Could H5N1 bird flu virus be the cause of the next human pandemic? DOI Creative Commons
Giorgio Palù,

Pier Francesco Roggero,

Arianna Calistri

et al.

Frontiers in Microbiology, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 15

Published: Oct. 8, 2024

Highly pathogenic type A avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have been affecting numerous wild and domestic species worldwide over the past decades continue to circulate, causing significant damage poultry industry (CDC, 2024a). Since 2021, regions worldwide, including Europe, faced a severe panzootic outbreak of HPAI H5N1 virus, clade 2.3.4.4b (Koopmans et al., 2024). This has caused death or culling hundreds millions farmed birds, making it one largest outbreaks on record It also led substantial economic losses severely disrupted supply chains. (Banyard The subtype was first detected at commercial goose farm in China 1996 (Watanabe 2013; M Tiwari 2024) later spread wide range bird Over time, virus evolved, by 2024, had developed into 16 genotypes, with dominant G1 genotype being across multiple countries. exhibited an unprecedented host infections pathogenicity, reported 90 as well more than 199 mammalian species, cats, foxes, minks, harbor seals sea lions (Caserta even reached polar regions, bear Arctic elephant fur penguins Antarctica Particularly intriguing worrying are recent cases dairy cattle, bovine were known be poorly susceptible IAV previously not (Sreenivasan 2019). In however, found infect cattle number farms, confirmed transmission humans four 2024a; CDC, 2024b; Oguzie 2024; Burrough 1996, there occasional spillovers humans. These only occurred when close contact avian-mammal-human interface. Additionally, few probable but sustained human-to-human transmission. Ungchusak 2005; Wang 2008). Notably, 6th September, CDC case patient from Missouri, USA, positive for H5 IAV. no immediate exposure animals, among contacts 2024c). total 15 human documented USA. With exception all others linked infected animals—four involving cows rest poultry. Subjects (hereafter referred Cow-H5N1) mild symptoms, primarily conjunctivitis, malaise, low-grade fever (Uyeki Human highly typically high fatality rates, averaging around 50%. remains unclear whether Cow-H5N1 inherently less compared other strains, if factors such route infection and/or viral load contribute milder symptoms observed.What is certain that detection represents cross-species transmission, highlighting adaptability its ability mammals, particularly ruminants, farms. Although current surveillance shows unusual activity, zoonotic potential currently circulating concern. possibility new pandemic this is, then, subject ongoing debate (Burki, Dye & Barclay, Koopmans Lancet, Zhai prospect acquiring mutations enable efficient especially alarming. However, we believe unlikely become least near future. perspective grounded three key points, which will detail following sections:a) yet demonstrated airborne transmission.b) still needs acquire genetic traits facilitate widespread populations.c) chaos logistic map indicates low probability adapt populations.Nonetheless, given nature outbreaks, risk future pandemic, while uncertain, cannot entirely ruled out. transmissionThe mammal-to-mammal avian-origin (AIV) rare depends both phenotypic adaptations hosts. lineages, American nearly thirty years, infecting animals. undergone continuous evolution, gaining efficiently spill several species. What fascinating about bovines largely remained unaffected (IAV) Indeed, rarely suggesting these mammals vulnerable hosts virus. view persisted until emergence D viruses, considered primary reservoir (Ruiz 2022). Certain proposed possess anti-influenza properties, potentially explaining resistance (Screenivasan Among (extensively reviewed Screenivasan 2019) specific serum components secretory proteins shown influence infection, interacting immune system. lactoferrin act broad-spectrum compound (Ammendolia 2012; Shin 2005). Finally, interferon-α-induced Mx protein potent antiviral activity due peculiar N-terminal motifs (Garigliany 2012). On hand, findings make very reassortment vessels potential. crucial understand what enabled cattle. Current data suggest stemmed single introduction (Worobey Worobey, 2024b). may transmitted farms birds mammals. precise events remain (Neumann Kawaoka, study, Eisfeld colleagues investigated pathogenicity routes isolated milk during 2024 New Mexico (Eisfeld Using mice experimental model, those Authors ingestion rapid dissemination respiratory non-respiratory organs. cows' mammary glands express avian-type (α-2,3) sialic acid receptors (Nelli recently human-type (α-2,6) receptor (Kristensen 2024), could shedding