ACM Computing Surveys,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: March 31, 2025
Deep
Neural
Networks
(DNNs)
have
been
widely
deployed
in
security-critical
artificial
intelligence
systems,
such
as
autonomous
driving
and
facial
recognition
systems.
However,
recent
research
has
revealed
their
susceptibility
to
Trojan
information
maliciously
injected
by
attackers.
This
vulnerability
is
caused,
on
the
one
hand,
complex
architecture
non-interpretability
of
DNNs.
On
other
external
open-source
datasets,
pre-trained
models,
intelligent
service
platforms
further
exacerbate
threat
attacks.
article
presents
first
comprehensive
survey
attacks
against
DNNs
from
a
lifecycle
perspective,
including
training,
post-training,
inference
(deployment)
stages.
Specifically,
this
reformulates
relationships
with
poisoning
attacks,
adversarial
example
bit-flip
Then,
newly
emerged
model
architectures
(e.g.,
vision
transformers
spiking
neural
networks)
fields
investigated.
Moreover,
also
provides
review
countermeasures
(including
detection
elimination)
Further,
it
evaluates
practical
effectiveness
existing
defense
strategies
at
different
Finally,
we
conclude
provide
constructive
insights
advance
countermeasures.
IEEE Access,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
12, P. 47433 - 47468
Published: Jan. 1, 2024
Deep
learning
has
significantly
transformed
face
recognition,
enabling
the
deployment
of
large-scale,
state-of-the-art
solutions
worldwide.
However,
widespread
adoption
deep
neural
networks
(DNNs)
and
rise
Machine
Learning
as
a
Service
emphasize
need
for
secure
DNNs.
This
paper
revisits
recognition
threat
model
in
context
DNN
ubiquity
common
practice
outsourcing
their
training
hosting
to
third-parties.
Here,
we
identify
backdoor
attacks
significant
modern
DNN-based
systems
(FRS).
Backdoor
involve
an
attacker
manipulating
DNN's
or
deployment,
injecting
it
with
stealthy
malicious
behavior.
Once
entered
its
inference
stage,
may
activate
compromise
intended
functionality.
Given
critical
nature
this
FRS,
our
comprehensively
surveys
literature
defenses
previously
demonstrated
on
FRS
As
last
point,
highlight
potential
vulnerabilities
unexplored
areas
security.
2022 IEEE/CVF Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision (WACV),
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
unknown, P. 3862 - 3871
Published: Jan. 3, 2024
Transformer
architectures
are
based
on
self-attention
mechanism
that
processes
images
as
a
sequence
of
patches.
As
their
design
is
quite
different
compared
to
CNNs,
it
important
take
closer
look
at
vulnerability
back-door
attacks
and
how
transformer
affect
robustness.
Backdoor
happen
when
an
attacker
poisons
small
part
the
training
with
specific
trigger
or
backdoor
which
will
be
activated
later.
The
model
performance
good
clean
test
images,
but
can
manipulate
decision
by
showing
image
time.
In
this
paper,
we
compare
state-of-the-art
through
lens
attacks,
specifically
attention
mechanisms
We
observe
well
known
vision
architecture
(ViT)
least
robust
ResMLP,
belongs
class
called
Feed
Forward
Networks
(FFN),
most
among
architectures.
also
find
intriguing
difference
between
transformers
CNNs
-
interpretation
algorithms
effectively
highlight
for
not
CNNs.
Based
observation,
test-time
blocking
defense
reduces
attack
success
rate
large
margin
transformers.
show
such
incorporated
during
process
improve
robustness
even
further.
believe
our
experimental
findings
encourage
community
understand
building
block
components
in
developing
novel
attacks.
Code
available
here:
https://github.com/UCDvision/backdoor_transformer.git
ACM Computing Surveys,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: March 31, 2025
Deep
Neural
Networks
(DNNs)
have
been
widely
deployed
in
security-critical
artificial
intelligence
systems,
such
as
autonomous
driving
and
facial
recognition
systems.
However,
recent
research
has
revealed
their
susceptibility
to
Trojan
information
maliciously
injected
by
attackers.
This
vulnerability
is
caused,
on
the
one
hand,
complex
architecture
non-interpretability
of
DNNs.
On
other
external
open-source
datasets,
pre-trained
models,
intelligent
service
platforms
further
exacerbate
threat
attacks.
article
presents
first
comprehensive
survey
attacks
against
DNNs
from
a
lifecycle
perspective,
including
training,
post-training,
inference
(deployment)
stages.
Specifically,
this
reformulates
relationships
with
poisoning
attacks,
adversarial
example
bit-flip
Then,
newly
emerged
model
architectures
(e.g.,
vision
transformers
spiking
neural
networks)
fields
investigated.
Moreover,
also
provides
review
countermeasures
(including
detection
elimination)
Further,
it
evaluates
practical
effectiveness
existing
defense
strategies
at
different
Finally,
we
conclude
provide
constructive
insights
advance
countermeasures.