Oxford University Press eBooks,
Journal Year:
2024,
Volume and Issue:
unknown, P. 99 - 162
Published: Oct. 21, 2024
Abstract
This
chapter
takes
up
the
question,
‘Why
does
it
matter
which
way
we
negotiate
BED
framework
(therein
pathologizing
distressing
emotions
or
otherwise)?’
Here,
I
consider
two
very
different
conceptions
of
flourishing:
on
one
conception
(which
call
‘health-based
flourishing’
(HF)),
doesn’t
make
much
a
difference
either
way.
However,
an
altogether
flourishing
(termed
‘excellence-based
(EF)),
argue
that
makes
all
framework.
What
EF
helps
us
to
recover
is
distinctly
agential
dimension
in
human
experience
emotions—a
obscured
by
pathologization
emotions,
and
HF
more
broadly.
This
Element
discusses
contemporary
theories
of
embodied
cognition,
including
what
has
been
termed
the
'4Es'
(embodied,
embedded,
extended
and
enactive
cognition).
It
examines
diverse
approaches
to
questions
about
nature
mind,
mind's
relation
brain,
perceptual
experience,
mental
representation,
sense
making,
role
environment,
social
it
considers
strengths
weaknesses
in
question.
contrasts
views
with
classic
cognitivism,
major
criticisms
their
possible
resolutions.
element
also
provides
a
strong
focus
on
theory
prospects
for
integrating
other
theories,
mediated
through
recent
developments
predictive
processing
free
energy
principle.
concludes
brief
discussion
practical
applications
cognition.
title
is
available
as
Open
Access
Cambridge
Core.
The
Computational
Theory
of
Mind
says
that
the
mind
is
a
computing
system.
It
has
long
history
going
back
to
idea
thought
kind
computation.
Its
modern
incarnation
relies
on
analogies
with
contemporary
technology
and
use
computational
models.
comes
in
many
versions,
some
more
plausible
than
others.
This
Element
supports
theory
primarily
by
its
contribution
solving
mind-body
problem,
ability
explain
mental
phenomena,
success
modelling
artificial
intelligence.
To
be
turned
into
an
adequate
theory,
it
needs
made
compatible
tractability
cognition,
situatedness
dynamical
aspects
mind,
way
brain
works,
intentionality,
consciousness.
Animal
minds
are
complex
and
diverse,
making
them
difficult
to
study.
This
Element
focuses
on
a
question
that
has
received
much
attention
in
the
field
of
comparative
cognition:
'Do
animals
reason
about
unobservable
variables
like
force
mental
states?'
The
shows
how
researchers
design
studies
gather
evidence
address
this
question.
Despite
many
virtues
current
methods,
hypotheses
cognition
often
underdetermined
by
empirical
evidence.
Given
this,
philosophers
scientists
have
recently
called
for
additional
behavioral
constraints
theorizing
field.
endorses
proposal
(known
as
'signature
testing'),
while
also
arguing
animal
would
benefit
from
drawing
more
heavily
neuroscience
biology.
This
Element
explores
the
nature
of
both
imagination
and
creative
thinking
in
an
effort
to
understand
relation
between
them
also
their
role
vast
array
activities
which
they
are
typically
implicated,
from
art,
music,
literature
technology,
medicine,
science.
Focusing
on
contemporary
philosophical
literature,
it
will
take
up
several
interrelated
questions:
What
is
imagination,
how
does
fit
into
cognitive
architecture
mind?
creativity?
Is
required
for
creativity
imagination?
a
person
simply
born
either
imaginative
or
not
(and
likewise,
not),
skills
that
can
be
cultivated?
And
finally,
uniquely
human
capacities,
had
by
nonbiological
entities
such
as
AI
systems?
Neurolaw
is
an
area
of
interdisciplinary
research
on
the
meaning
and
implications
neuroscience
for
law
legal
practices.
This
Element
addresses
potential
contributions
neuroscience,
brain
sciences
more
generally,
to
criminal
justice
decision-making
policy.
It
distinguishes
between
three
different
areas
domains
investigation
in
neurolaw:
assessment,
intervention,
revision.
The
first
concerns
brain-based
assessments,
which
may
be
used
predicting
future
violence,
lie
detection,
judging
insanity,
like.
second
treatments
other
interventions
that
aim
at
rehabilitating
criminals
and/or
preventing
crime
before
it
occurs.
third
investigates
ways
impact
by
changing
or
revising
commonsense
views
about
human
nature
causes
action.
This
Element
surveys
research
on
three
central
and
interrelated
issues
about
the
nature
of
memory
remembering.
The
first
is
as
a
cognitive
faculty.
part
discusses
different
strategies
to
distinguish
from
other
faculties
well
proposed
taxonomies
differentiate
distinct
kinds
memory.
second
issue
concerns
what
does,
which
traditionally
thought
have
simple
answer:
As
it
turns
out,
philosophers
not
only
disagree
how
characterize
remembering
but
also
whether
function
indeed
remember.
Finally,
third
we
remember-a
question
that
may
refer
object
our
memories
their
content,
with
views
disagreeing
relationship
between
two.
This
Element
provides
a
comprehensive
introduction
to
contemporary
theories
of
mental
content.
After
clarifying
central
concepts
and
identifying
the
questions
that
dominate
current
debate,
it
presents
discusses
principal
accounts
nature
content
(or
representation),
which
include
causal,
informational,
teleological
structuralist
approaches,
alongside
phenomenal
intentionality
approach
intentional
stance
theory.
Additionally,
examines
anti-representationalist
question
either
existence
or
explanatory
relevance
Finally,
concludes
by
considering
some
recent
developments
in
debate
about
content,
specifically
“explanatory
turn”
its
implications
for
representations
basic
cognitive
systems
representational
character
empirical
cognition.
Most
accounts
of
bodily
self-awareness
focus
on
its
sensory
and
agentive
dimensions,
tracking
the
origins
our
special
relationship
with
own
body
in
way
we
gain
information
about
it
act
it.
However,
they
often
neglect
a
fundamental
dimension
subjective
life,
namely,
affective
dimension.
This
Element
will
discuss
through
filter
significance.
It
is
organized
around
four
core
themes:
(i)
between
awareness
action
instrumental
protective
contexts,
(ii)
motivational
role
pain
interoception,
(iii)
sense
ownership
relation
to
value
for
survival,
(iv)
anchoring
peripersonal
egocentric
awareness.
title
also
available
as
Open
Access
Cambridge
Core.
The
very
idea
of
mental
illness
is
contested.
Given
its
differences
from
physical
illnesses,
it
right
to
count
it,
and
particular
as
genuinely
medical
opposed
moral
matters?
One
debate
concerns
value-ladenness,
which
has
been
used
by
anti-psychiatrists
argue
that
does
not
exist.
Recent
attempts
define
divide
both
on
the
presence
values
their
consequences.
Philosophers
psychiatrists
have
explored
nature
general
kinds
illnesses
might
comprise,
influenced
psychiatric
taxonomies
such
Diagnostic
Statistical
Manual
International
Classification
Diseases,
rise
a
rival
biological
'meta-taxonomy':
Research
Domain
Criteria
(RDoC).
assumption
concept
culturally
invariant
core
also
questioned.
This
Element
serves
guide
these
contested
debates.