Factors Influencing Member Satisfaction With Cooperation in an Agro-Industrialized Union DOI Open Access
Hanyue Li, Runqing Zhang

Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, Journal Year: 2023, Volume and Issue: 35(1), P. 1 - 18

Published: June 9, 2023

As a new form of agricultural organization, agro-industrialized unions (AIUs) have shown strong effectiveness. Based on data from Hebei Province in China, the triple-hurdle model was used to analyze impact governance structure and perceived interests satisfaction three stages. The main findings are: (1) Satisfaction with AIU affected by interests. former significantly impacted final satisfaction, whereas latter had positive effects all (2) Among interest factors, operating ability, sharing, risk defense influenced attitude whether performance improved. (3) Attitude toward perceptions ability benefit overall benefit-sharing risk-defense ability. Policy recommendations were suggested strengthen close bonds among members at last.

Language: Английский

The Government Subsidy Policies for Organic Agriculture Based on Evolutionary Game Theory DOI Open Access
Xingyi Yang,

Xiaopei Dai,

Yijing Zhang

et al.

Sustainability, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 16(6), P. 2246 - 2246

Published: March 7, 2024

Organic agriculture is a sustainable form of farming that can protect the environment. However, high production costs organic deter farmers from switching to farming. To support development agriculture, many governments offer subsidies or retailers. We develop an evolutionary game model investigate effect government on and conditions under which should subsidize find subsidizing retailers promote agricultural development. Government lower requirement for social responsibility premium offer. Furthermore, if consumer’s sufficiently low, government’s best choice If medium, farmers. Finally, higher motivate more produce products when subsidizes Conversely, farmers, it conducive reducing burden purchase products.

Language: Английский

Citations

5
The quadripartite evolutionary game of farmland transfer in rural China: a simulation approach DOI
Haolong Liu, Zhao Li, Xiangjiao Shi

et al.

Environment Development and Sustainability, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: Jan. 17, 2025

Language: Английский

Citations

0
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Quality of Agricultural Products in Supply Chain DOI Creative Commons
Feixiao Wang, Yaoqun Xu

Agriculture, Journal Year: 2022, Volume and Issue: 12(10), P. 1575 - 1575

Published: Sept. 29, 2022

There are many factors affecting the quality and safety of agricultural products in supply chain products. In order to ensure products, suppliers processors need take their own measures Quality inspection departments strictly supervise implementation by both parties. Within chain, decisions these three stakeholders affected initial intention, cost measures, penalty amount department. Outside they government regulation consumer feedback. This paper takes product as object, brings suppliers, processors, into evolutionary game model, that affect decision-making model parameters analyze stability different situations, then analyzes through mathematical simulation according specific examples. The results show enthusiasm is most intention each other measures. At same time, punishment department, feedback consumers, supervision also play a good role promoting quality.

Language: Английский

Citations

19
Impact of the degree of agricultural green production technology adoption on income: evidence from Sichuan citrus growers DOI Creative Commons
Yuying Liu,

R. Chen,

Yufan Chen

et al.

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 11(1)

Published: Sept. 7, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

4
Evolutionary Game of Pesticide Reduction Management for Sustainable Agriculture: An Analysis Based on Local Governments, Farmers, and Consumers DOI Open Access

Qizheng He,

Yong Sun,

Maoan Yi

et al.

Sustainability, Journal Year: 2023, Volume and Issue: 15(12), P. 9173 - 9173

Published: June 6, 2023

Promoting pesticide reduction is a critical component of achieving sustainable agriculture. However, the challenges involved in coordinating diverse stakeholder demands pose difficulties promoting behavior. To reveal evolutionary paths decision-making processes each player under various influencing factors and optimize policies, this paper proposes three-way game model that considers interests local governments, farmers, consumers. The study reveals six stable equilibrium strategies system for agriculture (SA). Under polycentric governance, ideal states allow governments to regulate farmers’ consumers’ purchases green agricultural products. Regulatory measures such as providing technical in-kind subsidies reduction, imposing penalties overuse pesticides, public awareness influence decisions when it comes reducing pesticides purchasing produce. Moreover, total benefits farmers utility produce consumption consumers are primary system’s eventual evolution toward different strategies. These primarily affect supply demand products, which turn impacts reduction. This enhances policy analysis provides valuable insights into constructing based on governance.

