Externalities and the Regulatory Role of Information Disclosure in Markets DOI

Julien Manili

SSRN Electronic Journal, Journal Year: 2022, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Jan. 1, 2022

Disclosure about many product attributes related to externalities is not mandatory, and consumers have rely on the information strategically disclosed by manufacturers. I show that under voluntary disclosure, dirty manufacturers can mislead exploiting a phenomenon of wishful belief formation. Bounded reasoning prevents from deducing production processes disclosure behavior. The resulting subjective uncertainty gives bite formation, which exploit through strategic use vagueness. These misperceptions reduce pressure demand side production, with important implications for role mandatory regulate externalities.

Language: Английский

Do Beliefs about Lobbying Affect Pro-environmental Behavior? Experimental Evidence DOI
Raphael Epperson

SSRN Electronic Journal, Journal Year: 2022, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Jan. 1, 2022

Lobbying is often expected to lower or prevent environmental regulations. A crucial question whether such beliefs affect individuals' willingness engage in pro-environmental behavior. I address this research by conducting a survey experiment with large heterogeneous sample from Germany. In the experiment, first induce random variation about impact of lobbying on climate protection. Afterward, exploit estimate causal effect these consider both observed and self-reported behaviors. While all point estimates suggest that expecting more negative makes individuals behave less pro-environmentally, only behaviors statistically significant.

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Externalities and the Regulatory Role of Information Disclosure in Markets DOI

Julien Manili

SSRN Electronic Journal, Journal Year: 2022, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Jan. 1, 2022

Disclosure about many product attributes related to externalities is not mandatory, and consumers have rely on the information strategically disclosed by manufacturers. I show that under voluntary disclosure, dirty manufacturers can mislead exploiting a phenomenon of wishful belief formation. Bounded reasoning prevents from deducing production processes disclosure behavior. The resulting subjective uncertainty gives bite formation, which exploit through strategic use vagueness. These misperceptions reduce pressure demand side production, with important implications for role mandatory regulate externalities.

Language: Английский

Citations

0