Irrationality

Published: Jan. 22, 2025

This Element surveys contemporary philosophical and psychological work on various forms of irrationality: akrasia, strange beliefs, implicit bias. It takes up several questions in an effort to better illuminate these more maligned aspects human behaviour cognition: what is rationality? Why it irrational act against one's judgement? Could ever be rational do so? What's going wrong with beliefs conspiracy theories, those arising from self-deception, or which are classed as delusional? Might some them fact appropriate responses evidence? Are biases when they conflict our avowed beliefs? Or might insofar track social realities?

Language: Английский

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Human Reasoning

Published: May 20, 2024

This Element is on new developments in the psychology of reasoning that raise or address philosophical questions. In traditional studies reasoning, focus was inference from arbitrary assumptions and not at all beliefs, classical binary logic presupposed as only standard for human reasoning. But recently a Bayesian paradigm has emerged discipline. views ordinary mostly inferring probabilistic conclusions degrees hypothetical premises relevant to purpose hand, often about revising updating belief. also covers formulations dual-process theories mind, stating there are two types mental processing, one rapid intuitive shared with other animals, slow reflective more characteristic beings. The final topic covered rationality.

Language: Английский

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Personal Identity and the Self

Published: Nov. 29, 2024

What are we? owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, the 'no-self' contention that self-representations about no real entity, before introducing positive hypothesis objects self-representations: 'animalist' claim biological organisms. 3 discusses classic challenge to animalism brain transplantation is something could survive but animal survive. This introduces alternatives animalism, as well animalist responses, including one which questions assumption psychology irrelevant organism persistence. 4 surveys 'thinking parts' problem conjoined twinning commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation these cases revisits bearers self-representation, relation biology psychology. title available Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Language: Английский

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Bayesian Models of the Mind

Published: Jan. 30, 2025

Bayesian decision theory is a mathematical framework that models reasoning and decision-making under uncertain conditions. The paradigm originated as of how people should operate, not they actually operate. Nevertheless, cognitive scientists increasingly use it to describe the actual workings human mind. Over past few decades, science has produced impressive mental activity. postulate certain processes conform, or approximately norms. offered within have illuminated numerous phenomena, such perception, motor control, navigation. This Element provides self-contained introduction foundations science. It then explores what we can learn about mind from by scientists.

Language: Английский

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Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Nick Chater Receiving the 2023 Rumelhart Prize

Topics in Cognitive Science, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: March 31, 2025

Abstract This is an introduction to the special issue of Topics in Cognitive Science , honoring Nick Chater's award 2023 David E. Rumelhart Prize for Contributions Theoretical Foundations Human Cognition. It provides a condensed overview his contributions cognitive science within which articles this are situated, finishing off with two short personal recollections by Editors.

Language: Английский

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The conjunction fallacy: confirmation or relevance?

Thinking & Reasoning, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 31(1), P. 82 - 108

Published: July 12, 2024

The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented reasoning error on which people rate a A∧B as more probable than one of its conjuncts, A. Many explanations appeal to fact that B has high probability in given scenarios, but Katya Tentori and collaborators have challenged such approaches. They report experiments suggesting degree confirmation—rather probability—is central determinant fallacy. In this paper, we two goals. First, address confound et al.'s experiments: they failed control for their stimuli where confirmed, it also conversationally relevant sense fits with topic or question under discussion. Conversely, when not irrelevant. Consequently, possible conversational relevance, rather confirmation, responsible differences found between confirmed hypotheses. Second, inspired by recent theoretical work, aim give first empirical investigation hypothesis type relevance own—independently confirmation—can be an important factor We vary design making without changing confirmation. doing so increases fallacy, plays role

Language: Английский

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