Emerging infectious diseases, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 31(1)
Published: Dec. 11, 2024
We show that human myxovirus resistance protein 1 (MxA) suppresses replication of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses isolated from mammals in vitro and MxA-transgenic mice. However, H5N1 can evade MxA restriction through replacement individual viral polymerase complex components a human-adapted MxA-resistant strain vitro.
Language: Английский
New England Journal of Medicine, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 390(21), P. 2028 - 2029
Published: May 3, 2024
Language: Английский
Citations
146
EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 22(7)
Published: July 1, 2024
Abstract Between 16 March and 14 June 2024, 42 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (15) wild (27) birds across 13 countries Europe. Although the overall number of Europe has not been this low since 2019–2020 epidemiological year, HPAI viruses continue to circulate at a very level. Most poultry due indirect contact with birds, but there was also secondary spread. Outside Europe, situation intensified particularly USA, where new A(H5N1) genotype (B3.13) identified >130 dairy herds 12 states. Infection cattle appears be centred on udder, milk from infected animals showing high viral loads representing vehicle transmission. Apart cattle, two other mammal species (alpaca walrus) for first time. 20 human cases infection Vietnam (one A(H5N1), one A(H9N2)), Australia (with travel history India, A(H5N1)), USA (three China (two A(H5N6), three A(H9N2), A(H10N3)), India Mexico fatal A(H5N2) case). The latter case laboratory‐confirmed subtype A(H5N2). had exposure poultry, live markets, or prior detection onset illness. Human infections remain rare no human‐to‐human transmission observed. risk currently circulating clade 2.3.4.4b remains general public EU/EEA. low‐to‐moderate those occupationally otherwise exposed contaminated environments.
Language: Английский
Citations
21
EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 22(10)
Published: Oct. 1, 2024
Between 15 June and 20 September 2024, 75 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) A(H7) virus detections were reported in domestic (16) wild (59) birds across 11 countries Europe. Although the overall number of Europe continued to be low compared previous epidemiological years, an increase cases along Atlantic, North Sea Baltic coasts was notable, particularly detection HPAI viruses colony-breeding seabirds. Besides EA-2022-BB other circulating genotypes, these also included EA-2023-DT, a new genotype that may transmit more efficiently among gulls. In Germany, A(H7N5) emerged poultry establishment near border with Netherlands. No mammals during this period, but reportedly affected dairy cattle establishments United States America (USA) rose >230 14 states, identified three mammal species. 21 19 human infection from USA (six A(H5N1) five cases), Cambodia (five cases, including one fatal), China (one fatal A(H5N6) case A(H9N2) case), Ghana case). Most (90%, n = 17/19) had exposure poultry, live markets, or prior onset illness. Human infections remain rare no evidence human-to-human transmission has been documented reporting period. The risk currently clade 2.3.4.4b remains for general public European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA). low-to-moderate those occupationally otherwise exposed infected animals contaminated environments.
Language: Английский
Citations
21
EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 23(1)
Published: Jan. 1, 2025
Abstract Between 21 September and 6 December 2024, 657 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) A(H5N5) virus detections were reported in domestic (341) wild (316) birds across 27 countries Europe. Many HPAI outbreaks clustered areas with high poultry density characterised by secondary farm‐to‐farm spread. Waterfowl, particularly the mute swan, primarily affected during this reporting period, focused on south‐eastern Notably, viruses expanded their geographic host range, resulting a surge mortality events described gulls crows. No new mammals Europe but number of dairy cattle farms reportedly United States America (USA) rose to >800 16 States, was identified two pigs mixed‐species farm. 11 56 human cases infection from North (45 cases), Viet Nam (one A(H5)) China (ten A(H9N2) cases). Most A(H5) (95.6%, n = 43/45) had exposure poultry, live markets, or prior detection onset illness. Human infections remain rare no evidence human‐to‐human transmission has been documented period. The risk currently circulating clade 2.3.4.4b remains low for general public European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA). low‐to‐moderate those occupationally otherwise exposed infected animals contaminated environments.
