proposed realizes cost severing its ties more important concerns, this will not an improvement. If we are mindful lessons, can appreciate practical vices. Yet tying back raises four problems own.

Language: Английский

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Anchoring Authority

Oxford University Press eBooks, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 113 - 143

Published: Jan. 31, 2025

Abstract This chapter reviews extant attempts to anchor the authority of concepts and argues that they present us with a trilemma between foundationalism, ironism, holism. It is argued first, when suitably generalized cover thick normative concepts, has become incredible; second results in indiscriminate disengagement from our concepts; third undiscriminating acceptance them. To escape this find more critical leverage which discriminate merit confidence do not, two things are required: picture conceptual apparatus as something harmonious, largely tensionless, inherently static must be replaced kaleidoscopic on tension-ridden dynamic; second, local needs harnessed by recognizing contingency extends also standards these meet.

Language: Английский

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Conceptual engineering: conceptual change or change in meaning?

Inquiry, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown, P. 1 - 25

Published: April 28, 2025

Language: Английский

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