milk. agreement, breast functions site replication, condition might favor generation tropism (Mallapaty S, confirm earlier experiments (Mitchell 1953; Paquette 2015) support hypothesis cow-to-cow mainly occurs via milking equipment. Vertical lactating their offspring observed, raising concerns similar calves 2024).Experiments based ferrets used assess droplets ferret seroconverted, RNA particles detected, indicating inefficient (Eisfled result consistent 2024d), limited droplet between Texas, CDC's study did demonstrate 1 out 3 pairs, overall, two investigations show routes. occur, would need adaptations, shift hemagglutinin (HA) binding specificity enhanced replication cells. populationThe growth AIV species-restricted envelope (HA), facilitates entry target cells recognizing cell (Long J so far, contacts, can partly attributed affinity α2-6 receptors, contributes barrier. Interestingly, observed Mexico, displayed α-2,3 α-2,6 finding suggests trait necessary already present Accordingly, focusing characterization phylogenetic analysis obtained cats Texas (Hu felines shared amino residues HA sequence (e.g., 137A, 158N, 160A). enhance (Yamada 2006; Gao 2009). critical associated adaptation increased (Gao 2009, Suttie 2019; Bordes 2023; Hatta 2007; Kong Kamal notably absent same isolates. Furthermore, substitutions identified improved overall health relatively present. preprint studies isolates preferentially bind (Chopra Santos retained acids confer specificity, evidence supporting acquired Thus, continued monitoring any changes appears essential. successful jump require gene. Specifically, change needed conserved domain (RBD) H5, 128 138 (Imai Xiong 2013). terms long-term noteworthy eighteen HAs different animal H1, H2, H3 types (Nabel 2016; Kumar 2018). remarkable feature lineage pairing full-length (long-stalk) neuraminidase (NA), unlike stalk deletions (short-stalk). contributed broad play role (Moratorio long facilitating undoubtedly area further research, context vaccination strategies.On important recognize evolve rapidly within infection. direct substitution E627K PB2 subunit polymerase complex identified, mutation 2024e). Of note, carrying discussed above 2024d) focused ferrets. reason higher efficiency report respect work carried Eisfled coworkers confirms gene spreading included (Gabriel G Long JS 2019), highlights spillover circulation controlled. according Chaos Theory mapThe theory (May, 1976; Fernández-Díaz, mathematical model exhibiting chaotic behavior under conditions. formally expressed equation (May RM, 1976):x (n+1)=r*x (n)*[1-x(n)]where rate "r" reflects combined effects reproduction density-dependent mortality starvation) size population. population x (n) stays [0, 1] r 0 4. If below 1, go extinct. Higher values lead either stable fluctuations values. For > 3.57, grows chaotically. We applied dynamics pandemics epidemics emerging (Roggero Calistri particular, coronaviruses emerged population—SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2—as Ebola responsible 2014 West Africa epidemic. value intrinsic biological characteristics mirrors initial establish lasting relationship 2023). More growth, seen SARS-CoV-2. involves genome mutations, speculated acquisition beneficial genomic changes, whereas do 2023).With premises using available November 1997 March determined 0.56 five years circulation, then decreased 0.18, resulting weighted mean 0.26 27 observation. Even restricting period January 2020 September better capture situation, differs significantly previous conditions, 0.01102. consistently 1. extinction (Fernández-Díaz, Roggero 2023), conclude cause pandemic. ConclusionWe acknowledge some information incomplete, affect difficult precisely predict likelihood event. lack serostatus individuals flu percentage people who asymptomatically mildly H5N1. addition, 2009 H1N1 elicits cross reactive immunity (Mahallawi 2009), (Daulagala interesting analyze applies thus impact know At moment, main humans, addition occupational exposure, comes consumption raw milk, pasteurization eliminates infectious (Spackman absence replicating beef meet (USDA, 2024).Although possesses features promote lacks required our view, supported map, agent, respond drugs. approved pre-pandemic vaccines candidate vaccine (CVVs) pipelines (Focosi Maggi, July WHO announced project develop mRNA (Anderer, While CVVs partially match strain, they serve interim solution protect high-risk accessible. expect mitigate public health, like IAV, increases evolving unpredictable potential.Hence, strongly advocate extensive tracing testing presence human-animal interface One Health approach. should accompanied continuous, global exchange veterinary, environmental, virologists.