Language: Английский

Citations

8
How to promote agricultural enterprises to reduce the use of pesticides and fertilizers? An evolutionary game approach DOI Creative Commons

Qizheng He,

Yong Sun,

Maoan Yi

et al.

Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, Journal Year: 2023, Volume and Issue: 7

Published: Oct. 27, 2023

With increasing awareness of environmental protection, food safety has become an increasingly important concern for people. The excessive use pesticides and fertilizers by agricultural enterprises poses a threat to safety. However, effective promotion their reduction faces many difficulties. To analyze how promote the pesticide fertilizer path decision-making evolution different stakeholders under changes influencing factors, this paper considers interests government, consumers, constructs evolutionary game model between government enterprises. study found that: (1) governance reducing can achieve four stable strategies, among which ideal state from multi-centre perspective is choosing regulatory strategy strategy. (2) reward measures taken have more significant impact on both parties, in actual process, should be used cautiously, mechanisms strengthened. (3) green preferences consumers are key exogenous variable that significantly affects decisions government. This improves policy analysis Chinese context provides innovative ideas building system reduce fertilizers. research conclusions provide guidance promoting

Language: Английский

Citations

8
How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies? DOI Creative Commons
Yalin Wang,

Liping Qi,

Shaoshuo Cai

et al.

Frontiers in Public Health, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 11

Published: Jan. 8, 2024

To effectively address the mental health risks associated with public emergencies, it is crucial to actively manage rumors. This study explores dynamic evolutionary process of rumor diffusion and its collaborative governance in emergencies. A game-theoretic model constructed, involving three main actors: regulators, parties involved emergencies (PIPHE), whistle-blowers. The behaviors game outcomes each party are analyzed, effectiveness feasibility validated through numerical simulations. findings this reveal that various factors, such as regulatory costs, penalty income, reputation damage for regulators; image loss, enhancement, expenditure PIPHE; time social responsibility, reward income whistle-blowers, all influence behavioral choices equilibrium party. Optimization strategies proposed study, including enhancing sense responsibility capability among increasing transparency credibility PIPHE, encouraging protecting participation provides a comprehensive analytical framework contributing improving maintaining online orders sustainability.

Language: Английский

Citations

2
Analysis of the Club Convergence and Driving Factors of China’s Green Agricultural Development Levels DOI Creative Commons
Silin Chen, Xiangyu Guo

Agriculture, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 14(4), P. 553 - 553

Published: March 31, 2024

Green agricultural development opens up a feasible way for China to construct sustainable communities and promote rural revitalization strategies. However, clear gap on the subject sets apart various regions in China, resulting off-balance development. This paper, based panel data from 31 provinces (municipalities autonomous regions) 2013 2020, established an evaluation index system China’s green levels, measured different regions, applied log(t) model, Ordered Probit Logit model identify convergence trends causes of level club convergence, respectively. Our research found following: (1) The levels are rise, regional gaps still significant. output products is focus promoting (2) have converged four clubs. gradually forming pattern with main production areas as core. (3) at environmental regulation first narrows, then expands, narrows. intensity most stage. indicates that should continue maintain current converge towards high-level In addition, GDP, grain area, fiscal support agriculture, human capital can narrow between regions.

Language: Английский

Citations

2
Hyper-industrialization of China’s Agricultural Sector: Effects of Administration, Logistics, and Trade Integration DOI

Tamar Papiashvili,

Jie Shang, Ali Raza

et al.

Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: unknown

Published: April 27, 2024

Language: Английский

Citations

1
Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Healthcare Fraud Supervision under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism DOI Open Access

Change Zhu,

Lülin Zhou, Xinjie Zhang

et al.

Healthcare, Journal Year: 2023, Volume and Issue: 11(13), P. 1972 - 1972

Published: July 7, 2023

This study aims to provide useful insights for the Chinese government in dealing with healthcare fraud by creating an evolutionary game model that involves hospitals, third-party entities, and based on reward punishment mechanism. paper analyzes stability of each participant's strategy choice, discusses influence element tripartite further equilibrium point system. The results show (1) increasing fines hospitals is conducive compliant hospital operations, incentive mechanism has little effect such operations; (2) lack third parties false investigations parties; (3) rewards from higher levels promote strict supervision local governments, but high cost inhibits probability supervision. Finally, Matlab 2020a used simulation analysis a reference improve fraud.

Language: Английский

Citations

2