Language: Английский
Citations
5
EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 23(1)
Published: Jan. 1, 2025
A risk assessment framework was developed to evaluate the zoonotic potential of avian influenza (AI), focusing on virus mutations linked phenotypic traits related mammalian adaptation identified in literature. Virus sequences were screened for presence these and their geographical, temporal subtype-specific trends. Spillover events mammals (including humans) human seroprevalence studies also reviewed. Thirty-four associated with five (increased receptor specificity, haemagglutinin stability, neuraminidase enhanced polymerase activity evasion innate immunity) shortlisted. AI viruses (AIVs) carrying multiple adaptive belonged both low highly pathogenic subtypes, mainly A(H9N2), A(H7N9), A(H5N6) A(H3N8), sporadic primarily detected Asia. In EU/EEA, H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b, which have increased opportunities evolution due widespread circulation birds occasional cases/outbreaks mammals, acquired highest number traits. Adaptive traits, such as immune evasion, frequently acquired, while receptor-specific remained rare. Globally, cases remain rare, majority overall A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) A(H9N2) that are among subtypes tend a higher The main drivers include host characteristics, external factors increasing AIV exposure humans wild domestic (e.g. activities ecological factors). Comprehensive surveillance AIVs targeting whole genome sequencing animals is essential early detection efficient implementation control measures. All preparedness, preventive measures must be implemented under One Health tailored setting epidemiological situation; particular, monitoring, biosecurity, genomic global collaboration critical mitigating risks AIV.
Language: Английский
Citations
2
EFSA Journal, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: 23(1)
Published: Jan. 1, 2025
When investigating and controlling outbreaks caused by zoonotic avian influenza viruses (AIV), a One Health approach is key. However, knowledge-sharing on AIV-specific strategies, tools action plans remains limited across the EU/EEA. It crucial to establish responsibilities, capacity requirements, collaboration mechanisms during 'peace time' enable timely effective outbreak investigations management. This report focuses five scenarios for investigation management of AIV at human-animal-environment interface, emphasising key actions stakeholders involved. The document primarily highlights collaborative framework necessary interdisciplinary coordinated responses, referring more detailed guidance technical reports published elsewhere when applicable. Three are triggered suspected in animals, including kept animals listed species, non-listed companion wild birds/mammals. other two initiated probable human case or detection virus wastewater environmental samples (e.g. surface water sources). All require cross-sectoral coordination approach. While specific sequence communication needs may differ scenarios, overarching response remain consistent. By presenting each scenario alongside integrated stakeholders, identifies critical development needs, such as data sharing platforms); points information exchange sectors, triggers joint risk assessments, gaps existing knowledge. should assist developing documents facilitate humans viruses.
Language: Английский
Citations
2
npj Viruses, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 2(1)
Published: May 29, 2024
The H5 subtype of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses represents a significant challenge to animal and human health. clade 2.3.4.4b have experienced an unprecedented global spread, coupled with remarkable genetic plasticity for adaptation in birds mammals. Although infections remain very limited, the establishment wild, marine, farmed animals, including recently dairy cattle, is concern. role mammalian hosts as intermediaries zoonotic or even pandemic A should not be underestimated. In order mitigate risk adequately prepared, it essential understand monitor dynamics HPAIV at avian-mammal interface.
