Abstract
William
James
first
articulated
his
account
of
consciousness
in
the
context
an
1870s
debate
over
automatism.
The
clash
automatism
carried
forward
older
dispute
limits
mechanistic
(roughly:
purely
physical)
explanation
physiological
function.
traces
back
at
least
to
Descartes,
whose
conception
mechanical
action
that
is
appropriately
tuned
circumstances
would
structure
later
debate.
This
chapter
examines
Descartes’s
views
on
brutes,
evocation
fabricated
automata,
appropriate
action,
and
third-person
criteria
for
distinguishing
conscious
from
non-conscious
(purely
mechanical)
action.
Abstract
How
did
William
James
understand
the
philosophic
and
scientific
character
of
his
work
on
mind?
This
chapter
opens
with
an
examination
vision
a
new
psychology
that
would
blend
philosophy
experimental
physiology.
Klein
pays
special
attention
to
educational
institutional
context
in
which
championed
vision.
Section
3
offers
overview
James’s
training
early
research
There
is
long
misleading
tradition
interpreting
as
leading
figure
“introspectionist”
psychology,
supposed
nineteenth-century
school
allegedly
employed
introspection
sole
or
most
important
investigative
tool
mental
science.
are
stronger
weaker
versions
this
caricature
James,
introduced
section
4.
A
strong
version
portrays
Jamesean
aiming
at
sound
introspective
description
almost
exclusively.
holds
aimed
“explain”
introspectively-described
states,
sometimes
by
appealing
underlying
physiological
causes.
shows
what
weak
caricaturists
have
mind
do
not
match
actual
views
explanation.
In
5,
attacks
idea
there
was
larger
introspectionist
covering
contemporaneous
figures
like
Wilhelm
Wundt.
sections
6
7,
presents
usual
textual
sources
underwrite
both
flavors.
Abstract
William
James
offered
complimentary
accounts
of
consciousness’s
physiological
and
evolutionary
functions.
Drawing
on
some
vivisection
results
from
his
day,
argued
that
consciousness
functions
as
a
behavior
regulator
in
creature’s
economy.
It
accomplishes
this
function
by
affording
capacity
to
valuate
what
is
(or
might
be
in)
the
environment,
giving
an
ability
attend
important,
ignore
much
else.
To
conscious
normally
one’s
actual
or
potential
circumstances,
short;
hypothesized
valuating
was
selected
(in
Darwinian
sense)
precisely
because
it
“regulated”
creatures
with
highly-articulated
brains.
This
chapter
places
James’s
view
against
backdrop
automatism
controversy
raging
Victorian
Britain.
then
reconstructs
abductive
argument
he
for
view,
paying
special
attention
experimental
physiology
which
relies.
The
concludes
showing
how
sidesteps
measurement
problem,
problem
finding
reasonable
criteria
determining
whether
other
creature
not
conscious.
Abstract
This
chapter
offers
a
new
reading
and
assessment
of
William
James’s
argument
against
all
forms
automatism,
including
epiphenomenalism.
James
developed
an
evolutionary
objection
to
such
views
that
is
still
discussed
today.
But
recent
responses
do
not
grasp
its
full
depth.
He
argued
our
life-essential,
phenomenal
pleasures
pains
have
three
features
suggest
they
were
likely
shaped
by
selection:
are
natively-patterned,
those
patterns
systematically
linked
with
antecedent
brain
states,
the
“universal”
among
humans.
If
epiphenomenalism
true,
could
been
selected
(because
precludes
consciousness
affecting
reproductive
success).
So
be
false.
also
draws
out
some
unexpected
consequences
for
today’s
philosophy
cognitive
science.
Accepting
should
push
us
reject
distinction
between
access-
phenomenal-consciousness,
versions
“hard”
problem
articulated
in
terms
this
distinction.
Abstract
William
James
first
articulated
his
account
of
consciousness
in
the
context
an
1870s
debate
over
automatism.
The
clash
automatism
carried
forward
older
dispute
limits
mechanistic
(roughly:
purely
physical)
explanation
physiological
function.
traces
back
at
least
to
Descartes,
whose
conception
mechanical
action
that
is
appropriately
tuned
circumstances
would
structure
later
debate.
This
chapter
examines
Descartes’s
views
on
brutes,
evocation
fabricated
automata,
appropriate
action,
and
third-person
criteria
for
distinguishing
conscious
from
non-conscious
(purely
mechanical)
action.
