Abstract
William
James
first
articulated
his
account
of
consciousness
in
the
context
an
1870s
debate
over
automatism.
The
clash
automatism
carried
forward
older
dispute
limits
mechanistic
(roughly:
purely
physical)
explanation
physiological
function.
traces
back
at
least
to
Descartes,
whose
conception
mechanical
action
that
is
appropriately
tuned
circumstances
would
structure
later
debate.
This
chapter
examines
Descartes’s
views
on
brutes,
evocation
fabricated
automata,
appropriate
action,
and
third-person
criteria
for
distinguishing
conscious
from
non-conscious
(purely
mechanical)
action.
Abstract
We
remember
William
James
for
his
colorful
descriptions
of
subjective
experience,
perhaps
above
all.
But
in
Consciousness
Is
Motor,
Alexander
Klein
shows
that
sculpted
phenomenal
around
an
armature
empirical
details.
reconstructs
James’s
models
consciousness
and
volition,
uncovering
results
from
animal
experimentation
clinical
observation
on
which
those
were
built.
early
work
engaged
the
1870s
automatism
controversy.
The
controversy
was
triggered,
argues,
by
experiments
demonstrating
living,
decapitated
frogs
are
capable
goal-directed
action.
One
side
regarded
goal-directedness
as
evidence
spinal
consciousness;
other
espoused
epiphenomenalism,
reasoning
must
play
no
role
producing
even
purposive
action
since
latter
is
possible
brainless
creatures.
intervened,
shows,
arguing
has
a
likely
evolutionary
function—behavior
regulation—and
so
cannot
be
mere
epiphenomenon.
It
accomplishes
this
function
affording
capacity
evaluation,
Klein’s
reading.
As
evidence,
appealed
not
just
to
introspection,
but
also
experimental
facts,
such
hemisphere-less
vertebrates
have
diminished
evaluating
different
available
means
pursue
goals.
“ideo-motor”
model
demonstrated
precisely
how
could
help
regulate
behavior.
excavates
key
observations
designed
ideo-motor
accommodate.
would
later
feed
into
distinctive
philosophical
outlook,
concludes,
soon
known
pragmatism.
Abstract
This
chapter
provides
a
reading
of
James’s
account
will
(volition)
and
his
related,
causal
theory
action.
It
begins
by
identifying
deep
connection
between
accounts
consciousness
will.
Consciousness
typically
involves
what
James
calls
“absent
sensation,”
one
variety
which
is
the
“anticipatory
image,”
key
trigger
in
volitional
The
shows
that
recognized
hierarchy
actions.
All
“ideo-motor
actions”
stem
from
anticipatory
images,
but
some
are
more
sense
involving
intentions
and,
cases,
deliberation
about
intentions.
argues
most
fundamentally
distinguished
T.
H.
Huxley’s
sensorimotor
approach
was
latter
conceived
action
terms
complex
cerebral
reflex
connecting
stimulus
with
response.
On
model,
not
all
actions
can
be
traced
back
to
prior
stimuli
without
remainder,
because
two
factors
such
include
endogenously
generated
images
subjective
interests;
neither
these
simply
“picked
up”
stimuli.
concludes
reflecting
on
implications
role
play
(on
view)
for
evolution
itself.
Abstract
If
I
raise
my
hand,
experience
arm
rising;
do
also
myself
raising
arm?
This
chapter
examines
William
James’s
empirically
informed
attack
on
the
idea
that
we
our
own
tryings.
A
debate
about
this
was
raging
in
late
nineteenth
century.
James
recruited
observations
of
patients
with
paralysis,
paresis,
and
kinaesthetic
deficits
(including
famous
Landry
case)
to
argue
have
no
outflowing
(efferent)
nerves
trigger
muscular
contraction.
The
feeling
effort
always
stems
from
inflowing
(afferent)
coming
just-contracted
muscles,
for
James.
uses
afference
theory
flesh
out
his
sophisticated
model
action
induction
motor
control.
cornerstone
is
what
he
called
a
“general
law,”
every
conscious
state
naturally
triggers
some
physiological
change
or
other.
No
special
trying
needed
translate
any
thought
into
bodily
change,
His
control
especially
interesting
because
it
proposes
predictive,
error-correction
feedback
loop
which
“guiding
sensations”
are
continually
compared
antecedent
predictions.
Finally,
reflects
substantial
role
forgotten
history
philosophy
mind.