Language: Английский
Citations
9
The Lancet, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 403(10443), P. 2461 - 2465
Published: May 9, 2024
Language: Английский
Citations
7
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, Journal Year: 2024, Volume and Issue: 145, P. 107062 - 107062
Published: April 16, 2024
epidemics, avian influenza, H5N1, highly pathogenic HPAI In 1996, influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus was first isolated from a domestic goose in Guangdong province, China.[1] Since then, it has been identified other poultries and wild birds with spillover into humans over 60 countries, including United States of America (US), Kingdom Canada. May 1997, the human case infection an outbreak total 18 cases 6 deaths Hong Kong were documented.[2] The high mortality rate very concerning attracted significant media attention disease dubbed "bird flu". Five years later, two history travel to southern China reported February 2003 Kong.[3] First 2005 China,[4] continued spread Asia (Southeast West) subsequently Africa.[5] global incidence remained at low level, public health authorities' diverted emerging re-emerging zoonoses such as Ebola, Lassa fever West Africa, MERS Saudi Arabia, variant swine 'pig' A(H3N2) US, novel A(H7N9) China, A(H5) subtypes Asia, Europe North America. From January 1, April 2024, 889 463 (CFR, 52%) 23 countries worldwide.[6] While currently does not transmit easily human, its ability cause severe illness, rate, potential mutate more contagious variants, ongoing circulation poultry well continuing reports is concern for pandemic critical preparedness. current Eurasian origin A(H5N1), clade 2.3.4.4b began 2020 proven unique infect many mammalian species. Outbreaks mammals have attributed their close proximity reservoirs or consumption infected prey scavenging most outbreaks free-ranging wildlife small, some those seals sea lions devastated local populations.[7-9] 2022, US Colorado, person who involved culling presumptive infection.[10] March detected dairy cows 16 herds six different states US. On 2024 Texas authorities CDC, country's second had exposure presumed be virus.[6] This report cow-to-human flu" created widespread coverage fear impending epidemic. reassured that safety risk cattle, meat, pasteurized milk low, concerns about impacts on prices livelihoods farmers however arisen. Nevertheless, CDC issued recommendations avoid raw undercooked food related uncooked products, unpasteurized (raw) cheese, animals suspected confirmed virus. Genetic sequencing shown only minor mutations cases.[11] According WHO seems acquired may facilitate transmission among estimated considered general population, moderate occupationally exposed persons.[6] brings forth several important issues question whether this signals making? Foremost, how cow occurred? Infected show symptoms decreased lactation, anorexia, lethargy, dehydration, raising increased H5N1 viruses becoming better adapted enhanced spilling livestock.[12] It suggested might spreading through air.[13] thought via use contaminated milking equipment between uninfected cows.[14] How causes respiratory tract ends up udders, detectable milk, organs are elucidate. No beef cattle yet, but could due sub-clinical mild lack active surveillance. Another prevent further farms. Taking reference experiences controlling associated poultry, strategies include entire herd, while vaccination another option. Improving farm biosecurity establishing surveillance programs will critical, steps protect personnel culling, by antiviral prophylaxis. previously led hundreds millions around globe past contained manner. However largely carried migrating continues new regions hosts cats, tigers, seals, dolphins, goats polar bears, constantly mutating hence possibly increasing humans.[15-16] Also, there number mink Spain autumn 2022 [17] 2023 multiple fur farms Finland.[18] So far, limited occurred after contacts latest followed mammal; importantly, little human-to-human observed. European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) warned large-scale if becomes transmissible people given population no immunity against herd absent.[19] As infection, would require shift preferred receptor cell surface sialic acid alpha 2,3 found deep lungs 2,6 upper tract.