Language: Английский

Preparedness, prevention and control related to zoonotic avian influenza DOI Creative Commons
Julio Álvarez, Anette Boklund, Sabine Dippel

et al.

EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 23(1)

Published: Jan. 1, 2025

A risk assessment framework was developed to evaluate the zoonotic potential of avian influenza (AI), focusing on virus mutations linked phenotypic traits related mammalian adaptation identified in literature. Virus sequences were screened for presence these and their geographical, temporal subtype-specific trends. Spillover events mammals (including humans) human seroprevalence studies also reviewed. Thirty-four associated with five (increased receptor specificity, haemagglutinin stability, neuraminidase enhanced polymerase activity evasion innate immunity) shortlisted. AI viruses (AIVs) carrying multiple adaptive belonged both low highly pathogenic subtypes, mainly A(H9N2), A(H7N9), A(H5N6) A(H3N8), sporadic primarily detected Asia. In EU/EEA, H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b, which have increased opportunities evolution due widespread circulation birds occasional cases/outbreaks mammals, acquired highest number traits. Adaptive traits, such as immune evasion, frequently acquired, while receptor-specific remained rare. Globally, cases remain rare, majority overall A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) A(H9N2) that are among subtypes tend a higher The main drivers include host characteristics, external factors increasing AIV exposure humans wild domestic (e.g. activities ecological factors). Comprehensive surveillance AIVs targeting whole genome sequencing animals is essential early detection efficient implementation control measures. All preparedness, preventive measures must be implemented under One Health tailored setting epidemiological situation; particular, monitoring, biosecurity, genomic global collaboration critical mitigating risks AIV.

Language: Английский

Citations

2

Coordinated One Health investigation and management of outbreaks in humans and animals caused by zoonotic avian influenza viruses DOI Creative Commons
Theresa Enkirch,

Andrea Gervelmeyer,

Luisa K. Hallmaier‐Wacker

et al.

EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 23(1)

Published: Jan. 1, 2025

When investigating and controlling outbreaks caused by zoonotic avian influenza viruses (AIV), a One Health approach is key. However, knowledge-sharing on AIV-specific strategies, tools action plans remains limited across the EU/EEA. It crucial to establish responsibilities, capacity requirements, collaboration mechanisms during 'peace time' enable timely effective outbreak investigations management. This report focuses five scenarios for investigation management of AIV at human-animal-environment interface, emphasising key actions stakeholders involved. The document primarily highlights collaborative framework necessary interdisciplinary coordinated responses, referring more detailed guidance technical reports published elsewhere when applicable. Three are triggered suspected in animals, including kept animals listed species, non-listed companion wild birds/mammals. other two initiated probable human case or detection virus wastewater environmental samples (e.g. surface water sources). All require cross-sectoral coordination approach. While specific sequence communication needs may differ scenarios, overarching response remain consistent. By presenting each scenario alongside integrated stakeholders, identifies critical development needs, such as data sharing platforms); points information exchange sectors, triggers joint risk assessments, gaps existing knowledge. should assist developing documents facilitate humans viruses.

Language: Английский

Citations

2

Survival of viruses in water microcosms DOI
Inés Girón‐Guzmán, Irene Falcó, Enric Cuevas‐Ferrando

et al.

The Science of The Total Environment, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 963, P. 178416 - 178416

Published: Jan. 15, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Genetic insights into avian influenza resistance in Jeju Island chickens: the roles of Mx1 and oligoadenylate synthetase-like single nucleotide polymorphisms DOI Creative Commons
Young-Won Kim, S. M. Jeong, Ju-Hee Yang

et al.