Abstract
This
postscript
connects
James’s
pragmatic
maxim—which
accounts
for
an
idea’s
meaning
in
terms
of
the
“conduct
it
is
fitted
to
produce”—with
his
physiological
and
psychological
work
on
volition,
action,
consciousness.
The
maxim
provides
a
future-directed,
causal
account
according
which
idea
intended
target
action
sequence.
briefly
considers
how
view
can
misrepresentation,
problem
with
more
traditional
theories
have
struggled.
If
reading
this
correct,
then
pragmatist
philosophy
naturalistic
sense
being
built
model
mind
that
itself
fundamentally
structured
by
empirical
evidence
from
experiment
clinical
observation.
Abstract
This
chapter
examines
the
1870s
automatism
controversy
with
a
focus
on
T.H.
Huxley.
It
reconstructs
his
central
argument
for
epiphenomenalism,
favored
form
of
automatism.
His
depended
mechanistic
idea
that
physiological
explanation
should
only
appeal
to
physical
and
chemical
causes.
Huxley
supported
plausibility
this
program
by
appealing
purposive
behavior
in
decapitated
frogs,
creatures
he
took
be
unconscious.
In
contrast,
anti-automatist
opponents
like
G.
H.
Lewes
had
premised
their
arguments
rival
interpretation
frog
experiments
according
which
such
retain
sentience.
When
two
sides
stalemated,
one
cause
was
an
inability
resolve
interpretations
these
experiments.
uses
nineteenth-century
dispute
over
frogs
develop
philosophical
analysis
so-called
measurement
problem,
is
problem
determining
empirically
whether
given
creature
conscious.
Abstract
This
chapter
provides
a
synoptic
overview
of
James’s
accounts
consciousness
and
action,
laying
out
the
guiding
questions
these
were
designed
to
address.
The
also
summarizes
motivates
overall
project
Consciousness
Is
Motor.
Klein
contends
that
James
conceived
as
Darwinian
adaptation
for
behavior
regulation,
function
it
purportedly
accomplishes
by
enabling
valuation
objects
actions.
ideo-motor
theory
action
functional
model
how
valuating
this
on
Klein’s
reading.
likens
unique
method
blending
first-
third-person
data
weaving
warp
weft
threads
into
tapestry.
Generations
readers
have
been
so
seduced
colorful
weft—his
introspective
description—that
they
failed
understand
way
drawn
from
animal
experimentation
clinical
observation
structure
fabric.
offers
preliminary
reflections
terminology
often
used
characterize
experience,
today,
including
“phenomenal
consciousness”
“qualia.”
former
term
fits
work
only
awkwardly,
while
latter
is
himself
pioneered.
Abstract
This
chapter
examines
experimental
work
by
Eduard
Pflüger,
G.
H.
Lewes,
and
others
that
sought
to
establish
sentience
volition
in
spinal
frogs.
It
situates
their
as
part
of
a
broader
older
dispute
tracing
back
Descartes
over
the
limits
purely
mechanistic
(roughly:
physio-chemical)
explanation
physiology.
The
outlines
Lewes’s
vitalist
emergentism,
which
he
advanced
naturalistic
alternative
neo-Cartesian
mechanisms.
on
vertebrates
is
shown
lend
support
this
program.
also
offers
an
initial
sketch
“measurement
problem,”
these
nineteenth-century
experimentalists
faced
nonhuman
animal
consciousness.
Many
experiments
relied
third-person
accessible,
behavioral
criteria
for
determining
whether
creature
given
condition
or
not
conscious.
measurement
problem
concerns
inherent
difficulty
providing
any
rational
grounds
such
criteria.
Lewes
had
clever
argument
overcoming
problem,
but
open
fundamental
objections.
Abstract
This
chapter
discusses
William
James’
accounts
of
the
three
central
methods
to
be
employed
in
physiological
psychology.
These
include
introspective,
experimental,
and
comparative
methods.
The
provides
a
reading
James’s
model
introspection,
with
special
attention
his
views
on
nature
representation
(intentionality)
objectivity.
On
model,
introspection
can
only
target
prior
(just-passed)
mental
states;
is
matter
having
capacity
intervene
an
object.
aims
correct
common
misreading
according
which
James
denigrated
all
but
introspective
In
fact,
held
that
have
fruitful
role
play
psychological
investigation
when
conducted
properly;
aim
at
objectivity
sense
researcher
should
try
minimize
genuine
gap
between
appearance
reality.