Oxford University Press eBooks,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown, P. 95 - 121
Published: Jan. 26, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
addresses
the
challenge
of
integrating
theory
and
results
across
disciplines
working
on
animal
minds.
In
particular,
it
underappreciated
role
that
assumptions
homology
play
in
inferences
integrate
neuroscience
evolutionary
biology
into
comparative
psychology.
Two
traits
different
species
are
homologous
when
they
both
descended
from
a
single
trait
most
recent
common
ancestor.
Cross-species
comparisons
often
based
assumption
under
discussion
homologous.
Claims
psychological
capacities
homologous,
though,
especially
hard
to
establish.
The
discusses
pitfalls
such
face,
suggests
some
ways
avoid
them,
calls
for
greater
research
establishment
homologies
can
ground
these
integrative
inferences.
It
work
emotions
rats
cats
as
well
chimpanzee
mind-reading
Animal
minds
are
complex
and
diverse,
making
them
difficult
to
study.
This
Element
focuses
on
a
question
that
has
received
much
attention
in
the
field
of
comparative
cognition:
'Do
animals
reason
about
unobservable
variables
like
force
mental
states?'
The
shows
how
researchers
design
studies
gather
evidence
address
this
question.
Despite
many
virtues
current
methods,
hypotheses
cognition
often
underdetermined
by
empirical
evidence.
Given
this,
philosophers
scientists
have
recently
called
for
additional
behavioral
constraints
theorizing
field.
endorses
proposal
(known
as
'signature
testing'),
while
also
arguing
animal
would
benefit
from
drawing
more
heavily
neuroscience
biology.
This
Element
presents
a
philosophical
exploration
of
the
concept
'model
organism'
in
contemporary
biology.
Thinking
about
model
organisms
enables
us
to
examine
how
living
have
been
brought
into
laboratory
and
used
gain
better
understanding
biology,
explore
research
practices,
commitments,
norms
underlying
this
understanding.
We
contend
that
are
key
components
distinctive
way
doing
research.
focus
on
what
makes
an
important
type
model,
use
these
models
has
shaped
biological
knowledge,
including
represent,
they
as
tools
for
intervention,
representational
commitments
linked
their
affect
practices
associated
with
them.
This
Element
is
an
introduction
to
the
metaphysics
of
biology,
a
very
general
account
nature
living
world.
The
first
part
addresses
more
traditionally
philosophical
questions
-
whether
biological
systems
are
reducible
properties
their
physical
parts,
causation
and
laws
nature,
substantialist
processualist
accounts
life,
kinds.
second
half
will
offer
understanding
important
entities,
drawing
on
earlier
discussions.
division
should
not
be
taken
too
seriously,
however:
topics
in
both
parts
deeply
interconnected.
Although
this
does
claim
scientific
work,
it
aim
firmly
grounded
our
best
knowledge;
exercise
naturalistic
metaphysics.
Its
most
distinctive
feature
that
argues
throughout
for
view
as
processes
rather
than
things
or,
technical
sense,
substances.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience,
Journal Year:
2022,
Volume and Issue:
15
Published: April 12, 2022
It
is
only
in
recent
decades
that
subjective
experience
-
or
consciousness
has
become
a
legitimate
object
of
scientific
inquiry.
As
such,
it
represents
perhaps
the
greatest
challenge
facing
neuroscience
today.
Subsumed
within
this
study
non-human
animals:
particularly
difficult
endeavor
becomes
even
more
so,
as
one
crosses
great
evolutionary
divide
between
vertebrate
and
invertebrate
phyla.
Here,
we
explore
possibility
group
invertebrates:
cephalopod
molluscs.
We
believe
such
review
timely,
considering
cephalopods'
impressive
learning
memory
abilities,
rich
behavioral
repertoire,
relative
complexity
their
nervous
systems
sensory
capabilities.
Indeed,
some
cephalopods,
these
abilities
are
so
sophisticated
they
comparable
to
those
higher
vertebrates.
Following
criteria
framework
outlined
for
identification
hallmarks
non-mammalian
species,
here
propose
cephalopods
octopus
provide
unique
test
case
among
invertebrates
examining
properties
conditions
that,
at
very
least,
afford
basal
faculty
consciousness.
These
include,
others:
(i)
discriminatory
anticipatory
behaviors
indicating
strong
link
perception
recall;
(ii)
presence
neural
substrates
representing
functional
analogs
thalamus
cortex;
(iii)
neurophysiological
dynamics
resembling
signatures
conscious
states
mammals.
highlight
current
lack
evidence
well
potentially
informative
areas
warrant
further
investigation
support
view
expressed
here.
Finally,
identify
future
research
directions
tantalizing
animals.
Frontiers in Veterinary Science,
Journal Year:
2022,
Volume and Issue:
9
Published: April 27, 2022
Debates
around
fishes'
ability
to
feel
pain
concern
sentience
:
do
reactions
tissue
damage
indicate
evaluative
consciousness
(conscious
affect),
or
mere
nociception?
Thanks
Braithwaite's
research
leadership,
and
concerns
that
current
practices
could
compromise
welfare
in
countless
fish,
this
issue's
importance
is
beyond
dispute.
However,
nociceptors
are
merely
necessary,
not
sufficient,
for
true
pain,
many
measures
held
have
the
same
problem.
The
question
of
whether
fish
–
indeed
anything
at
all
therefore
stimulates
sometimes
polarized
debate.