Journal of Animal Science and Technology, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 67(1), P. 69 - 85

Published: Jan. 1, 2025

Influenza A virus (FLUAV) causes serious diseases in both poultry and humans. Various host proteins, including Mx1, are considered candidates for avian influenza (AI) resistance. After infecting Jeju Native chicken embryo fibroblasts (CEFs) with three types of AI viruses, we performed gene expression profiling, identified single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) through RNA-sequencing, confirmed phenotypes showing antiviral activity vitro. Highly pathogenic viruses upregulated FGF2, LYN, FLT4 downregulated HGF, ANGPT1, ROR2, while a low pathogenicity PARK7, RACK1, DTX3L SIRT1, LRRK2, WAC. However, no affected Mx1 expression. Although SNPs could not discriminate alone, the only CEF resistant to H5N6, strain AN4, contained 631 R/R genotype strongly expressed an oligoadenylate synthetase-like (OASL) variant unique SNP: c.G880A (p.E294K). Using transfected cell lines, H5N6-infected cells expressing OASL SNP showed minimal cytopathic effects lowest M This study confirms that chickens specific combinations H5N6 resistance demonstrates interplay genetic factors host-pathogen dynamics, suggesting need integrated analyses multiple genes inform prevention strategies.

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Prevention and control of avian influenza virus: Recent advances in diagnostic technologies and surveillance strategies DOI Creative Commons
Qian Niu, Zhiwen Jiang, Lifang Wang

et al.

Nature Communications, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 16(1)

Published: April 15, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Pandemic-Proofing: Intercepting Zoonotic Spillover Events DOI Creative Commons
Bharti Bhatia, Sudipta Sonar, Seema A. Khan

et al.

Pathogens, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 13(12), P. 1067 - 1067

Published: Dec. 3, 2024

Zoonotic spillover events pose a significant and growing threat to global health. By focusing on preventing these cross-species transmissions, we can significantly mitigate pandemic risks. This review aims analyze the mechanisms of zoonotic events, identify key risk factors, propose evidence-based prevention strategies reduce future threats. Through comprehensive literature analysis major databases including PubMed, Web Science, Scopus from 1960–2024, examined documented their outcomes, intervention strategies. article emphasizes that targeting root cause—the event itself—is averting pandemics. analyzing historical contemporary outbreaks, extract crucial insights into dynamics transmission. Factors underlying include increased human–animal contact due habitat encroachment, agricultural intensification, wildlife trade. Climate change, travel, inadequate healthcare infrastructure exacerbate The diversity potential viral reservoirs rapid evolution present challenges for prediction prevention. Solutions enhancing surveillance populations, improving biosecurity measures, investing in diagnostic capabilities, promoting sustainable management. A “One Health” approach integrating human, animal, environmental health is crucial. Predictive modelling, international cooperation, public education are Developing pre-exposure prophylactics post-exposure treatments essential mitigating outbreaks. While obstacles remain, advances genomics ecological modelling offer hope. proactive, addressing causes vital safeguarding against

Language: Английский

Citations

1

Occurrence and environmental fate of anti-influenza drugs in a subcatchment of the Yodo River Basin, Japan DOI
Takashi Azuma, Masaru Usui,

Tomohiro Hasei

et al.

The Science of The Total Environment, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 953, P. 176086 - 176086

Published: Sept. 10, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

0

Could H5N1 bird flu virus be the cause of the next human pandemic? DOI Creative Commons
Giorgio Palù,

Pier Francesco Roggero,

Arianna Calistri

et al.