[20] However, patient presented conjunctivitis symptom, mucosal occurred. possible, however, cases, sub-clinical, undetected investigation needed, serology studies humans. A pertinent vaccines based circulating should developed stockpiled, also workers vaccinated using vaccine stockpile? Currently stockpile targeting early strains available, specific birds,[21] need since threat ever present. For exists. possible develop modifying ones which already used. hand, used successes.[22] Concerns international trade restrictions adoption industry countries. Vaccinating potentially concerning, possibility silent infections breakthrough leading resistance.[23] strategy recently endorsed compatible pursuit safe World Assembly Organization Animal Health (WOAH) national delegates.[24] Current prevention control rely reactive surveillance, notifications, isolating places captivity, contact. policy effective missed heralded dead cats farm.[13] mechanisms taken account influences climate environment change drivers zoonotic diseases outbreaks. At time lot uncertainties. Scaling production variants imperative, primarily high-risk individuals stockpiling, secondly increase preparedness evolve sustained transmission. Culling so far resulted (enzootic) A(H5N1); perhaps towards instead, needs considered. Limiting comprehensive 'One Health' measures mitigate adaptation bird humans,[19][25] embracing concept shared risks benefits. Extrinsic activities, farming practices natural resources, climatic environmental factors. They addressed urgently enhancing ensuring access rapid diagnostics. Can diagnostic tests manufactured quickly distributed all animal husbandry? Effective engagement veterinarian virologists, epidemiologists professionals expertise important, strengthen programs, reduction contact animals, especially More proactive put place alongside detection programs. scale enormous, concern.[26] recent incident wake-up call action. 2020, caused 50 million worldwide, Middle East contracting poultry. dying Peru indicate adapting mammal-to-mammal problem even changes, migration affected drought, rising temperatures, levels.[27] leap become pathogen lead must monitored carefully. Given evolving epidemiology virus, obvious urgent apply notion 'shared benefit' approach, grounded One Health,[24] achieving control. Striking right balance existing essence. Based inter-species protection attained mass hesitancy, real test quadripartite organizations – FAO (Food Agriculture Organization), UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), WOAH. 1.Chen H L. China. Sci Ser C-Life 2009;52(5):419-427. 10.1007/s11427-009-0068-62.Katz JM, Lim W, Bridges CB, Rowe T, Hu-Primmer J, Lu X, et al. Antibody response (H5N1) anti-H5 antibody household social contacts. J Infect Dis 1999;180(6):1763-70. 10.1086/315137WHO3.Guan Y, Poon LL, Cheung CY, Ellis TM, Lipatov AS, influenza: protean threat. Proc Natl Acad U S 2004;101(21):8156-61. 10.1073/pnas.0402443101.4.Yu H, Shu Hu S, Zhang Gao Z, Chen Mainland Lancet 2006;367(9504):84. 10.1016/S0140-6736(05)67894-4.5.Lai Qin Cowling BJ, Ren Wardrop NA, Gilbert M, Tsang TK, Global humans, 1997-2015: systematic review individual data. 2016;16(7):e108-e118. 10.1016/S1473-3099(16)00153-5.6.World Organization. Disease Outbreak News. Avian 9 2024. Geveva:WHO, https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON5127.Ulloa Fernández A, Ariyama N, Colom-Rivero Rivera C, Nuñez P, Mass event South American (Otaria flavescens) correlated Chile. Vet Q 2023;43(1):1-10. 10.1080/01652176.2023.22651738.Plaza PI, Gamarra-Toledo V, Rodríguez Euguí Rosciano Lambertucci SA. Pacific Atlantic lion Influenza Travel Med 2024;59:102712. 10.1016/j.tmaid.2024.1027129.Puryear Sawatzki K, Hill Foss Stone JJ, Doughty L, Highly New England States. Emerg 2023;29(4):786-791. 10.3201/eid2904.22153810.Centers Control Prevention. Press release: U.S. 1 Atlana:CDC,2024. https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2024/p0401-avian-flu.html11.Centers Technical Update: Summary analysis genetic sequences Texas. Atlanta:CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/spotlights/2023-2024/h5n1-analysis-texas.htm12.World Health. High pathogenicity cattle. 