Here,
we
try
bridge
divide.
After
reviewing
key
concepts,
identify
“red
herring”
should
be
used
infer
because
also
present
non-sentient
organisms,
notably
those
lacking
nervous
systems,
like
plants
protozoa
(P);
spines
disconnected
from
brains
(S);
decerebrate
mammals
birds
(D);
humans
unaware
states
(U).
These
“S.P.U.D.
subjects”
can
show
approach/withdrawal;
react
with
apparent
emotion;
change
their
reactivity
food
deprivation
analgesia;
discriminate
between
stimuli;
display
Pavlovian
learning,
including
some
forms
trace
conditioning;
even
learn
simple
instrumental
responses.
Consequently,
none
these
responses
good
indicators
sentience.
Potentially
more
valid
aspects
working
memory,
operant
conditioning,
self-report
state,
higher
order
cognition.
We
suggest
new
experiments
on
test
hypotheses,
as
well
modifications
tests
“mental
time
travel”
self-awareness
(e.g.,
mirror
self-recognition)
allow
now
probe
(since
currently
they
reflect
perceptual
rather
than
evaluative,
affective
consciousness).
Because
“bullet-proof”
neurological
behavioral
thus
still
lacking,
agnosticism
about
remains
widespread.
To
end,
address
how
balance
such
doubts
protection,
discussing
raised
by
skeptics
Overall,
celebrate
rigorous
evidential
standards
required
unconvinced
sentient;
laud
compassion
ethical
rigor
shown
advocating
protections;
seek
precautionary
principles
support
protecting
physical
harm.
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
unknown
Published: July 19, 2024
Abstract
Can
octopuses
feel
pain
and
pleasure?
What
about
crabs,
shrimps,
insects,
or
spiders?
How
do
we
tell
whether
a
person
unresponsive
after
severe
brain
injury
might
be
suffering?
When
does
fetus
in
the
womb
start
to
have
conscious
experiences?
Could
there
even
rudimentary
feelings
miniature
models
of
human
brain,
grown
from
stem
cells?
And
what
AI?
These
are
questions
edge
sentience,
they
subject
enormous,
disorienting
uncertainty.
The
stakes
immense,
neglecting
risks
can
terrible
costs.
We
need
err
on
side
caution,
yet
it’s
often
far
clear
‘erring
caution’
should
mean
practice.
going
too
far?
not
doing
enough?
Edge
Sentience
presents
comprehensive
precautionary
framework
designed
help
us
reach
ethically
sound,
evidence-based
decisions
despite
our
Mind & Language,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
39(3), P. 415 - 433
Published: Jan. 4, 2024
The
marker
approach
is
taken
as
best
practice
for
answering
the
distribution
question
:
Which
animals
are
conscious?
However,
methodology
can
be
used
to
increase
confidence
in
many
presume
unconscious,
including
C.
elegans
,
leading
a
trilemma:
accept
worms
conscious;
reject
specific
markers;
or
question.
I
defend
third
option
and
argue
that
requires
secure
theory
of
consciousness.
Accepting
hypothesis
all
conscious
will
promote
research
theory,
which
needed
create
reliable
consciousness
tests
AIs.
Rather
than
asking
question,
we
should
shift
dimensions
How
Oxford University Press eBooks,
Journal Year:
2025,
Volume and Issue:
unknown, P. 173 - 196
Published: Jan. 26, 2025
Abstract
This
chapter
addresses
the
challenge
of
measuring
consciousness.
Consciousness
does
not
seem
to
fit
into
standard
scientific
picture
world.
As
such,
it
has
been
largely
ignored
across
and
scientifically
minded
fields.
begun
change
in
recent
years.
Using
consciousness
cephalopods
as
its
example,
this
“distribution
question,”
question
which
animals
are
conscious
first
place.
We
need
measures
that
can
identify
animals.
However,
candidate
theories
all
still
extremely
uncertain
contentious.
The
suggests
a
way
thinking
about
their
relation
theory
help
further
development
these
even
we
develop
attempt
learn
conscious.
Comparative
psychology,
the
multidisciplinary
study
of
animal
behavior
and
confronts
challenge
how
to
animals
we
find
cute
easy
anthropomorphize,
odd
objectify,
without
letting
these
biases
negatively
impact
science.
In
this
Element,
Kristin
Andrews
identifies
critically
examines
principles
comparative
psychology
shows
they
can
introduce
other
by
objectifying
subjects
encouraging
scientists
remain
detached.
outlines
scientific
benefits
treating
as
sentient
research
participants
who
come
from
their
own
social
contexts
with
whom
will
be
in
relationship.
With
discussions
science's
quest
for
objectivity,
worries
about
romantic
killjoy
theories,
debates
chimpanzee
cognition
between
primatologists
work
field
those
lab,
address
different
through
greater
integration
subdisciplines
psychology.
Current
knowledge
of
the
genetic,
epigenetic,
behavioural
and
symbolic
systems
inheritance
requires
a
revision
extension
mid-twentieth-century,
gene-based,
'Modern
Synthesis'
version
Darwinian
evolutionary
theory.
We
present
case
for
this
by
first
outlining
history
that
led
to
neo-Darwinian
view
evolution.
In
second
section
we
describe
compare
different
types
inheritance,
in
third
discuss
implications
broad
heredity
various
aspects
end
with
an
examination
philosophical
conceptual
ramifications
thinking
incorporates
multiple
systems.