Distrusting the policy: how inference over action shapes our experience of temporality in flow states and life more broadly DOI Open Access
Darius Parvizi-Wayne

Published: Jan. 18, 2024

Time is a strikingly bizarre phenomenon. It both objectively measurable – notwithstanding relativistic effects - and subjectively felt, yet it fundamentally fleeting, in so far as any attempts to demarcate the present are always tardy. Furthermore, 'now' seems phenomenologically thick, constituted by just-past about-to-happen manner described first James (1890) Husserl (2019). Although theoretical accounts of structure time-consciousness have begun proliferate active inference framework, few models exist for passage time per se. The most prominent attempt comes from Hohwy et al. (2015), who ground distrusting hypothesis about cause sensory data. In this paper, I argue that model which roots lived dynamics temporality action policy selection, rather than pure perceptual inference, more consonant with phenomenal nature time’s passing. This analysis begins an explication subjective flow states, action-centric particularly well-suited, before expanding into account phenomenology broadly.

Language: Английский

Principled Limitations on Self-Representation for Generic Physical Systems DOI Creative Commons
Chris Fields,

James F. Glazebrook,

Michael Levin

et al.

Entropy, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 26(3), P. 194 - 194

Published: Feb. 24, 2024

The ideas of self-observation and self-representation, the concomitant idea self-control, pervade both cognitive life sciences, arising in domains as diverse immunology robotics. Here, we ask a very general way whether, to what extent, these make sense. Using generic model physical interactions, prove theorem several corollaries that severely restrict applicable notions self-observation, self-control. We show, particular, adding observational, representational, or control capabilities meta-level component system cannot, even principle, lead complete representation whole. conclude self-representation can at best be heuristic, self models general, empirically tested by systems implement them.

Language: Английский

Citations

11
Distrusting the policy: how inference over action shapes our experience of temporality in flow states and life more broadly DOI Open Access
Darius Parvizi-Wayne

Published: Jan. 18, 2024

Time is a strikingly bizarre phenomenon. It both objectively measurable – notwithstanding relativistic effects - and subjectively felt, yet it fundamentally fleeting, in so far as any attempts to demarcate the present are always tardy. Furthermore, 'now' seems phenomenologically thick, constituted by just-past about-to-happen manner described first James (1890) Husserl (2019). Although theoretical accounts of structure time-consciousness have begun proliferate active inference framework, few models exist for passage time per se. The most prominent attempt comes from Hohwy et al. (2015), who ground distrusting hypothesis about cause sensory data. In this paper, I argue that model which roots lived dynamics temporality action policy selection, rather than pure perceptual inference, more consonant with phenomenal nature time’s passing. This analysis begins an explication subjective flow states, action-centric particularly well-suited, before expanding into account phenomenology broadly.

Language: Английский

Citations

3