5 Paris:WOAH, https://www.woah.org/en/high-pathogenicity-avian-influenza-in-cattle/13.Kozlov Mallapaty S. Bird flu cows: why scientists concerned. Nature 2024; https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-01036-114.Cohen J. transport. Science 24 https://www.science.org/content/article/bird-flu-may-be-spreading-cows-milking-and-herd-transport15.Jang SG, Kim YI, Casel MAB, Choi JH, Gil JR, Rollon R, HA N193D substitution alters binding affinity enhances virulence hosts. Microbes 2024;13(1):2302854. 10.1080/22221751.2024.2302854.16.Huang Sun Li Wu Q, Rezaei Jiang Potential cross-species H5 subtype (HPAI H5) calls development H5-specific universal vaccines. Cell Discov 2023;9(1):58. 10.1038/s41421-023-00571-x.17.Agüero Monne I, Sánchez Zecchin B, Fusaro Ruano MJ, farmed minks, Spain, October 2022. Euro Surveill 2023;28(3):2300001. 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2023.28.3.2300001.18.Lindh E, Lounela Ikonen Kantala Savolainen-Kopra Kauppinen Central Ostrobothnia Finland, July 2023. 2023;28(31):2300400. 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2023.28.31.2300400.19.European Authority (EFSA); Centre Prevention (ECDC); Adlhoch Alm Enkirch Lamb F, Melidou Willgert Marangon Stegeman JA, Delacourt Baldinelli Broglia A. Drivers options mitigation measures. EFSA 2024;22(4):e8735. 10.2903/j.efsa.2024.873520.Nicholls Chan RW, Russell RJ, Air GM, Peiris JS. Evolving complexities receptors. Trends Microbiol 2008 Apr;16(4):149-57. 10.1016/j.tim.2008.01.008.21.European (EFSA). Vaccination Available (10 2023). EU:EFSA, https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/vaccination-poultry-against-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-available-vaccines-and22.Swayne DE, Spackman Pantin-Jackwood M. Success factors impact bird-agricultural interface. Ecohealth 2014;11(1):94-108. 10.1007/s10393-013-0861-3.23.Islam Munro Hassan MM, Epstein Klaassen role Bangladesh. 2023;17:100655. 10.1016/j.onehlt.2023.10065524.Capps Lederman Z. Health, Vaccines Ebola: opportunities Agric Environ Ethics 2015;28(6):1011-1032. 10.1007/s10806-015-9574-7.25.Franklin SI. fight influenza? Planet Jun;7(6):e442-e443. 10.1016/S2542-5196(23)00086-4. PMID: 37286240.26.Venkatesan P. mammals. Microbe 2023;4(7):e492. 10.1016/S2666-5247(23)00173-8.27.Wille Atkinson Barr IG, Burgoyne Bond AL, Boyle D, Long-distance migrants fail bring Australia year row. Other Respir Viruses 2024;18(4):e13281. 10.1111/irv.13281. authors declare conflict interest. Eskild Petersen Lone Simonsen acknowledge financial support PandemiX Center, Danish National Research Foundation (grant No. DNRF170). Professor Sir Ali Zumla acknowledges Pan-African Network Rapid Response, Preparedness Emerging Re-Emerging Infections (PANDORA-ID-NET) funded EU-EDCTP2 - EU Horizon Framework Programme. He receipt UK NIHR Senior Investigator Award. Mahathir Award EU-EDCTP Pascoal Mocumbi Prize Laureate.
Language: Английский
Citations
4
Bioinformatics Advances, Journal Year: 2025, Volume and Issue: unknown
Published: Feb. 5, 2025
Ecological systems are complex. Representing heterogeneous knowledge about ecological is a pervasive challenge because data generated from many subdisciplines, exist in disparate sources, and only capture subset of interactions underpinning system dynamics. Knowledge graphs (KGs) have been successfully applied to organize predict new linkages complex systems. Though not previously broadly ecology, KGs much offer an era when dynamics responding rapid changes across multiple scales. We developed KG demonstrate the method's utility for problems focused on highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), transmissible virus with broad host range, wide geographic distribution, evolution pandemic potential. describe development graph include related HPAI including pathogen-host associations, species distributions, population demographics, using semantic ontology that defines relationships within between datasets. use perform set proof-of-concept analyses validating method identifying patterns ecology. underscore generalizable value ecology ability reveal known testable hypotheses support deeper mechanistic understanding The code available under MIT License GitHub at https://github.com/cghss-data-lab/uga-pipp.
Language: Английский
Citations
0