Frontiers in Microbiology, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 15

Published: Oct. 8, 2024

Highly pathogenic type A avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have been affecting numerous wild and domestic species worldwide over the past decades continue to circulate, causing significant damage poultry industry (CDC, 2024a). Since 2021, regions worldwide, including Europe, faced a severe panzootic outbreak of HPAI H5N1 virus, clade 2.3.4.4b (Koopmans et al., 2024). This has caused death or culling hundreds millions farmed birds, making it one largest outbreaks on record It also led substantial economic losses severely disrupted supply chains. (Banyard The subtype was first detected at commercial goose farm in China 1996 (Watanabe 2013; M Tiwari 2024) later spread wide range bird Over time, virus evolved, by 2024, had developed into 16 genotypes, with dominant G1 genotype being across multiple countries. exhibited an unprecedented host infections pathogenicity, reported 90 as well more than 199 mammalian species, cats, foxes, minks, harbor seals sea lions (Caserta even reached polar regions, bear Arctic elephant fur penguins Antarctica Particularly intriguing worrying are recent cases dairy cattle, bovine were known be poorly susceptible IAV previously not (Sreenivasan 2019). In however, found infect cattle number farms, confirmed transmission humans four 2024a; CDC, 2024b; Oguzie 2024; Burrough 1996, there occasional spillovers humans. These only occurred when close contact avian-mammal-human interface. Additionally, few probable but sustained human-to-human transmission. Ungchusak 2005; Wang 2008). Notably, 6th September, CDC case patient from Missouri, USA, positive for H5 IAV. no immediate exposure animals, among contacts 2024c). total 15 human documented USA. With exception all others linked infected animals—four involving cows rest poultry. Subjects (hereafter referred Cow-H5N1) mild symptoms, primarily conjunctivitis, malaise, low-grade fever (Uyeki Human highly typically high fatality rates, averaging around 50%. remains unclear whether Cow-H5N1 inherently less compared other strains, if factors such route infection and/or viral load contribute milder symptoms observed.What is certain that detection represents cross-species transmission, highlighting adaptability its ability mammals, particularly ruminants, farms. Although current surveillance shows unusual activity, zoonotic potential currently circulating concern. possibility new pandemic this is, then, subject ongoing debate (Burki, Dye & Barclay, Koopmans Lancet, Zhai prospect acquiring mutations enable efficient especially alarming. However, we believe unlikely become least near future. perspective grounded three key points, which will detail following sections:a) yet demonstrated airborne transmission.b) still needs acquire genetic traits facilitate widespread populations.c) chaos logistic map indicates low probability adapt populations.Nonetheless, given nature outbreaks, risk future pandemic, while uncertain, cannot entirely ruled out. transmissionThe mammal-to-mammal avian-origin (AIV) rare depends both phenotypic adaptations hosts. lineages, American nearly thirty years, infecting animals. undergone continuous evolution, gaining efficiently spill several species. What fascinating about bovines largely remained unaffected (IAV) Indeed, rarely suggesting these mammals vulnerable hosts virus. view persisted until emergence D viruses, considered primary reservoir (Ruiz 2022). Certain proposed possess anti-influenza properties, potentially explaining resistance (Screenivasan Among (extensively reviewed Screenivasan 2019) specific serum components secretory proteins shown influence infection, interacting immune system. lactoferrin act broad-spectrum compound (Ammendolia 2012; Shin 2005). Finally, interferon-α-induced Mx protein potent antiviral activity due peculiar N-terminal motifs (Garigliany 2012). On hand, findings make very reassortment vessels potential. crucial understand what enabled cattle. Current data suggest stemmed single introduction (Worobey Worobey, 2024b). may transmitted farms birds mammals. precise events remain (Neumann Kawaoka, study, Eisfeld colleagues investigated pathogenicity routes isolated milk during 2024 New Mexico (Eisfeld Using mice experimental model, those Authors ingestion rapid dissemination respiratory non-respiratory organs. cows' mammary glands express avian-type (α-2,3) sialic acid receptors (Nelli recently human-type (α-2,6) receptor (Kristensen 2024), could shedding milk. agreement, breast functions site replication, condition might favor generation tropism (Mallapaty S, confirm earlier experiments (Mitchell 1953; Paquette 2015) support hypothesis cow-to-cow mainly occurs via milking equipment. Vertical lactating their offspring observed, raising concerns similar calves 2024).Experiments based ferrets used assess droplets ferret seroconverted, RNA particles detected, indicating inefficient (Eisfled result consistent 2024d), limited droplet between Texas, CDC's study did demonstrate 1 out 3 pairs, overall, two investigations show routes. occur, would need adaptations, shift hemagglutinin (HA) binding specificity enhanced replication cells. populationThe growth AIV species-restricted envelope (HA), facilitates entry target cells recognizing cell (Long J so far, contacts, can partly attributed affinity α2-6 receptors, contributes barrier. Interestingly, observed Mexico, displayed α-2,3 α-2,6 finding suggests trait necessary already present Accordingly, focusing characterization phylogenetic analysis obtained cats Texas (Hu felines shared amino residues HA sequence (e.g., 137A, 158N, 160A). enhance (Yamada 2006; Gao 2009). critical associated adaptation increased (Gao 2009, Suttie 2019; Bordes 2023; Hatta 2007; Kong Kamal notably absent same isolates. Furthermore, substitutions identified improved overall health relatively present. preprint studies isolates preferentially bind (Chopra Santos retained acids confer specificity, evidence supporting acquired Thus, continued monitoring any changes appears essential. successful jump require gene. Specifically, change needed conserved domain (RBD) H5, 128 138 (Imai Xiong 2013). terms long-term noteworthy eighteen HAs different animal H1, H2, H3 types (Nabel 2016; Kumar 2018). remarkable feature lineage pairing full-length (long-stalk) neuraminidase (NA), unlike stalk deletions (short-stalk). contributed broad play role (Moratorio long facilitating undoubtedly area further research, context vaccination strategies.On important recognize evolve rapidly within infection. direct substitution E627K PB2 subunit polymerase complex identified, mutation 2024e). Of note, carrying discussed above 2024d) focused ferrets. reason higher efficiency report respect work carried Eisfled coworkers confirms gene spreading included (Gabriel G Long JS 2019), highlights spillover circulation controlled. according Chaos Theory mapThe theory (May, 1976; Fernández-Díaz, mathematical model exhibiting chaotic behavior under conditions. formally expressed equation (May RM, 1976):x (n+1)=r*x (n)*[1-x(n)]where rate "r" reflects combined effects reproduction density-dependent mortality starvation) size population. population x (n) stays [0, 1] r 0 4. If below 1, go extinct. Higher values lead either stable fluctuations values. For > 3.57, grows chaotically. We applied dynamics pandemics epidemics emerging (Roggero Calistri particular, coronaviruses emerged population—SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2—as Ebola responsible 2014 West Africa epidemic. value intrinsic biological characteristics mirrors initial establish lasting relationship 2023). More growth, seen SARS-CoV-2. involves genome mutations, speculated acquisition beneficial genomic changes, whereas do 2023).With premises using available November 1997 March determined 0.56 five years circulation, then decreased 0.18, resulting weighted mean 0.26 27 observation. Even restricting period January 2020 September better capture situation, differs significantly previous conditions, 0.01102. consistently 1. extinction (Fernández-Díaz, Roggero 2023), conclude cause pandemic. ConclusionWe acknowledge some information incomplete, affect difficult precisely predict likelihood event. lack serostatus individuals flu percentage people who asymptomatically mildly H5N1. addition, 2009 H1N1 elicits cross reactive immunity (Mahallawi 2009), (Daulagala interesting analyze applies thus impact know At moment, main humans, addition occupational exposure, comes consumption raw milk, pasteurization eliminates infectious (Spackman absence replicating beef meet (USDA, 2024).Although possesses features promote lacks required our view, supported map, agent, respond drugs. approved pre-pandemic vaccines candidate vaccine (CVVs) pipelines (Focosi Maggi, July WHO announced project develop mRNA (Anderer, While CVVs partially match strain, they serve interim solution protect high-risk accessible. expect mitigate public health, like IAV, increases evolving unpredictable potential.Hence, strongly advocate extensive tracing testing presence human-animal interface One Health approach. should accompanied continuous, global exchange veterinary, environmental, virologists.

Language: Английский

Citations

0