Memory and Markov Blankets DOI Creative Commons
Thomas Parr, Lancelot Da Costa, Conor Heins

et al.

Entropy, Journal Year: 2021, Volume and Issue: 23(9), P. 1105 - 1105

Published: Aug. 25, 2021

In theoretical biology, we are often interested in random dynamical systems-like the brain-that appear to model their environments. This can be formalized by appealing existence of a (possibly non-equilibrium) steady state, whose density preserves conditional independence between biological entity and its surroundings. From this perspective, conditioning set, or Markov blanket, induces form vicarious synchrony creature world-as if one were modelling other. However, results an apparent paradox. If all dependencies system surroundings depend upon how do account for mnemonic capacity living systems? It might that any shared dependence past blanket states violates condition, as variables on either side now share information not available from current state. paper aims resolve paradox, demonstrate does preclude memory. Our argument rests drawing distinction implied state density, dynamics conditioned configuration at previous time. The interesting question then becomes: What determines length time required stochastic 'forget' initial conditions? We explore example system, possesses through simple numerical analyses. conclude with discussion relevance memory cognitive systems like us.

Language: Английский

Active Inference and Abduction DOI
Ahti‐Veikko Pietarinen, Majid Davoody Beni

Biosemiotics, Journal Year: 2021, Volume and Issue: 14(2), P. 499 - 517

Published: May 12, 2021

Language: Английский

Citations

23

Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive? DOI Creative Commons
Julian Kiverstein, Matthew Sims

Biology & Philosophy, Journal Year: 2021, Volume and Issue: 36(2)

Published: April 1, 2021

Abstract A mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating from non-cognitive causes behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required settle question when evolution life cognition first emerged. An answer this however avoid two pitfalls. It overintellectualising minds other organisms, ascribing them capacities which they have no need given lives lead within niches inhabit. But equally it do justice remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed microorganisms not a nervous system. We resist seeking explanations simply because an organism fails exhibit human-like feats thinking, reasoning problem-solving. will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) serve as basis avoids twin pitfalls or underestimating achievements evolutionarily primitive The FEP purports describe organisation any must instantiate if is remain well-adapted its environment. Living systems plants all way up humans act ways tend long run minimise free energy. If provides cognitive, we argue does, mandates indeed ascribed plants, organisms lack

Language: Английский

Citations

20

The neural correlates of consciousness under the free energy principle: From computational correlates to computational explanation DOI Creative Commons
Wanja Wiese, Karl Friston

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, Journal Year: 2021, Volume and Issue: 2

Published: July 19, 2021

How can the free energy principle contribute to research on neural correlates of consciousness, and scientific study consciousness more generally? Under principle, should be defined in terms dynamics, not states, complemented by computational – probabilities encoded states. We argue that these restrictions brighten prospects a explanation addressing two central problems. The first is account for absence sensory stimulation behaviour. second allow possibility systems implement computations associated with without being conscious, which requires differentiating between merely simulate conscious beings are themselves. Given notion computation entailed we derive constraints ascription controversial cases (e.g., behaviour). show this also has implications what it means be, as opposed system.

Language: Английский

Citations

19

The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model-Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism DOI
Michael D. Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein, Ian Robertson

et al.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Journal Year: 2022, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: May 13, 2022

Language: Английский

Citations

12

Memory and Markov Blankets DOI Creative Commons
Thomas Parr, Lancelot Da Costa, Conor Heins

et al.

Entropy, Journal Year: 2021, Volume and Issue: 23(9), P. 1105 - 1105

Published: Aug. 25, 2021

In theoretical biology, we are often interested in random dynamical systems-like the brain-that appear to model their environments. This can be formalized by appealing existence of a (possibly non-equilibrium) steady state, whose density preserves conditional independence between biological entity and its surroundings. From this perspective, conditioning set, or Markov blanket, induces form vicarious synchrony creature world-as if one were modelling other. However, results an apparent paradox. If all dependencies system surroundings depend upon how do account for mnemonic capacity living systems? It might that any shared dependence past blanket states violates condition, as variables on either side now share information not available from current state. paper aims resolve paradox, demonstrate does preclude memory. Our argument rests drawing distinction implied state density, dynamics conditioned configuration at previous time. The interesting question then becomes: What determines length time required stochastic 'forget' initial conditions? We explore example system, possesses through simple numerical analyses. conclude with discussion relevance memory cognitive systems like us.

Language: Английский

Citations

15